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ABSTRACT 
One of the most fundamental concerns of political philosophy is the question of what 
binds individuals to obey the laws of the state. For liberal democratic theorists, the 
answer can generally be found in the idea of consent, given either through citizen 
participation in political practices and other voluntary activities, and through the 
acceptance of certain benefits the state provides. Thus, political obligation is clearly 
linked to the notion of citizenship. 
In this thesis I propose to cast serious doubt on the above claim, through critical 
analysis of consent theory and through philosophical and empirical investigation of the 
distribution of burdens and benefits within liberal democratic society. This will be 
conducted within the contexts of both peace and war, thus assessing the extent of one's 
political obligation to obey the laws of the state and to kill or to die on its behalf. 
Hence,, attention will be focused upon the changing relationship between citizen and 
state in terms of reciprocal rights and duties, and the ways in which the mode of 
warfare has altered preconceived notions of citizenship and political obligation. 
My intention is to suggest that the justification of political obligation demands a far 
richer conception of the 'political' which in turn requires a reconstruction of the idea of 
'citizenship', and to this end I will set out to construct the kind of society which may 
give rise to the obligation of citizens to kill or to die in its defence. This will involve, 
among other things, formulating a theory of distributive justice and the specification of 
social policies necessary for the pursuit of a worthwhile life and a just peace. Thus, in 
contrast to the liberal democratic view, I will argue that only from the starting-point of 
a good society and a just peace, can we be said to owe a political obligation to obey its 
laws or engage in a just war. 
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How an individual, conceived as originally free from all bonds, comes to owe a 
political obligation, is perhaps the central question of liberal democratic theory. It is 
also a question which serves as a starting-point for my philosophical inquiry into the 
nature of the relationship between citizen and state, and their reciprocal obligations, in 
the context of war. My intention, in the opening chapter, is to challenge the standard 
liberal democratic answer to the above question which holds that citizens are bound to 
obey the laws of the state through the expression of consent. Consent theory attempts 
to give a voluntarist justification for political obligation by pursuing either of two 
strategies. The first embodies the idea of a social contract as an act of hypothetical 
consent by imaginary men and women sharing an understanding of what is rational, or 
negotiating with one another in the artificial conditions of a 'state of nature' or an 
'original position'. The other involves the redescription of certain acts and omissions 
as signs of tacit consent - for example, through voluntary activities (such as 'travelling 
the highway), through the acceptance of certain 'benefits' the state provides, and 
through participation in certain political practices (eg. voting). 
In order to address the limits of the liberal democratic notion of political obligation I 
will be posing a number of questions. If we assume that such an obligation exists (and 
this is yet to be proven) is it singular in character? Are all obligated persons bound in 
the same way or to the same degree? What about socially and economically 
disadvantaged citizens or those who have little input into the political process (in 
current jargon, the socially excluded and the disempowered)? These issues will be 
explored in the course of my discussion which will cast serious doubt on the validity of 
the liberal democratic claim. 
This leaves me with the question of what sort of society could bind citizens to a 
political obligation? Moreover, on what grounds may such a society legitimately 
demand what some would regard as the ultimate obligation - that is, the obligation of 
citizens to kill or to die on its behalP And given that such an obligation may exist, 
what are the implications for the future conduct of war? Could we argue, for example, 
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that a society which maintains just social arrangements or supports the good life, is an 
essential precondition for the conduct of a just war? What do we mean by ajust war'- 
what criteria need to be met for a war to be 'just'? Moreover, gaining the consent of the 
people to engage in war implies a form of exchange between state and citizen, which 
may in turn require the creation of a social system which guarantees physical well- 
being and autonomy, in the sense of freedom from certain hindrances which constrain 
moral action. In return citizens would offer their loyalty and commitment to defend 
such a society which has looked after them well, and be more willing to assist other 
vulnerable groups or societies in achieving or protecting social justice which may be 
under threat. Could we argue then, that a 'just war' can only be conducted from the 
starting-point of ajustpeace, in which allegiance is based on a willingness to defend a 
just society, rather than being merely coerced or legally obliged to do so? 
Through empirical investigation I will be assessing the extent to which liberal 
democratic society (with particular reference to Britain) has met the criteria set out 
above which may give rise to the political obligation to risk one's life in its defence. 
Political institutions and social policies will be examined in the contexts of both peace, 
war and the nuclear age, alongside an analysis of the changing conception of 
citizenship to which such institutions and policies are inextricably linked. Should 
citizenship be viewed in terms of a legal minimum of civil and political rights? Or 
should it be richer in conception, encompassing social rights such as welfare rights? 
However, the construction of a good society and the analysis of a just war go beyond 
an empirical approach - such tasks not only involve an examination of existing 
arrangements but also of what is possible in the future. This in turn raises fundamental 
issues of moral and political philosophy encompassing various ethical concepts, modes 
of argument and theoretical traditions which have preoccupied philosophers for 
centuries. But why pursue a philosophical approach at all? In the study of war, for 
example, it might be said either that philosophers should not ponder the ethics of topics 
better left to political and military experts, or if they insist upon considering such 
issues, they should accept that their conclusions will have little impact on the real 
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activities of individuals. So what relevance, if any, does a philosophy of war have in 
the real world? 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that most philosophers who have dealt with war 
in a theoretical manner have given arguments in its favour. For instance, according to 
one theory from human nature, war is justifiable because human beings possess 
aggressive war-like instincts. Another view can be traced back to Christian theorists 
such as Augustine and Aquinas who introduced the idea that wars fought in self- 
defence can be regarded as just. A further argument focuses on the sovereignty of the 
state - for example, Machiavelli and Hobbes saw war as basic to the state's existence, 
necessary to preserve sovereignty and avoid anarchy. However, recent and current 
theories favouring war neither assert its inevitability (in the sense of innate aggression) 
nor its glory but view it as a necessary means of upholding justice and preserving 
freedom. 
So why is it that philosophers have been so reluctant to adopt a critical stance towards 
the institution of war? In order to answer this question it is worth pondering briefly 
Plato and Aristotle's lack of profound reflection or critique on the established 
institution of slavery. It can be suggested that living in a society which viewed slaves 
as non-persons, (denied all legal rights and, by implication, moral rights) the slave 
system was accepted by these great thinkers as a matter of course. As Whitehead 
(1933) points out, slavery was "... presupposed in the very structure of society: and 
such necessity limits the scope of all generalities. " PJ 7) In the context of the modem 
world, it is possible, by replacing the institution of slavery with the institution of war, 
to understand how reliance on military strength to deal with enemies (both actual and 
fictitious) is as deeply rooted in Western culture today as slavery was in the classical 
period. In other words, we live in a world where our values, ideologies, language, 
conceptions of history and politics and philosophies are shaped by a system in which 
war is an integral part. Moreover, this reality promotes a common value; though it is 
sometimes unjust, war as an instrument for resolving conflicts is always just in some 
form. It is unjust when it is waged against us and it is just when we wage it against 
others. But as Ginsberg (1969) remarks: 
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"Since other people as well are convinced of the rightness of their 
waging war, the system of the world provides a bloody spectacle of 
righteous extermination. " (P. xix) 
And extermination is precisely what it could be, extermination of the human species. 
It has become abundantly clear, especially since the world entered the nuclear age 
(despite the fact that it partly de-commissions it) that our 'ingenuity' to devise a single 
weapons system has made possible the destruction of the planet. Both adults and 
children now recognise total annihilation as a contemporary possibility. Surely this 
horrific scenario constitutes one of the most important problems for human beings, and 
consequently, must be addressed by both decision-making structures within the 
international community and philosophers concerned with the ethics of war. Since 
war may be viewed as getting one's way at all costs, it violates all rational standards 
including the pursuit of inquiry. Consequently, it is my belief that philosophy, as the 
foundation of inquiry, has fundamental implications for our perceptions of war and its 
justification. This is all the more true if we consider the words of UNESCO's 
Constitution which state: 
"Since wars begin in the minds of men (sic), it is in the minds of men 
that the defences ofpeace must be constructed. " (Ibid) 
Thus, it follows that the interpretation and analysis provided by philosophy are 
essential ingredients in any serious attempt to change the minds of the inhabitants of a 
world of war. 
Finally, what of the view that to identify and urge a good society is to pursue goals that 
are hopelessly utopian, given the constraints imposed by the 'real' world. How far, in 
setting out an ideal picture of a good society that may be worth risking one's life for, is 
one falling into the trap of idealism, and forgetting that material conditions will 
determine both the future and the development of ideas about the future? In 
undertaking this task, am I succumbing to the urge of grasping "this sorry Scheme of 
Things entire .. shatter it to bits, and then remould 
it nearer to the Heart's Desire. " 
(quoted in Robinson 1962. p. xii), totally disregarding the human, political and 
socioeconomic conditions of the real world - past, present or future? My answer would 
4 
be no. I acknowledge that, as Marx put it, we make our own history (though not in 
circumstances of our own choosing); what shapes that history is our ideas and 
activities, themselves arising Out Of our past and present experience. By focusing on 
'ideas' rather than activities, my tools for constructing the good society are thus 
philosophical in emphasis rather than merely empirical implements, but this does not 
necessarily imply that my approach cannot be an 'objective' one. For example, if I am 
expressing a moral belief (as opposed to mere opinion) then it would seem that there is 
a moral truth to be discovered, that that truth is in principle objectively ascertainable, 
and that it is the task of reason to ascertain what kind of actions really are right or 
wrong. 
Acting upon any conception of the good society then, requires a detached concern with 
truth and understanding. However, such an approach need not be understood as a 
retreat into the academic ivory tower and away from the harsh realities of the world 
outside the university or research institute. In fact, one of the great merits of a 
philosophical approach is that it shows us what we ought to think of the claims that 
politicians and ordinary people make in the everyday world of public affairs and social 
policy, as well as the claims of philosophers and theorists. In turn, a philosophical 
approach to constructing the good society teaches and encourages critical reflection, 
rather than settling for the comforting (or discomforting) rhetoric so characteristic of 
empirical approaches. An uncritical empiricism precludes a theoretical approach to 
social issues. For example, in the area of social policy, there has been a tendency 
(particularly by writers within traditional social administration) to define out of the 
study of policy analysis the really important questions surrounding the distribution of 
power, thus focusing on what the government does rather than the situation of a 
particular form of society. Of course, we can learn a great deal by looking at social 
statistics or reading detailed histories (I have drawn upon such sources throughout this 
thesis), but questions which arise from the study of the social sciences cannot 
be 
settled by any simple appeal to accumulated evidence. There 
is also the matter of 
deepening our understanding of why social life is organised the way it is, and how and 
why it is changing, and how it ought to be organised and changed. 
The determinants 
of social life and the patterns of change within it, cannot be fully grasped simply 
by 
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gathering descriptive material of various kinds. We have actively to process what 
information we have, by approaching it through carefully defined categories of 
analysis and by relating it to more general bodies of theory. Thus, through a 
theoretical process of constructing an ideal, we are invited to exercise our minds over 
subjects of great importance to us all. 
However, I may still be 'accused' (and have been! ) of engaging in nothing more than a 
'parlour game' - no matter how 'good' or 'just' my ideal society may be, critics argue, 
we will never be capable of successfully engineering the triumph of the 'good' putting 
an end to all injustice. Yet even if I were to accept our relative powerlessness (which I 
do not), this can only serve to strengthen the validity of a philosophical construction of 
the good society. Through critical reflection we can at least know what is good and 
hope for and speak for the right things, and consequently avoid, or struggle for the 
eradication of, all things we believe to be wrong or unjust. Thus, implicit in these 
statements is that my good society, once constructed, should be viewed as the product 
of an ongoing philosophical line of inquiry, and is thus subject to this same process - 
that is, to be improved and updated subject to particular ideas and problems of 
particular times and places. From this perspective then, I would argue that my good 
society is not idealistic in the sense of being a total abstraction from the real world and 
representing a perfect or supremely excellent form, that is to say, my ideal society is 
not the final word. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE 
It has been taken for granted by many liberal democratic theorists, particularly those 
influenced by the writings of John Locke, that all citizens, no matter what their status, 
carry an equal political obligation. Indeed the argument that all citizens are equally 
obligated looks reasonable enough once universal suffrage is admitted to the liberal 
democracy. However, I want to challenge this assumption by questioning whether the 
equality of citizenship does in fact transcend the substantive socioeconomic 
inequalities that divide individuals within a liberal democratic society. If not, do these 
inequalities give rise to differential political obligations or possibly no obligation 
whatsoever? 
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND CONSENT 
It is frequently argued that we owe a political obligation to the government because it 
is popular; that is, citizens ought to obey it because they have consented to its rule. 
But what is consent? Consent must be to something; in the case of political obligation 
it is consent to, amongst other things, a proposed or already existing relationship. In a 
liberal democracy no one has agreed (at least recently) to the setting-up of this kind of 
decision-making procedure so we cannot say that express consent has been given. So 
how do supporters of the view that consent gives rise to political obligation deal with 
this problem? 
In 'Man and Society' (1992) Plamenatz explores Locke's distinction between 
direct 
consent which 
"grants authority, or establishes or alters a system of government" and 
indirect (or tacit) consent (p. 338). 
For Plamenatz, all those who participate in an election directly consent to the 
goverment that takes office, because they voluntarily took part 
in the knowledge of 
7 
the consequences of an election. Furthermore, those who abstain from voting give tacit 
consent to the political system as a whole. That is, simply by remaining a member of 
society one tacitly consents to be bound by its laws. (Plamenatz 1968. p. 6) Other 
consent theorists place all citizens on the same footing whether they vote or not. As 
Pateman explains, the evidence of consent according to this view is that 
Frone can participate if one chooses to do so " and therefore "the 
individual is obligated .... whether he (sic) personally utilises his 
opportunity or not. " (Pateman 1979p. 84). 
Is this a reasonable argument? 
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM. 
Let us examine how the voter directly consents to the government. For example, by 
voting in an election is a person actually consenting to be bound by the results of the 
election? To address this question, we need to explore the nature of the electoral 
system itself. 
Electoral systems are a central feature of the democratic process and are often seen as 
the political instrument through which notions such as consent and representation are 
translated into reality. For an electoral system is ultimately a method of converting 
votes cast by electors into seats in a legislature. It follows then that electoral systems 
will differ according to the method by which each allocates seats. Broadly speaking, 
there are two ways in which this can be done. Seats can be allocated to a candidate on 
a 'winner-take-all' basis - the candidate who gains the most votes wins the election, no 
matter what proportion of the overall vote he or she gains. The other type of electoral 
procedure is proportional representation - where seats in a representative assembly are 
allocated in terms of proportions of the vote attained. For the purposes of my 
argument, I will confine myself to the British system (the former type) which is 
characterised by one round of voting and no requirement that the winning candidate 
must get over half the vote. 
8 
The electoral system which a country adopts depends more upon its political tradition 
than upon abstract considerations of electoral justice or good government, which, as 
we shall see, raises a number of issues surrounding the moral question of political 
obligation. The British system of single-ballots and pluralities (often called 'first-past- 
the-post) is used in other countries which have come under British influence (Canada, 
India, New Zealand, the United States). In contrast, almost every Continental 
democracy uses a list system of proportional representation. The plurality system as it 
developed in Britain was linked to the notion of territorial representation. MPs 
represented not segments of opinion, nor political parties, but constituencies or 
communities. However, with the growth of political parties the plurality system could 
no longer be defended as securing the representation of communities and was attacked 
(as it is today) by advocates of proportional representation who insist that it fails to 
meet the 'resemblance' criteria of ideal norms of democratic representation. 
For example, under the plurality system there is an enormous advantage in having an 
efficiently distributed vote. This means that in a two-party system a party can, at the 
limit, achieve a seats-to-vote ratio of 2: 0 - that is, its percentage of seats in parliament 
can be twice as high as its percentage of votes in the nation. Thus, what matters is not 
the number of votes alone but their spatial distribution. Consequently, this can 
exaggerate the support of large parties while under-representing small parties (unless 
they are territorially concentrated). In post-war Britain, plurality has tended to inflate 
the seats-to-vote ratio of Labour (now New Labour) and Conservative and deflate the 
seats-to-vote ratio of the Liberal Democrats. Moreover, it is obvious that the spatial 
distribution of party support is also affected by where the constituency boundaries fall, 
because for elections it is the distribution between constituencies that matters. This 
allows scope for manipulation by powerful groups, one method being 
'gerrymandering', that is, the art of maximising the efficiency of a party's vote in terms 
of consequential seats. The basic principle of this form of electoral engineering is to 
draw constituency boundaries in such a way that a party has no votes at all where it 
loses and a plurality where it wins. Examples would include the manipulation of 
electoral boundaries by Unionists in Northern Ireland where there was a Catholic 
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majority in the population; and more recently, the 'homes-for votes' charges levelled 
against the Conservative Westminster council. 
Nevertheless, the plurality system continues to be seen as a means to a stable and 
effective government which forces the voter to decide his or her priorities. It is 
conceded by apologists that the plurality system gives disproportional representation 
(since the votes of those supporting losing candidates are wasted), but this is held to 
secure a positive benefit since it is likely to yield a single-party government without 
the need for coalitions. Thus, under the umbrella concept of representation, there is a 
profound conflict between the representation of territories (based on constituency size) 
and the representation of party or opinion. It also follows that the above observations 
cast serious doubt on the liberal democratic claim that citizens owe an equal obligation 
to the government, in the sense that obligation cannot be owed equally within a 
representative system that we have seen is unequal. To argue that a person who votes 
against the successful candidate consents to his/her election, is to overlook the fact that 
in many cases no consent was given. 
However, the reply of the consent theorists would be that since the purpose of an 
election is to select one of the candidates to a position of authority, a voter who, 
knowing this, freely takes part in an election does consent to the conferring of that 
authority on the person who receives the most votes, even if that should happen to be a 
candidate against whom he or she voted. Thus, Plamenatz argues that it is the fact of 
voting that matters (that is, participation in a certain kind of voting system 
characterised by freedom of assembly, freedom of information etc. ) and not the 
individual's other intention of selecting a particular candidate. But if the intention of 
selection is to be discounted, then voting is reduced to a empty gesture, so any 
discussion of consent must also be empty. Nevertheless, if we accept that it is thefact 
of voting that matters we could reasonably assume that consent arises from the act of 
participating in an election, which in turn indicates support for the electoral system and 
thus gives rise to an obligation to accept its results. Yet Plamenatz, applying 
Locke's 
example of travelling freely upon the highway, argues that non-participation also gives 
rise to consent, albeit of a tacit or indirect nature. 
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The claim about consent and non-voting rests on arguments that the formally equal 
status of citizenship shared by all adults, not only guarantees equal entitlement and the 
safest system for minorities (Singer 1979), but also provides the basis of their 
obligation to the government whether they use their vote or abstain if they choose to do 
so. No matter what their socioeconomic position, their interests are protected, or at 
least expressed, through the liberal democratic electoral mechanism. This may be 
plausible if both the politically active and electoral abstainers are drawn equally from 
all sections of the population. Yet empirical evidence reveals that this is far from the 
case; the politically active tend to be middle class and disproportionately male, while 
abstainers tend to be drawn from the lower socioeconomic ranks and tend to be 
disproportionately female. To understand why this is so, we need to take a closer look 
at the liberal democratic notion of political equality. 
POLITICAL EQUALITYe 
At first sight it may be felt that the voting procedure is an adequate embodiment of 
political equality. If decisions are taken by reference to votes, and if each person has 
one vote, then that appears to accord equal influence over the outcome. Yet as we have 
seen, in the British electoral system, where voters are electing representatives to make 
decisions on their behalf, examples of gross inequality between the power of different 
votes occur because of differences in effectiveness in getting the representative of your 
interests elected, which in turn produces inequality of outcome, either because of 
disparities in constituency size, or because of the nature of the plurality system itself. 
In relation to the official decision-making procedure, we can suggest that voting is the 
first stage of initiating that procedure. But in reality, it frequently stands at the end of a 
series of social processes which are themselves permeated by substantial economic, 
sexual and racial inequality, which in turn influences the degree of political equality at 
the voting stage. Thus, voting is not exhaustive of political power which suggests that 
even equality in voting does not establish political equality, making an assessment of 
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equality of political obligation even more subtle For example, even if I were to accept 
that the value of my vote is the same as the next person's, if that next person happens to 
be a newspaper magnate or a Cabinet Minister, then the influence I have over what 
millions of other electors end up voting for is nothing like equal to theirs, nor is my 
chance of being a candidate myself. Thus, opportunities for influence or activity of 
this kind are very unequally distributed, and vary with such factors as the amount of 
wealth I have at my disposal, the amount of time I am able to devote to political issues 
or the degree to which my own views (and the rationality of those views) reflect those 
of one of the most powerful political parties in society. This is not to suggest that Bill 
Clinton's youthful attraction, for example, did not play some part in his election 
victories, although, of course, physical attributes are not equally distributed either. But 
what concerns us here are significant structural inequalities, those closely connected 
with one's socioeconomic position, rather than individual traits such as good looks. 
It is hardly surprising therefore, that much emphasis has been placed in empirical study 
on the ignorance and apathy of the electorate (although it should be noted that this, in 
itself, is not a measure of inequality provided that opportunities and participation are 
there). Schumpeter, for example, highlights the different degrees of effort and 
intelligent thought which people bring to politics on the one hand, and leisure activities 
on the other). (Schumpeter J. 1954. ) Barnes and Kaase (1979) found that when they 
asked respondents whether they discussed politics often, sometimes, frequently or 
never, only 15% in Britain, the Netherlands, West Germany and Austria discussed it 
often. (p. 541-2) 
Nevertheless, although political discussion is peripheral to the typical citizen, any large 
electorate shows considerable variability in the extent of its political thinking and 
activity. One reason for the division of the citizenry into the more or less politically 
active is because the inactive and electoral abstainers do not see political participation 
as worthwhile. For example, with the dramatic increase in poverty during the past 20 
years, it comes as no surprise that the poor and those dependent on state benefit 
perceive the vote as instrumentally ineffective. That such beliefs and doubts are 
rational is supported by much empirical evidence which concludes that voting 
helps 
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those who are already better off. Thus, the more reason there is to believe that voting 
is not helpful, the more reason there is to say that non-voting does not show consent. 
Returning to the notion of consent for the moment, it is hardly plausible to interpret 
electoral abstention as consent (even tacit consent) to a voting system that helps 
reinforce socioeconomic inequality! Moreover, even if the poor were politically active 
(for example, if the unemployed or lone parents organised themselves into pressure 
groups), they may have no means of bringing effective pressure to bear if they are 
devoid of power. Even if organisations such as the Child Poverty Action Group 
mobilise pressure on their behalf, the poor have no real threats or sanctions they can 
bring to bear to force the hands of government. However well organised they may be, 
they cannot lay down threats to government of either of the kinds that powerful 
financial interests or organised labour can. Similarly, the old, the disabled and 
deprived ethnic minorities are even less likely to develop organisational structures to 
enhance their interests, given both the lack of resources at their disposal and the lack of 
consciousness of having definite interests to be protected in an organised way. The 
electoral insignificance of deprived groups has been highlighted by a 1997 Church of 
England report (cited in The Guardian 4/5/97 p. 1) which accused the main political 
parties in the run-up to the 1997 General Election, of ignoring the plight of the poor, 
preferring instead to channel their energies into attracting middle class voters 
One of the essential ingredients of political equality, building up from the voting 
system, is education. Higher education in particular has a striking effect on political 
interest,, knowledge and sophistication. Klingemann (1979) found that education had 
more effect than other social variables on the ability to think about politics in an 
ideological way. He argues that analytical skills, more information and greater interest 
in politics enable the highly educated to adopt clear positions on hard political issues 
and vote in accord with them. (in Barnes & Kaase p. 255-79) In contrast, Carmines 
and Stimson (1980) found that those with low levels of education are particularly 
likely to be easy-issue voters (eg. voting on emotive issues such as racial questions). 
(American Political Science Review Vol. 74. p. 78-91). In Britain today, educational 
reform under the Conservative government is moving down the path of transforming 
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the state education system into a two-tier service, in which most provision is made 
through a privatised system with a residual, very much second class service for those 
unable to pay. Individualism and competitiveness as root values are replacing notions 
of education as creating forms of social cohesion and solidarity and tending towards 
social equality. Thus, British society is characterised by inequality of educational 
opportunity, opportunities which are necessary to improve the extent to which citizens 
can decide questions on the balance of rational argument, rather than emotive reasons, 
and crucial to political equality. This background of political opportunity is 
presupposed or left unspecified in consent theory, and is, therefore, a legitimate 
question to be addressed. 
Economic and educational inequality are not the only factors which question the liberal 
democratic notion of political equality. Feminists argue that women have never been 
admitted as full and equal citizens in any country known as a democracy. In 
discussions of empirical evidence which conclude that women are less politically 
active than men, it has often been taken for granted that differential rights and status 
are the result of 'natural' differences between the sexes and that women's proper place 
is in the private sphere of social life. British social policy has created an ever-growing 
body of legislation concerned with reinforcing the nuclear family as the norm. 
Legislation on sexuality, marriage, birth control, child care and mothering have all had 
crucial effects on our perceptions of what constitutes the 'normal' family, perceptions 
within which women are firmly located within the private sphere. It follows that 
women confined to the small circle of the family and without the experience of 
political activity will find it difficult to use their vote effectively in order to protect 
their interests. 
Moreover, women's status as workers is as ambiguous as their status as citizens. 
Despite the so-called Teminisation' of the labour force, many of the factors which 
determine female participation in the early stage of capitalist development continue to 
affect occupational choice, gender segregation and women's overall subordination at 
work. Persistent negative facets of women's employment, such as sex-typed jobs, low- 
ranking position and low comparative earnings reflect the continued operation of a 
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deep-seated belief in the nuclear family. Women's jobs are concentrated in secondary 
labour markets (such as the service sector - waitressing, cleaning, retail sales work 
etc. ), forms of employment which are unstable, where job security and wages are low, 
there a few opportunities for promotion, and working conditions are frequently poor. 
Thus, the structure of the labour market and the workplace, despite considerable 
restructuring in recent years, continues to pose complex problems for women's political 
equality and participation. 
Once we recognise the constraints imposed on women, it is possible to reach a very 
different conclusion from the one which states that 'natural' differences make women 
unsuitable for political life. Pateman's reply to the question; 'What reasons do women 
have to participate in politicsT is "veryfew indeed" (in Duncan G. 1983. p. 207), an 
answer I am inclined to endorse given the seemingly inescapable distribution of power. 
Thus, we should take seriously the many influences on unequal political power prior to 
the vote. However, we need also to consider the political influence of individuals after 
the completion of the voting stage, in particular, the position of minorities. The 
discrimination suffered by minority groups clearly shows that one person, one vote, is 
insufficient to ensure that decisions operate fairly. For an individual who is in a 
permanent minority and indeed for one who is in a minority more than on average, the 
mathematics of representative democracy through the mechanism of the plurality vote 
has negative appeal. Actual cases relevant to my argument are those concerning ethnic 
minority groups. Blacks in Britain and Catholics in Northern Ireland constitute 
permanent minorities to which there is attached a history of prejudice, manifested not 
only in policy but in political speeches and common attitudes. Both suffer 
discrimination in terms of rights and opportunities (eg. employment, housing) and are, 
to some degree, spatially and socially isolated from the larger community. We can 
argue therefore, that in situations where the vote is used to the constant disadvantage of 
a minority, then the group in question does not have so strong an obligation to the 
govermuent. 
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It follows then, that against the backcloth of inequalities such as those described above, 
the political equality we are said to possess when we all come to vote pales into 
insignificance. If this is the case, we also have a problem with political obligation. If 
we recall the arguments of liberal democratic theorists, we could now argue that only 
those socially and economically advantaged citizens with the greatest political 
influence owe a political obligation. However, writers within the liberal democratic 
tradition attempt to overcome this difficulty by employing the 'benefits' argument. 
That is, that individuals nevertheless benefit from or 'voluntarily take advantage of 
liberal practices and institutions. So what are these benefits and how are they 
distributed? 
THE BENEFACTOR ARGUMENT AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION. 
The most fundamental 'benefit' emphasised by liberal democratic theorists is 
'protection of the person' which is identified with the formal equality of citizenship. 
However , in what sense 
is the person protected? Could it be the protection of his or 
her life? If so, how then do we explain class differentials in mortality rates? An 
update of the Black Report carried out by Margaret Whitehead in 1986 revealed that, 
on average, death rates are still twice as high for adults and children in Social Class V 
as for those in Social Class 1. (p. 258). One contributory factor to this difference in 
mortality rates is industrial accident and disease. Are we to accept then, that an 
individual voluntarily takes advantage' of a capitalist system that is responsible for 
such hazardous effects on his or her health? I would argue that the conventional 
picture of 'protection of the person' is too narrow, focusing on assault/abuse by other 
persons. But if we embrace a broader conception of the individual, as a creature not 
just of the political, but also of social and economic life, then we can see how, for the 
state, protection is far from equal, thus highlighting the superficiality of the liberal 
conception of 'protection of the person'. 
Let us look at another benefit, that is, equal treatment before the law. According to 
liberal democratic theory, all individuals who break the law are, in principle, equally 
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subject to the sanctions imposed on offenders, regardless of their social position. Yet 
numerous studies of the criminal justice system conclude that those of low 
socioeconomic status do not receive the same treatment at the hands of law 
enforcement agents as the wealthy. Although they are over-represented in the prison 
population, criminal activity is by no means confined to the poorer sections of society. 
Many affluent people commit crimes, the consequences of which can be much more 
far-reaching than the often petty crimes of the poor. For example, the detection of 
white-collar crime (tax, security and land frauds, embezzlement, illegal sales, the 
production and sale of dangerous substances, illegal environmental pollution) is 
usually fairly limited and convictions are rare. Why is this? 
Of major influence are the stereotypical categories which shape the perceptions and 
responses of police and courts to the behaviour which they encounter. In other words, 
such selective discrimination depends to a large degree on criteria connected with the 
biases and prejudices of law enforcement agencies about certain groups and offences, 
and such things as the offender's social status, attitude and appearance. A good 
illustration of differences in judicial attitudes to white-collar and 'orthodox' crime is 
provided by Napes, who cites the case of an American stockbroker found guilty of 
illegal trading involving a sum of $20 million. On the day on which he received a 
suspended sentence and a $30,000 fine, the same judge gave a Black unemployed clerk 
a year's prison sentence for stealing a television worth $100. (Napes G. 'Wall Street 
Journal 9/9/70. ) 
Thus, in the face of such institutionalised injustice, it is not surprising to find the 
working class and ethnic minorities over-represented in official crime statistics, given 
that such groups are more likely to fit the stereotypical views of law enforcement 
agencies. Moreover, as Pearce (1976) states: 
"Concentrating on lower class criminals .. isfunctional to maintaining the 
class system... If the criminals are also the social failures ... then their 
criminality is caused by their inadequacies ... and the major social 
institutions are not exposed to critical assessment. 11 (p. 81). 
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Overall, police and court perceptions do not result in uniform application of the law 
but involve highly selective decisions. These judgements emanate from the class 
relations between the powerful and the powerless; where the former enshrine their 
definitions of 'crime' and 'criminals' in legal statutes, and the latter are rendered 
incapable of mobilising the material and social resources necessary for their defence. 
In sum then, if actual examples of 'benefits' and their distribution are considered, then 
it is impossible to draw the reassuring conclusions about political obligation which 
many political theorists favour. 
I have attempted, in the above discussion, to challenge the argument put forward by 
liberal democratic writers, that we all owe an equal political obligation to the 
goverm-nent by virtue of our formally equal status as citizens. Through an examination 
of ideas such as consent and participation and their supposed linkage to the practice of 
voting, I can only conclude that the liberal democratic vote represents no more than a 
symbolic gesture of authorisation. My account has tried to give a central place to 
liberal democracy's most essential feature: namely, to the alienation by citizens, 
through elections, of their right to make political decisions. As a result, I cannot accept 
this alienation of political authority to representatives as creating 'political obligation'. 
The practice of political obligation should not be conceived as a vertical relationship 
(that each person can be said to owe an obligation to the government) but as a 
horizontal relationship, as an obligation which citizens owe to each other. In the 
following discussion I will attempt to construct a democratic model within which all 
citizens may evaluate their own actions, participate in their own decisions which may 
be reassessed, changed and revoked by them at any time, and where all citizens take 
part in creating their own political obligations. 
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 
In the previous section I argued that political obligation in liberal democratic theory 
was a vertical relationship of obligation, precisely because 
it is owed to the 
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government rather than to fellow citizens. Moreover, this argument must be given a 
voluntarist appearance; that is, such an obligation must be a self-assumed obligation 
otherwise the question of how and why 'naturally' free and equal individuals could be 
legitimately governed by anyone else at all cannot be answered. 
My purpose here is to argue that our political obligation is owed first and foremost to 
each other. However, this view of political obligation as a horizontal relationship 
between citizens cannot be reconciled with the liberal conception of the political. It is 
compatible only with a revised conception of democracy within which the political 
sphere is not separated from everyday life, but is part of the collective dimension of 
social life as a whole. Thus,, I will try to develop a theory of democracy which relates 
to our capacity to be autonomous moral agents but from a collectivist viewpoint. First 
however, we need to explore the theoretical arguments about the nature of democracy 
and its justification. It is necessary to distinguish particular kinds of Procedure and 
arrangement and how they conform to specific ideals and principles which themselves 
gain our approval. If they do not, we need to look for alternative procedures. Thus, 
my conception of democracy must show how political life is constituted by rules that 
are grounded in the notion of the collective (an idea which itself will be clarified later 
in the chapter) . In such a society, the purpose of democratic political change is, as far 
as possible, to transform power relationships into relationships of authority in which 
citizens collectively exercise political authority. However, such a conception of 
democracy will be seen as mere utopianism by those writers who take a 'realistic' view 
of the political and insist that democracy is simply an arrangement for making 
decisions and thus cannot function as or embody an ideal. It is the 'realism' of these 
ideas which I need to challenge. Only after detecting and dealing with the deficiencies 
of this approach can I then proceed with developing a theory of democracy which takes 
account (and attempts to eliminate) the constraints imposed by particular facts about 
the circumstances in which we live or about human nature. First however, I want to 
explore the nature of democracy, using the more familiar British model as way of 
illustration. In order to fully grasp the implications of the following arguments, we 
need to be clear at the outset about what precisely we mean when speaking of 
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citizenship in the democratic sense. What is a democracy, what forms does it take, 
how far can we argue that we live in a democratic society? 
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DEMOCRACY: DIRECTOR REPRESENTATIVE? 
Democracy, as the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it means: 
"(State having) government, direct or representative: form of society ignoring hereditary class distinctions and tolerating minority views. 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary 7th Ed. 1986. p. 254). 
To discover how such a definition may apply to our existing political system we need 
to examine whatform of democracy most closely resembles the British experience. 
Consider the origin, rather than the definition of the term 'democracy'. In the Greek it 
denotes a form of rule by a section of the populace, the DEMOS as opposed to the rich 
or aristocratic. In turn, DEMOS could be used to denote the citizen body, the common 
people or simply the lower orders. (Graham 1986 p. 13) Whichever way we may look 
at it, DEMOS does not appear to denote the entire populace, unlike the modem 
concept encapsulated in the slogan 'democracy is government of the people for the 
people by the people'. Taking this further, accepting that to govern is to rule, what 
does this imply? It could imply direct influence by the people over decisions, but more 
commonly, especially in the modern political sphere, it implies rule in the sense of 
selecting, in accordance with certain conditions, those who subsequently take decisions 
on the people's behalf. Initially then, our conception of 'democracy' should recognise 
these two senses of rule and corresponding to them, direct and representative forms of 
democracy. It could be argued that direct democracy is the basic form of democracy, 
thus, the idea of representative democracy implies representatives who replace or are 
'present' instead of others. Therefore, in virtue of the meaning of the term, 
representative democracy is a substitute for something else and this something else can 
only be direct democracy. Thus, in the context of the British political system, we are 
referring to democracy in its representative form. 
The system of political representation with which we are now familiar in Britain, can 
be traced back to the emergence of absolutist monarchies in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, which brought about a more centralised form of domination as the activities 
of monarchs successfully concentrated more and more power in their own hands. 
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These sovereign states, through the monopolisation of coercion, imposed laws and 
taxes over their territory which clearly needed functionaries to run it (notably powerful 
allies of the king). However, these gradually came to be replaced by administrators 
whose power no longer depended upon wealth or military success but on their official 
position. For example, professional lawyers became increasingly responsible for 
codifying and modifying a body of law which limited the arbitrary rule of the monarch. 
The establishment in the 17th century of what Poggi calls the 'rational administration 
by officials' culminated in bureaucracy and a rationalisation of politics. (Poggi 1978) 
In late 17th and 18th century Britain at least, these trends were emerging alongside the 
industrial revolution, and the growing bourgeoisie (merchants, traders and 
manufacturers), feeling threatened by this centralised state if it was not represented in 
it, led to struggles to gain political representation. These struggles are often seen as 
establishing the conditions for capitalist expansion through the winning of dominance 
for Parliament and the constitutional regulation of the monarch. Such events aided the 
rise of capitalism through maintaining peace, protecting property rights, contracts and 
foreign trade, all of which aided the development of markets. Thus, the British road to 
capitalism gradually established the principles of representative liberal democracy, as 
first the commercialised landowners, then industrialists slowly established notions of 
individual citizenship and rights of political expression. However, the achievement of 
full voting rights for all adults is relatively recent, and, as my discussion of citizenship 
in Chapter 4 will show, had to be struggled for in the face of governments' reluctance 
to admit the principle of the universal franchise. 
So how successful have these reforms been in establishing a representative system that 
may be perceived as just and democratic? For example, the representative's function is 
to speak and vote as those he or she is representing would have spoken or voted, had 
they been present. But is it possible for representatives to act in this way? When we 
consider that the representative is taking the place not of one but of many, with a 
variety of opinions, we encounter difficulties. Apart from the minority who did not 
vote for the candidate who obtained the most votes, there will be differences of opinion 
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among those who did. These problems have led a number of thinkers to focus on just 
how the notion of representation is to be specified. 
One school of thought stresses the idea of 'resemblance', the reproduction in Parliament 
of a microcosm of the nation, representative in every way. Putting a left-wing view, 
Aneurin Bevan (19 5 2) wrote that: 
ff.. a representative person is one who will act in a given situation in much 
the same way as those he (sic) represents would act in that same situation. 
In short, he must be of their kind. " (p. 30) 
But in a capitalist society such as Britain, social and economic inequality means that 
the pool of candidates with the time, financial resources, interest and knowledge to 
stand for Parliament and win elections is not drawn equally from all social groups. 
Furthermore, however much elected officials may resemble society on the day of their 
election, parliamentary and government experience changes their perspectives and 
interests. These problems have led some thinkers, most notably Rousseau, to deny that 
people can be represented. In his words: 
".. the English are only free when they are electing members of 
parliament Once the election has been completed, they revert to a 
condition of slavery. They are nothing. " (Harrop & Miller. 1987. p. 246. ) 
It appears then, that no selection process can guarantee resemblance, at least not in the 
context of substantive socioeconomic inequality. 
However, there are other concepts of representation. We may not want representation 
by 'people like us' so much as by people who will act effectively on our behalf. This is 
the view of Edmund Burke who told his electors in Bristol: 
ff ... when you have chosen him 
(the candidate) he is not a member of 
Bristol, but he is a member ofparliament .. Your representative owes you, 
not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays you, instead of 
serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion. " (ibidp. 247) 
Thus, Burke stresses the independent judgement of the legislator, once elected. On this 
view, electors are voting for the candidate who will express their opinions and promote 
their interests,, despite the possibility of disagreement between the former and the latter 
about how this is best done. 
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Nevertheless, this view would be rejected among those who see the legislator more as a 
'foot-soldier for the political party. Thus, the candidate would be elected by those who 
identify with the party label and consequently expects the representative to be morally 
bound by its programme. Party identification refers more to a psychological 
attachment to a party, rather than a rational choice based on an instrumental assessment 
of the party's aims or policy packages. Party identification (or partisanship) therefore, 
has much to do with a party's public image and is one of the long-term influences on 
voting behaviour. During an election, a person's party identification will determine 
how issues and events are interpreted and evaluated, and thus serves as a filter through 
which political messages pass to the individual voter providing a framework within 
which political events are understood and evaluated. However, identifying with a party 
is not the same as voting for it. Party identification varies in intensity and can, of 
course, lead to party dealignment. Moreover, within this context, the bureaucratisation 
of political parties is inevitable - to achieve power, representatives must demonstrate 
absolute loyalty to the party machine which in turn displays the bureaucratic 
characteristics of rigidity and inflexibility, thus further undermining the democratic 
process. 
So which notion of representation most closely resembles the British political system? 
Once the 'resemblance' view is rejected, we are left with the 'trustee model' advocated 
by Burke or choice made on the grounds of Party membership. If we accept either of 
these views we are left with the more limited notion of representation as a choice 
between 'competing elites'. 
ELITE THEORY. 
My findings so far suggest that representatives do not vote as their constituents would 
have voted, nor are representatives microcosms of the nation. So what precisely are 
the functions of representative democracy? We now turn to one explanation, that of 
elite theory. 
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Elite theory embodies the recognition of the reality of our political system, a system 
where elites compete periodically for endorsement by the wider population, with that 
wider population playing little or no part in substantive decision-making. Writers 
within this tradition include Schumpeter, Dahl and Michels, whose ideas are briefly set 
out below. 
Of central influence on elite theory has been Schumpeter's 'Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy' (1942), which attacks the 'myths' of democracy; including the belief that 
the 'people' hold a definite and rational opinion about every political question, and that 
they choose representatives who will see to it that their opinion is carried out. He 
concedes the possibility of a high degree of rationality within the individual's own 
personal experience from the personal sphere, there is a diminished sense of reality and 
a reduced sense of responsibility. This is most acute when we enter the national and 
international spheres, within which the individual is a member of an unworkable 
committee, that is, the committee of the whole nation. At this stage the initiative lies 
not with the individual (the voter) but with the candidate; the voter's choice is limited 
to accepting one of a small number of 'bids' made to him or her. Thus, for Schumpeter, 
democracy is simply one institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions. 
Robert Dahl reaches a similar conclusion to Schumpeter, albeit via a pluralist route. In 
'A Preface to Democratic Theory' (1956) he concludes that the majority rarely rules, 
but that democracy must be characterised by the rule of minorities. He states: 
"Elections and political competition do not make for government by 
majorities in any significant way, but they vastly increase the size, 
number and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into 
account by leaders in makingpolicy choices. (p. 132) 
Moreover, the political process is identified as one: 
"in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can 
make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of 
decisions. " (ibid). 
But what does this mean? Could we not argue that an 'inactive' group is unworthy of 
an effective hearing if it cannot be bothered to attempt to influence decisions? 
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However, when Dahl speaks of an 'inactive' group, this activity could be due to 'free 
choice, violence, intimidation or law' (ibid). Similarly, the qualification 'legitimate' 
may also restrict activity. For example, legitimate could mean those whose activity is 
seen as lawful and conforming to the standards of the active majority. Thus, some 
groups may be denied the opportunity of being heard effectively because their activity 
is not considered right or proper by the majority. For Dahl, any theory of democracy 
applicable to reality must have as its central feature a system in which minorities rule. 
Other elite theories would include the work of Michels (1915). Based upon an 
extensive examination of modern European systems and bureaucracies of all types, 
Michels concluded that there was a natural, necessary and inevitable tendency within 
all social structures towards oligarchical control. According to his famous 'iron law of 
oligarchy' it was an inescapable fact of human experience that a dominant minority 
class must exist in society, with the equally inescapable consequence that the majority 
cannot rule. A more recent theorist Paul Corcoran (1983) agrees with Michels rather 
fatalistic conclusion. For him: 
" the brute fact remains that democratic politics cannot prevent the 
creation of remote, stable and entrenched centres ofpower which tend to 
promote general apathy, cynicism and ignorance about politics among 
th e masses of people. " (p. 19) 
Such pessimistic views have been supported by reference to certain 'facts' of social life, 
namely the size and complexity of modern society. The volume of decisions which 
modern governments have to make, their complex and technical nature, mean that the 
average individual simply does not have the knowledge or interest to make a 
significant contribution to those decisions. But to cite existing 'facts' is to do that and 
no more. It does not demonstrate that existing structures are fixed or that people's 
perceptions of what is possible might not change in the future. For example, systems 
can be devised (or already exist) which can overcome the technical or organisational 
difficulties stressed by the elite theorists. Technological systems are already in place 
which could implement the proposal put forward by R. P. Woolf (1976) for an 'instant, 
direct democracy'. (p. 34). The development of computer technology and cable 
television allowing a 2-way flow are clearly relevant. Today, a consumer can purchase 
26 
goods through 'television shopping', place votes for participants in talent shows, so 
why not votes on political matters requiring social decisions? Such a procedure can be 
assisted by television briefing sessions and debates and the employment of experts to 
provide relevant data and make recommendations. Fishkin's analysis of a 2-way cable 
television network in Columbus, Ohio led him to conclude that there is no problem 
about the technical feasibility of large-scale political participation. Thus, the more 
optimistic view of information technology (see Stonier 1983, Toffler 1981, Bell 1980) 
incorporates the belief that it will open up many opportunities for direct democracy as 
citizens are able to vote 'on-line' via their home computers or cable TV. on issues of 
local and national importance, assisted by an increased knowledge via hypertext 
systems to access vast quantities of information. It appears therefore, that there are no 
technological obstacles to Woolfs 'instant, direct democracy'; in fact, technology 
reveals the ways in which and the extent to which, a given ideal may be embodied in 
actual social relations. 
Another feature of elite theory we may take issue with is the idea that active political 
participation is unnecessary, given the ability of liberal societies to function with an 
apathetic populace. I discussed earlier empirical studies which portrayed the ignorance 
and apathy of the electorate, yet it is possible to cite evidence which stands in 
opposition to these findings. For example, Keys (1966) suggested that voters behaved 
rationally and responsibly given the existing political arrangements, the lack of 
alternatives and the information available. Other studies depict the electorate as far 
more disposed to align their voting behaviour with preferences than out of blind habit 
or tradition. (Graham. 1986. p. 133). Nevertheless, one cannot deny that apathy does 
exist, but we do not have to accept that such behaviour is irrational. I have already 
drawn attention to the fact that if citizens correctly perceive that they do not belong to 
the most powerfully organised political groups, and that, in consequence, any efforts 
they make will be relatively ineffectual, then their 'apathy' can be viewed as rational. 
But leaving aside questions of technology and human ignorance, there is one aspect of 
elite theory that, at first sight, is more difficult to challenge. This is Michels argument 
that it is facts about human organisation which dictate exclusion for all but a few. In 
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other words, the 'iron law of oligarchy' expresses the tendency for a group to emerge 
and formulate a will of their own. Their position gives special knowledge which is 
transformed into an overriding claim to have their opinions respected and their 
suggestions implemented. I have accepted elsewhere that political influence tends to 
be concentrated in the hands of small powerful groups, but we also need to explain 
why elites flourish the way they do. It can be argued (indeed forcefully) that it is 
inequalities in wealth and education which produce elites; that those inequalities are 
themselves socially produced rather than the result of an 'iron law'. Thus, if the 
creation of elites is the product of social arrangements, then the possibility exists for 
changing those arrangements. In the language of Herbert Marcuse, capitalism has 
seemingly produced a one-dimensional mentality unable to envisage any alternative to 
what currently prevails. And it is a difficult task indeed, to present empirical evidence 
to argue that history stands still. 
The fundamental problem with elite theory is its empiricism. Empirical theories can be 
traced back to the ideas of David Hume, who is often thought (debatably) to have 
argued that there is an unbridgable gulf between statements of fact and statements of 
value. For him, normative judgements or judgements of value are not susceptible to 
truth or falsity and should therefore be treated with caution, if not avoided altogether. 
Consequently, researchers have attempted to engage in 'scientific' objective and value- 
free theorising and elite theory is no exception. Yet an emphasis on facts and 'reality' 
has caused elite theory to side-step alternative explanations. Factual evidence may be 
of essential importance but so is the interpretation of it. For example, empirical data 
on people's voting behaviour can be open to quite different interpretations; and the 
interpretation adopted will depend on more general theories and values. Moreover, 
there is always a danger that an insistence on the supreme importance of empirical fact 
may also serve as a justification of the status quo, introducing a presumption that 
reality is fixed. Uncritical empiricism leads to a persistent tendency to emphasise 
prescription and remedy at the expense of a wider diagnosis based on evaluation and 
explanation. By taking existing arrangements for granted, we are left with piecemeal 
reform at most. Thus, an examination of the facts as presented by elite theory, might 
lead us to ask why theorists label the existing system as a democracy at all? This in 
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turn raises the question of what alternative arrangements would sit more comfortably 
with the democratic ideal I want to construct in the following sections. 
I have stated from the outset that my overall objective is to construct a democratic 
model within which our political obligations are owed to fellow citizens rather than the 
state. It follows then, that I must cite the grounds on which democracy is to be 
favoured; for example, should our democratic ideal be based on the principles of 
equality and fairness? Through such an approach, questions will emerge as to why 
anyone should be in favour of adopting democratic procedures, and why they should 
abide by them in circumstances where their individual autonomy is likely to be 
curtailed. Thus,, we need to recognise the possibility of conflict between the individual 
and the collective. It is appropriate to start by addressing what is often regarded as one 
of the most fundamental grounds for democracy, that is, the principle of liberty. 
FOUR CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERTY. 
Individuals have the capacity for a range of experiences, emotional, moral and other 
kinds; we are also capable of understanding our surroundings to some degree and of 
formulating intentions to change those surroundings. Also, it is plausible to say that it 
is important for these capacities to be under one's own control, rather than someone 
else's. We can connect these human attributes and democracy by emphasising 
democracy as a kind of 'self-rule' rather than rule by others. Thus, the extent of one's 
autonomy in exercising one's capacities of the kind described above must be a question 
of crucial importance. For these reasons, the connexion of liberty with democracy is a 
good reason for valuing the latter. However, the concept of liberty is not 
straightforward and requires a consideration of a number of conceptions. 
It is usual to separate the writers on the subject of liberty into two categories. On the 
one hand are those who contend, to different degree, that the freedom of the individual 
ranks very high in most possible lists of characteristics that must be present in an 
ideal 
society. These writers advocate 'negative liberty'. Berlin (1969), for example, 
favours 
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a conception of liberty which has as its core the idea of non-interference; liberty in this 
sense concerns the extent to which an individual 
"is or should be left to do or be what he (sic) is able to do or be without 
interferencefrom other persons. " (p. 131). 
Hayek is also a proponent of negative liberty; the opening lines of 'The Constitution of 
Liberty' (1960) are to the effect that freedom means that in condition in which 
"coercion of some others by some others is reduced as much as possible 
in society. " (p. 12) 
Mises defines freedom as that state of affairs in which the individual is free in the 
sense of being free to choose between various actions in a market economy. For him, 
only capitalism can guarantee true freedom (through the cash nexus) and it arose in the 
process of social development. 
Advocates of 'positive liberty' on the other hand, are concerned with the source rather 
than the area of control, and its core is the idea of self-mastery: 
"I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external 
sources of whatever kind, I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of 
other men's (sic) acts of will. " (Berlin 1969. p. 131). 
Such a concept of liberty would include the positive fact of choice rather than the mere 
negative fact of non-interference. Norman (1982) stresses the importance of equality, 
for him liberty and equality are interdependent. He argues that equality in the areas of 
social power, wealth and education enable us to make choices which ultimately 
produce greater freedom. However, this is not the appropriate place to engage in the 
ongoing debate over the conflicting conceptions of 'negative' and 'positive' liberty. 
Indeed, in an attempt to avoid this, Rawls in 'A Theory of Justice' (1972) focuses on 
the relative value of different liberties rather than the definitions. 
Rawls two principles of justice are first, that everyone is to enjoy the most extensive 
liberty compatible with equal liberty for others, and second, the 'difference principle' 
which holds that material inequalities must work to everyone's advantage (that is, that 
inequalities must either make the worst off better off or not disadvantage them further). 
However, the first principle must take precedence over the second. This is because, for 
Rawls, these principles presuppose a division of the social structure into two parts; the 
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realm of citizenship where liberty is inviolable and equal, and the realm of 
socioeconomic relations, where considerable inequality may prevail. Thus, the 
inviolable sphere is the one in which individuals act as citizens and is essentially a 
political sphere. We could argue that what Rawls is supporting then is civil liberties 
such as freedom of speech, assembly and association, liberty of thought and 
conscience. But why single out civil liberties? Most basically, because they connect 
with rationality. If we believe it is important that people have control over their own 
lives, that they formulate and realise projects in accordance with their own conceptions 
and decisions5 then we must believe that they are capable of doing so sensibly, 
(through planning social policies, for example, to realise these conceptions) and not in 
an idiotic or self-defeating way. This point is of crucial importance for our democratic 
ideal; the introduction of civil liberties which relates to our capacity to be rational self- 
governing agents, is an important starting-point for our model of decision-making. 
That is,, a procedure for conducting human affairs through the force of rational 
argument and judgement. Nevertheless, despite Rawls' attempts to bypass the question 
of whether liberty should be defined negatively or positively, he ends up with a 
negative view similar to Berlin's, in that within a principled limit the economic and 
social sphere looks after itself. Thus, although an emphasis on civil liberties is 
important, we need to look elsewhere for a more satisfactory and exhaustive definition 
of liberty. 
Graham (1986) puts forward a view of liberty which embodies both freedom from 
interference and freedom as self-rule. Graham accepts the importance of civil liberties 
for autonomous individuals but states that the negative idea of free from is too 
narrowly constrained; generally through confining the notion of constraints to 
deliberate human intervention. In our model of decision-making it was emphasised 
that individuals should be capable of conceiving plans, goals and objectives and acting 
to realise them in accordance with their own formulated intentions. But constraints on 
autonomous action can be factors other than actions of human beings. For example, 
lack of material resources or the particular institutional arrangements of a given society 
may prevent me from pursuing a chosen project (although from the point of view of 
methodological individualism it can be argued that these arrangements are also 
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reducible to the actions or inactions of human beings). Graham calls his approach the 
'integrated view' for a number of reasons. First, it integrates the different kinds of 
constraint which limit autonomous action (inadequate resources, oppressive laws, the 
socioeconomic structure). Second, his view integrates civil liberties with liberties 
connected with socioeconomic position; for example, my economic circumstances may 
be an obstacle standing in the way of conscientious action and is thus a denial of my 
rational autonomy. Through such an approach, Graham is therefore making a 
distinction between lack of freedom and deprivation of freedom ; in other words, 
constraint by identifiable human agency is not the only form. 
In relation to democracy then, it could be argued that the negative concept of liberty 
confines questions of democracy to the traditional political sphere. If we support 
(which I do) Graham's 'integrated' view, we are able to recognise that the grounds for 
supporting democratic arrangements require democratisation in other areas of social 
life. 
EQUALITY: FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE. 
Following Graham's 'integrated' view of liberty, we arrive at another fundamental 
principle on which democracy should be grounded; that of equality. We may recall 
Rawls' two principles of justice in which his first principle which provides for liberty, 
takes precedence over the second principle, which allows material inequalities only 
where they work to everyone's advantage. But equality should also carry an 
independent weight in democratic theory because it implies the elimination of 
disadvantage which acts as a constraint on liberty (broadly conceived). As we have 
seen, the liberal democratic voting procedure supposedly embodies a kind of equality 
through 'one person, one vote'. However, it was also pointed that such a procedure was 
inadequate for the realisation of political equality. Thus, it is necessary to find a place 
for political or formal equality of some form in our developing conception of 
democracy. The question I must now address therefore, is what the extents and limits 
of formal equality must be to satisfy the requirements of democracy. 
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Almost everyone agrees that the exclusion of children from the decision-making 
procedure is justified, usually on the grounds that children lack political knowledge or 
the ability to reach responsible judgements. But can we not argue that adults differ in 
these respects too? If so, then it is reasonable to suggest that political power should be 
unequal. A possible solution to this problem has been the suggestion that there is some 
characteristic which all individuals possess, the degree to which one has it being 
irrelevant. Theorists have thus attempted to identify characteristics which are closely 
connected with the existence of individuals as moral beings. 
Rawls (1972) cites one such characteristic; it is, he says, moral personality, which is 
identified as the capacity for having a rational plan of life and a conception of justice. 
For Steven Lukes (1973), it is the capacity for autonomous choice and action. For 
these writers, the possession of such characteristics are bases upon which equal 
treatment should be accorded. But should we talk in terms of equal treatment as a 
principle of fonnal. political equality? To view equality in such a way is to treat 
citizens as recipients. If we recall that democratic theory is concerned with a 
distribution of power where the people rule, then we are not concerned with whether 
they just receive a certain kind of treatment. This is to fail to give equal power by 
virtue of their role as moral agents. So if we value a system where people rule, then it 
becomes increasingly difficult to isolate the principle of equality to one area of 
decision-making. It follows then, that the most undesirable form of inequality is one 
which excludes people from contributing to the shaping of institutions which in turn 
influence their lives; and precisely because so many other aspects of social 
arrangements have an effect on the decision-making sphere, any discussion of equality 
must begin by considering the features of a democratic society rather than 
focusing 
exclusively on the features of a democratic polity. In other words, 
in our discussion of 
equality, our primary concern should be with substantive socioeconomic 
inequality 
rather than formal political inequality. Capacity requires, 
indeed depends, on 
socioeconomic conditions, thus the polity in the good society 
is shaped and , 
in turn 
shapes, its socioeconomic features. 
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I have already made reference to the way in which inequality of wealth in societies 
such as ours may result in inequality of political influence. However, to remedy this 
situation, we are concerned not only with a more equal distribution monetary wealth; 
we also require a definition of the level of need satisfaction. In the matter of needs and 
considering how things presently are, we surely know enough about human beings to 
be able to say what common basic needs must be catered for to make possible a decent 
human existence for all: adequate nutrition, housing, clothing and fuel, proper medical 
care; some meaningful and agreeable work, and the possibility of significant amounts 
of free time from work for political and recreational activities, with some resources 
given to these ends. Equality of incomes would then occur over and above this 
satisfaction of basic needs. It follows then, that an equalisation of wealth gives us 
more opportunity to direct our own lives in accordance with our own desires and 
intentions, including the opportunity for political participation. 
But even if this were achieved, equality in other areas of social life needs to be 
pursued. For example, we would need to take seriously equality of education for 
participation in the democratic process. The more knowledge and understanding we 
have (through greater access to educational opportunities) the more we are able to 
think rationally and coherently, and the more successful we shall be in controlling our 
environment, carrying out our wishes and satisfying our desires. 
At this point however, it should be acknowledged that equality is a problematic value 
because it is always on some specified dimension and compatible with, or even 
requiring, inequalities in other dimensions. For example, if a primary objective is to 
make well off those who are badly off by way of certain policies, there will be 
occasions when we shall do so by securing a certain inequality. One such policy 
would be concerned with transferring resources (for example, wealth through 
progressive taxation) from those who are better off to those who are badly off Of 
course, the limit of transfer is open to debate but obviously (significant) distress must 
not be increased by the transfer of resources. That this method may have the effect of 
reducing the absolute well-being of the better-off is a fact that must be overridden by 
the moral priority of achieving equality. 
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Moreover, the pursuit of equality also includes the struggle for equality of opportunity 
which, amongst other things, may be taken to consist in the use of certain resources 
including peoples' abilities and freedom from unfair discrimination. It follows that if it 
is the case that some individuals are less capable than others, we shall sometimes do 
best by securing that they have more opportunity. For example, we are already 
familiar with the idea of using more resources for the less able in education. 
Moreover, remedying unfair discrimination (eg. on the grounds of race, gender, sexual 
orientation etc. ) requires steps to be taken which will attack the problem at a structural 
level. Thus, positive discrimination programmes could be considered in cases where 
opportunities for the individual are restricted on irrelevant grounds (although 
obviously such programmes would be a temporary measure designed to eliminate the 
sort of society in which systematic unfair discrimination necessitates their 
implementation). 
Nevertheless, I would argue that, overall, emphasis should be placed overwhelmingly 
on the inequality of structural power relations, in particular the relations of production 
in a class society. I will be offering a fuller account of this Marxist position later in the 
chapter (and again in Chapter 3) but to briefly summarise: Marx argued that capitalist 
relations of production give the class owning the means of production a pervasive 
power over the other, not just in economic life, but in the making of decisions about 
the life of society as a whole. In contrast, egalitarian relations of production would 
consist in the common ownership and popular control of the means of production. 
These would give people power over their own lives, and especially over their working 
lives. They would constitute a democratic society in which all would share equally in 
the making of decisions and choices about the organisation and direction of economic 
and political activity, in place of a society in which most people have these choices 
made for them. 
It is possible then, to cite liberty and equality, which does not undermine the status of 
human beings as autonomous, rational agents, as the foundation of democracy. 
However, I have yet to resolve the dilemma of a clash between the individual and some 
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collective entity responsible for making and implementing decisions which impinge 
upon that individual. In what circumstances do we owe a political obligation to a 
collective, and does this obligation still hold when we believe a decision taken to be a 
mistaken one? 
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AUTONOMY, COLLECTIVISM, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION. 
The philosophical anarchist Robert Paul Wolff gives first place to personal autonomy 
and individual responsibility and second place to political obligation. For him, every 
person is morally responsible for his or her own actions and has a moral duty to take 
full responsibility for those actions. Essentially, people have an obligation to make up 
their own minds about what is the best thing to do and then to act on that judgement. 
In fact, Wolff believes that this is the supreme moral obligation people have. His view 
is similar to the one expressed by Thoreau who wrote: 
"The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time 
what I think right. " (Bedau 1979. p. 28) 
Thus, both Wolff and Thoreau are embracing the principle of autonomy: that we have a 
duty always to follow our own conscience, rather than allowing some other agency to 
determine how we shall act. However, it is possible to envisage circumstances where 
the curtailment of autonomy is consistent with a principled commitment to autonomy. 
For example, if someone wants to kill or injure me (for pleasure or gain) then the 
carrying out of his or her autonomous actions will interfere with my ability to carry out 
my autonomous actions. Inevitably, in this situation someone's autonomy is violated, 
and in accordance with the conditional principle to violate the autonomy of the attacker 
rather than permit the violation of the victim's autonomy is justified. 
However, while Wolff is correct to stress the value of personal autonomy, he overlooks 
the implications of both our need to cooperate with others and the respect we owe to 
others as autonomous beings. As Robert Dahl (1970) has argued, if preserving our 
autonomy were the only important goal, we would have to be hermits or dictators or 
find people to live with who always want to do just what we want. (p. 8-1 1). But 
human beings impinge on one another via the projects they conceive and their attempts 
to realise these projects in action. Thus, autonomy consists not just in making up one's 
mind but in acting upon it. Returning to Wolff s argument, I have an obligation to take 
responsibility and think out how I am to act. But if I regard autonomy as a supreme 
value, I must also be prepared to extend this value to others and universalise 
this claim. 
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Thus, any regard for autonomy must extend beyond the boundaries of the individual 
and must be manifested in action. 
So on what grounds can we justify a curtailment of autonomy? First, it is possible that 
forfeiting a degree of my autonomy with respect to a particular decision taken may 
greatly increase the probability of my making many more autonomous decisions in the 
future. For example, in studying for a degree I decide to conform to the rules and fulfil 
the obligations set down by the university because I believe that the useful knowledge I 
will gain will increase my autonomy at a later date. 
Second, anyone who relates to others as equals must sometimes defer to their wishes or 
judgement. Thus, an individual who makes a promise limits his or her autonomy by 
being bound to take certain actions. So, if I make a promise to meet a friend in a pub 
at 7 o'clock, it would be morally unacceptable to arrive at half-past eight or not at all, 
simply because I had found something better to do. This is because when entering into 
a relationship of obligation, we then acquire a reason to act in accord with what these 
relationships require. So what of political obligation? We can argue that the more 
autonomous decisions there are in favour of a political action, then autonomy will be 
curtailed if that option is rejected. By extension, if most autonomous decisions are in 
favour of a certain political option, then autonomy is maximised if that option is 
accepted. In short, the requirements of autonomy themselves appear to justify the 
acceptance of majority decisions. However, this leaves no room for forms of 
democracy where decision-making lies in the hands of a small group, with relatively 
little direct control by the populace. In other words, there is no place for the 
representative form of democracy which is characteristic of British society. Thus, any 
relationship of political obligation can only be justified where 
decision-making 
involves the participation of all citizens (encompassing a notion of citizenship yet to 
be 
clarified) Nevertheless, it would be naive to suggest that conscientious resistance 
to 
collective decisions would never be justified in these circumstances, and 
if it is, we 
need to know when and why. 
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In order to explain why an individual should abide by a collective decision we need to 
examine what moral weight a collective carries. Graham (1986) offers the useful 
concept of 'ontological collectivism' to show how collectives, as well as individuals, 
may be viewed as appropriate objects of moral appraisal. That is, he challenges the 
view, put forward by theorists such as Wolff and Nozick, that the only proper objects 
of moral appraisal are the individual's actions, attitudes and so on. Using the examples 
of a jury and a committee, Graham argues that there are some entities which although 
consisting of nothing over and above individuals, it is not as individuals but only as 
members of the collective that these individuals have any role in the process which 
constitutes that collective's deliberations and actions. By focusing upon 'ontological 
collectivism' Graham is arguing against the view taken by Wolff and Thoreau that I 
must retain for myself the final decision how to behave, and that I am causally 
responsible for actions following that decision. He concedes that this may be true with 
the respect to the behaviour of an individual moral agent but not with respect to the 
behaviour of a member of a collective, for the latter is at most only partially 
responsible for what the collective does, and so the objection of causal responsibility 
which is used to resist the implementation of social decisions has been removed. For 
example, a member of a jury is not solely responsible for the verdict passed, it is only 
his or her contribution to the decision of the jury as a collective entity which is 
significant. 
At a theoretical level then, we have a situation where a number of individuals, with 
good reason, voluntarily and explicitly form themselves into a collective with specific 
and definite purposes in mind. It is then appropriate to think of myself as a member of 
that collective. We can now ask what the precise nature of an individual's contribution 
to the decision-making of the collective would be. One form could simply be uttering 
the words 'I promise' which constitutes not only the description but also the 
performance of the action itself. But what of those members who are not willing to 
promise? It is certainly possible for a collective to make a decision not agreed by all 
members. One option is, of course, majority decision. Acceptance of majority 
decisions is no longer stigmatised because, if we recall the jury example, the reason to 
reserve one's autonomy (complete causal responsibility for the outcome) 
has been 
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removed. Indeed, if individuals view themselves as members of a voluntarily formed 
collective, and concede that their dissent may obstruct the achievement of consensus, 
then a willingness to give way may carry the same moral weight as compromising 
one's own convictions. However, the primary aim of the collective should be to 
achieve initial unanimity, and if this appears unlikely, then it should be possible to 
postpone a collective decision in the interests of further discussion with a view to 
achieving consensus. 
The above scenario has implications for our democratic ideal of equal citizenship and 
political obligation. To be a citizen of a cooperative association is to owe the other 
members a political obligation; it is a horizontal relationship which we owe to each 
other as equal citizens rather than a vertical relationship of obedience to the state. In 
our new democratic polity we owe other citizens the same behaviour we expect from 
them. This is because the polity of the good society is a cohesive collective entity, 
which speaks in the name of its citizens and justifies its actions in terms of their 
interests. Citizens' rights and opportunities, together with the material resources which 
give such rights and opportunities meaning, are the outcome of collective efforts. 
Thus, political life in the good society is a shared life, a collective experience - the 
individual citizen is a social being, not a theoretical abstraction as liberal democratic 
theory would suggest. For these reasons, citizens constitute and recognise themselves 
as forming part of a collective, and their political identity is an important element in 
their conception of themselves. In the good society, citizens have the security of the 
collective as their business, indeed, we are citizens before we are private individuals. 
Thus, it may be that we may, as private individuals, find some laws, policies or 
decisions disagreeable or burdensome, but if dissent threatens the moral quality of 
collective life, then individual autonomy (in the sense of disobedience) must be 
curtailed. 
But saying this, our political obligation does not imply that respect for individuals, in 
different forms and in different contexts, be eradicated. We still retain the duty to 
consider our actions, and we need not absolutely put ourselves in the control of others. 
Moreover, we retain the duty to assess the system of which we are members and to 
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ensure, if we choose to live within it (and travel its highways! ), that it is a just and fair 
system for all members. The polity we create must respect the right and duty of 
citizens to examine its laws and policies, and freely decide whether such laws and 
policies benefit or harm the community, and in the case of the latter, whether they have 
an obligation to criticise, protest and in specific circumstances, even perhaps disobey. 
If we decide that the system is as fair and just as it can be, then we owe a political 
obligation, and it is through this horizontal relationship of obligation, that we do our 
fair share to support the system. This implies direct democracy, where all individuals' 
judgements are accommodated, which in turn requires maximum citizen participation, 
rather than relinquishing this to other individuals. 
However, this is not deny diversity of function. Different functions may be performed, 
but the nature of that function and who performs it will have to be justified in terms of 
relevant criteria. For example, it may be fair to exclude someone from the university 
hockey team on the grounds of inferior ability but not on the grounds of race. Again, 
Aristotle makes this point well using the example of flute players. The best flutes are 
given (although not in a market economy! ) to the best flute players not to those who 
are nobly born. For Aristotle, the sole consideration must be ability at the work which 
has to be done, in this case flute-playing. (Mulgan 1977 p. 61) Nevertheless, we shall 
need to address the question of how the required level of political participation is to be 
achieved, and it is to this problem that we now turn. 
PARTICIPATION THEORY. 
We have seen that any democratic system must, by its nature, involve some degree of 
participation. Our problem now is where to fix that degree between minimal 
participation over social decisions and total involvement at every stage of every 
decision. We may recall, through our discussion of elite theory, that there is a high 
degree of apathy among citizens, and we now examine an approach which puts forward 
a number of suggestions about how participation may be increased. Commonly 
known 
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as participation theory, it includes the work of Rousseau, G. D-H Cole and Carole 
Pateman. 
Rousseau's entire political theory in the 'Social Contract' (1762) hinges on the 
individual participation of each citizen in political decision-making. Individuals enter 
a reciprocal agreement with each other not just as individuals but also as legislators. 
Thus, they enter into an agreement, collectively, to make laws for themselves as 
citizens, and to obey those laws as individuals. Political obligation, in Rousseau's 
political association, is thus owed by citizens to each other and binds them in a 
horizontal relationship together. (Ryan 1983 p. 39-58) 
Rousseau also argued that certain economic conditions were necessary for a 
participatory system; he advocated a society of economic equality and economic 
independence whereby: 
rpno citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to 
beforced to sell h imsey' ." (ibid. p. 96) 
But in order to preserve this equality, Rousseau also wanted individuals to be 
interdependent to ensure that the only policy that will be acceptable to all is one where 
advantages and disadvantages are equally shared. The policy result is that the 'general 
will' or the 'political morality of the common good' is always just (affects all equally). 
However, for Rousseau, the central function of participation is an 'educative' one (in 
the broadest sense). Through the participatory process the individual learns to consider 
matters beyond his or her own private interests, if the cooperation of others is to be 
secured, and one also learns that public and private interests are linked. Moreover, the 
participatory system is self-sustaining in the sense that the more a citizen participates, 
(assuming he or she wishes to) the more he or she is able to do so, through increased 
knowledge, skills. opportunities and so on. . 
Building on Rousseau's argument that the 'will' is the basis of social and political 
organisation, G. D. H. Cole in 'Guild Socialism Restated' (1920) argues that the 
individual is: 
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ffmost ftee where he (sic) cooperates with his equals in the making of 
laws". (P. 104-6). 
The idea of participation is central to his theory. 
For Cole,, like Rousseau,, there could be no equality of political power without a 
substantive measure of economic equality. 
"Theoretical democrats" he said, ignored "the fact that vast inequalities 
of wealth and status, resulting in vast inequalities o education, power ýf 
and control of the environment, are necessary fatal to any real 
democracy, whether in politics or any other sphere. " (ibid) 
Cole proposed an elaborate system of guilds which involved maximum participation 
and face-to-face discussion at the basic level, with representatives elected to 
subsequent layers of decision-making up to a National Commune, with all 
representatives subject to recall. The horizontal (political) structure was to give 
expression to the 'communal spirit of the whole society'. Each town or country area 
would have its own commune where the basic unit would be the ward, again to allow 
for maximum individual participation. 
For Cole, the educational function of participation is crucial, arguing that it was only 
participation at the local level and in local associations that individuals could 'learn 
democracy'. In Cole's view, industry provided the all-important arena for the educative 
effect of participation to take place, for it is in industry that, outside government, the 
individual is involved to the greatest extent in relationships of superiority and 
subordination. 
Carole Pateman similarly argues that one reason for making industrial participation 
central,, is that abolishing the distinction between 'managers' and 'men' would go a long 
way towards the economic equality required for equal participation. In 'Participation 
and Democratic Theory' (1970) Pateman distinguishes between 'pseudo-participation' 
(where employees are encouraged to question decisions); 'partial participation' 
(where 
employees have some influence over decisions but the final power rests with 
the 
management); and'full participation' which is 
defined as: 
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ffa process where each individual member of a decision-making body has 
equalpower to determine the outcome of a decision. " (p. 71) 
Through presenting empirical evidence on participation in the workplace, Pateman 
argues that participation has an important psychological impact on workers increasing 
the sense of dignity and worth of the individual and enhancing job satisfaction. 
However, she also concedes that much of the evidence is about partial participation, 
and suggests that the low existing demand for higher level participation in the 
workplace could be partially explained as "an effect of the socialisation process". 
(ibid. p. 14) which fosters in many workers a feeling of powerlessness against authority 
and an incapacity to take effective action in one's own interest. 
The problem with participation theory is partly one of motivation and partly one of 
expertise and social organisation. Although the empirical evidence cited by 
participation theorists (particularly the work of Almond and Verba) suggests a 
significant desire for greater participation on the part of employees, this is far removed 
from a wish to become involved in wider political processes. Moreover, even for those 
with significant leisure time and political interest, it is extremely unlikely that they will 
equip themselves with the knowledge of all the different areas where expertise is 
required. 
Furthermore, there are strengths and weaknesses in focusing upon industry. The 
strengths lie first, in highlighting evidence which suggests that diminished autonomy 
in the workplace is a situation only grudgingly accepted by employees. Second, it 
stresses the need to examine institutions and structures of authority which lie outside 
the political process. The major weakness however, is that in today's society of high 
unemployment, structural adjustments to the labour force and demographic change, 
many people do not spend their lives in the workplace. Moreover, within the 
productive sphere itself, we are witnessing fragmentation: instead of unified trade 
unions dominated by the male manual worker, we have more variegated workers' 
organisations in which white-collar and professional workers, and women in all 
occupational groups, are playing larger roles. Thus, participation theory needs to be 
transformed into a much wider theory, which draws other institutions and more varied 
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and fragmented social movements into the debate. Similarly, given the emphasis 
placed by participation theorists on economic inequality, it is also crucial to discuss 
patterns of ownership of substantial resources and how such patterns may be changed. 
In sum then, participation theory offers valuable insights into how political 
participation may be increased, and the importance of participation as an educative 
device, but it needs to be more radical in its recommendations. This is an appropriate 
place therefore, to turn our attention to the work of Karl Marx. 
MARXIST THEORY. 
In one way, a discussion of Marx's ideas is continuous with that of participation theory; 
it is a theoretical proposal for change, rather than merely a description and explanation 
of existing reality. However, Marx's theory is not in the first instance a theory of 
democracy, but what he has to say about the means of emancipation which must be 
adopted by the working class, and the connexion between political life and other 
material aspects of society, all suggest a concrete application of the subject of 
collective decision-making by free, rational agents. 
Marx believed that to understand the development of a society it was necessary to 
build up a concept of historical change, and stated that it was material economic forces 
which lay behind the transition from one type of economy to another, or 'mode of 
production' to another. Marx argued that class divisions only arise when a surplus is 
generated and it becomes possible for a class of non-producers to live off the 
productive activity of others. Those who are able to gain control of the means of 
production (factories, raw materials, tools etc. ) form a dominant or ruling class both 
economically and politically. For Marx, each mode of production, for example 
feudalism, would destroy itself and create the conditions for the next, in this case 
capitalism. Increasing demands for more production within each economic system 
inevitably lead to changes in the forces of production (the way things are made) yet the 
existing social relations of production (class position) are vigorously defended. This 
conflict of interests results in the destruction of the old system and the creation of a 
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new mode of production which will have a new social relationship compatible with the 
changed forces of production. Under capitalism, the two 'hostile camps' are the 
bourgeoisie (those owning the means of production) and the proletariat (the vast 
majority who are forced to sell their labour power in return for a wage). However, 
according to Marx, the proletariat (or working class) surrender part of their production 
without receiving anything in return, this is 'surplus value'; surplus value is the 
mechanism by which the capitalist class exploit the workers, it is the value of surplus 
labour for the capitalist and is thus extracted at the expense of the working class. 
For Marx,, the mode of production of material life (or economic base) conditions the 
social, political and intellectual life processes in general. This leads him to argue 
therefore, that: 
"... it is not the consciousness of men (sic) that determines their being, 
but on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness". (Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy'. 18599 
This sketch of Marx's view of production enables us to understand his view of politics. 
For him, the state, parliament and the entire political sphere do not occupy neutral 
ground in which success is obtained purely on the basis of rational argument and 
numerical appeal. Indeed, political freedom is only related to the formal political 
sphere which itself forms only a segmented part of the social totality. Thus: 
"... just as the Christians are equal in heaven, but unequal on earth, so 
the individual members of the nation are equal in the heaven o their !f 
political world, but unequal in their earthly existence of society. " (Levin 
1983 p. 82) 
For Marx then,, the liberal democratic notion of politics is fraudulent, involving the 
leadership's betrayal of the class interests they are supposed to represent. 
Marx's theory is an explanatory theory which provides us with a view about the social 
change to be effected and its relation to democratic procedure. Thus, the task of the 
proletariat is to bring about a situation 'where capital is converted into common 
property, into the property of all members of society'. This proposal for a fundamental 
transformation of productive relations therefore implies a transformation of the whole 
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of social relations. It follows then that a political revolution is also necessary for a 
social revolution. What are the conditions for its occurrence? 
Marx stressed emphatically that the revolution to emancipate the working class had to 
be achieved by the working class themselves. A means of achieving this would be 
through a system of universal suffrage, that it be:. 
"transformed ftom the instrument offraud that it has been up till now, 
into an instrument of emancipation ". (Fernbach 1974 p. 3 76-7) 
Similarly, Engels saw universal suffrage as providing an index of the degree of support 
which has been won, thus warning against untimely action or inaction. (Evans 1975. 
p. 137. ) Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to interpret Marx as suggesting the 
employment of liberal democratic institutions as they presently stand (that is, 
reflecting the capitalist economic base), political institutions would themselves need to 
change in our ideal democratic society. 
Marx's crucial emphasis on self-emancipation has often been overlooked by many 
Marxist commentators who tend to adopt a'broadly-defined' Marxism which combines 
Marxist/Leninist theories. Thus, it is prudent, from a democratic point of view, to refer 
briefly to Graham's analysis of Marx in which he argues for the need to put a 
theoretical distance between Marx and Lenin. Graham points out that the tragic fate of 
Marxism was that it was 'Leninised'. Through an examination of Lenin's writings 
Graham draws attention to Lenin's emphasis on emancipation from outside the 
proletariat through the process of 'vanguardism'. That is, Lenin argued that most 
workers are incapable of developing the necessary political consciousness, thus 
emancipation depends crucially on some other, smaller group's leadership, guidance or 
domination in some stronger form. (Lenin identified the Party as this agency, and later 
the Central Committee). 
Moreover, Lenin focused on the tactical function of parliamentary practices (such as 
boycotting parliament or electing parties in order to highlight their 
deficiencies). This 
is far removed from Marx's self-emancipation thesis and 
his stress on the positive 





individuals can be achieved only through a political movement in which agents 
themselves fully participate as equals. Political activity is then designed to bring about 
a change in political consciousness thus securing consent. If this effect is unsuccessful, 
then the desired change to a state of affairs characterised by voluntary and harmonious 
cooperation is, in any case, postponed. For Marx, propaganda, the attempt to convince, 
is precisely what is required to hasten the move towards revolutionary change. Thus, 
the most important political development for Marx takes place prior to any revolution 
and outside parliamentary institutions, namely in the growth of working class 
consciousness. For Lenin, on the other hand, revolutionary change must come first, 
which in his account requires a deference from the working class to those privileged 
enough to be able to see where the proletariat's interests lie. Thus, for Graham, the 
necessity for maintaining a distinction between Marx and Lenin is essential as his 
following statement testifies: 
"Hitler is reported as having said that Nazism is what Marxism could 
have been, had it freed itself from the absurd, artificial link with a 
democratic system.. On the contrary, Leninism is what it became when its 
natural link with democratic principles was forcibly severed. " (Graham 
1986p. 230). 
Having anticipated the danger of incorporating Leninism within our Marxist approach, 
we must now ask how the ideas of Marx can help us in the construction of our 
democratic ideal. First, we have seen in previous discussions how wealth (or its 
absence) can play a major role in interfering with the plans which a rational agent 
might otherwise bring to fruition. Thus, Marx is right about the necessary conditions 
in which democratic principles can be embedded; strategies such as an increase in 
taxation or the encouragement of charity for example, which leave capitalist relations 
and institutions intact, are clearly insufficient. What is needed is a radical 
reconstruction of productive relations. 
Second, recalling our discussion of 'ontological collectivism' and its usefulness 
in 
providing a model in which individuals fully participate 
in decision-making, Marx 
gives concrete historical context to the idea of the reality of collectives. 
His focus on 
how the capitalist mode of production brings workers together 
in a huge cooperative 
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effort, also shows how the same mode of production serves to unite and organise this 
'collective power' which can bring about a classless society. Workers therefore have a 
reason to constitute into a collective and identify with its aims. Today, there is much 
academic discussion about the 'New Times' we are living in -a post-Fordist, post- 
modernist world of fragmentation, differentiation and diversity in which the old 
dichotomies of labour versus capital, men versus women, black versus white etc. no 
longer apply. These collective entities of traditional theories (or 'meta-narratives') we 
are informed, are now out-dated concepts. However, it may be that a vast range of new 
forces are representing the varied interests of society but such change serves only to 
strengthen the case for a Marxist approach. Marx himself made the important point 
that individuals/workers need to look beyond sectional interests (differences of status, 
income,, cultural diversity etc. ) and beyond the confines of capitalist society. He 
proposes that they look to a more fundamental level where they share a common 
interest, and act to convert productive resources into the common possession of all. 
Marxism shares with participation theory a mistrust of existing representative systems 
and an aspiration to a much fuller participation in decision-making by the whole 
populace. However, Marxism differs in that it is much wider in scope, offering an 
analysis of the whole social structure. Marx concentrates on collective efficacy, and in 
doing so brings into focus the possibility of a large number of individuals having 
rational grounds for identifying with large collectives. It follows then, that in such a 
collective any relationship of obligation is owed to fellow members, rather than to a 
political authority which presently excludes the vast majority of the populace from the 
decision-making process. 
POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN THE GOOD SOCIETY. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show how, for a political obligation to exist or 
be justified, one must voluntarily place him or herself in a relationship of obligation; 
that is, political obligation must be self-assumed obligation. Through an analysis of 
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existing political arrangements, I have challenged the liberal democratic view that 
citizens owe a political obligation to the state. 
We have seen that in Britain 'democracy' in its representative form, is representation as 
a choice between competing elites, through an electoral system which reproduces the 
representation of constituency size rather than public opinion. Moreover, I have tried 
to show that political obligation as consent cannot be given through liberal democratic 
electoral participation. My analysis of political equality, an essential prerequisite for 
equal political obligation, throws up the profound inequality of opportunity for equal 
participation and influence within the liberal democratic political process. Economic, 
educational and sexual inequality prior to the vote, and the persistent discrimination 
suffered by minority groups after the vote suggest that the notion of equality of 
political citizenship giving rise to political obligation is untenable, and certainly not 
our experience. Thus, I concluded that alienation by citizens, through elections, of 
their right to make political decisions cannot be political obligation. At most, it is a 
vertical relationship whereby citizens are compelled to obey a political authority 
having no other alternative of democratic redress. 
I then proceeded to construct a democratic model within which political obligation 
must be a horizontal relationship owed by citizens to each other. To demonstrate the 
feasibility of my model I attempted to challenge the fatalism of elite theory which 
stressed the apathy of the citizenry, and the size and complexity of existing 
institutional arrangements as fixed. Then, starting from the idea of democracy as self- 
rule, I examined the role of liberty and equality as components in that idea, and 
suggested that the grounds for favouring political liberty and equality dictated a 
concern with arrangements in the broader social context, not just the narrower political 
one. However, this still left us with the problem of how the principle of autonomy and 
a procedure for collective decision-making may be reconciled. Using Graham's 
concept of 'ontological collectivism', it was possible to envisage a situation where 
majority decisions may be reached and acted upon without 
impinging significantly on 
the individual as a free, rational agent. 
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Nevertheless, having faced the theoretical obstacles, the problem of establishing the 
required level of political participation within the collective still remained, and to this 
end I examined the ideas of participation theorists. However, although this approach 
rightly pointed out the importance of the educative function of participation, its focus 
on the industrial sphere was too narrowly constrained. Although participation theory 
has much to offer in its suggestions for social change to occur, I felt that it did not go 
far enough. Hence, I turned to the more radical theory of Marx, who, through his self- 
emancipation thesis and emphasis on universal suffrage, provided a programme for the 
abolition of existing socioeconomic relations. This would be replaced with a set of 
relations which reverse the relationship of dominance which currently exists between 
decision-makers and the electorate, and greatly increase the control exercised by the 
latter. In sum, what Marx is advocating is social and political revolution. 
However, we must now ask ourselves whether our move towards direct democracy 
through revolutionary means is a realistic objective? The reader may still remain 
unconvinced of this possibility and argue that human nature, being what it is, makes 
individuals unfit for democracy. He or she may possibly share the general assertions 
of other thinkers, that the overall lack of interest in political activity on the part of the 
populace is a 'fact of human nature' established by empirical study, rather than the 
effect of a particular social and economic system (Sartori). Or, the reader may agree 
with Dahl who states that'man' is not by nature a political animal. He or she may even 
endorse the view of Freud who states that the apparent rationality and autonomy of the 
individual is merely illusion. (Duncan G. 'Democratic Theory and Practice' 1983) 
However, I would assert that individuals collectively have the potential capacity to run 
their own affairs and, in the right circumstances, the will to do so. It may be that we 
are addressing ourselves to people in societies in which deep social and economic 
inequality is a fact, widely accepted as normal; in which the health of many is daily 
jeopardised and their lives needlessly shortened, in the midst of the affluent 
enjoyments of the more fortunate others. That is the structure of the 
lived experience 
of the society in which we exist, and consequently 
lies deep in our attitudes and 
culture. Thus, we need to appeal to citizens as 
individual moral agents as well as 
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potential members of a collective. We need to ask not only what people ought to do 
but also in what conditions they are likely to recognise that they ought to and likely to 
want to and psychologically be able to do in order to bring about social change. 
So what are the implications of individual moral responsibility for political obligation? 
In the first place, it follows that one should strive to behave in one's dealings with 
others in accordance with recognised principles: (avoiding violence and coercion as far 
as possible, thus according respect for an individual's autonomy); not assuming any 
individual or group to be more disposable than others; respecting individuals' basic 
physical and psychological needs and so on. This obviously involves some degree of 
compromise. Moreover, it also follows that individuals must view themselves in a 
more role-playing light, as members of a collective engaged in certain social and 
political practices, in respect to which they have a certain responsibility and owe a 
political obligation to other members of the collective. This requires individuals to 
view themselves as actually empowering (through their political apathy and failure to 
participate) many of those processes and injustices which they claim to deplore, and 
would actively resist were it not that they believe that they are beyond their individual 
control. This latter point is linked to the arguments of Peter Singer (1984) who stresses 
our negative responsibility towards others. For Singer: 
"If it is in our power to prevent something very had happening, without 
therehy sacrificing anything of comparahle moral significance, we ought 
to do it. 11 (p. 168. ) 
He argues that people ought to assist (eg. give to famine relief) as much as possible, 
(without causing serious suffering to oneself or one's dependants) and ought (morally) 
to be working full-time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of 
famine and other disasters. Here then is an ethical argument on the issue of 'killing or 
letting die' (a concept we consider more fully in the next chapter). If we fail to assist in 
alleviating suffering, regardless of how that suffering came about, we are committing 
an injustice through our inaction. As Singer points out: 
"If then, allowing someone to die is not intrinsically different from 
killing someone, it would seem that we are all murderers". (ibid. p. 164) 
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Political participation is crucial then in so far as it registers a protest and emphasises 
individual moral responsibility towards others, thus contributing generally to 
sustaining a progressive moral and political culture. 
However, even if we were to accept that many people may be acquisitive, possessive, 
apathetic individuals in regard to formal politics, 'human nature' cannot be read off 
from these supposedly widely shared characteristics. We must remember that we are 
observing people in a historically specific context, living within the confines of 
capitalism, the results of which Marcuse calls 'a mutilated, crippled and frustrated 
human existence' (Geohegan 1983 p. 156). If we take into account the remarkable 
diversity of individuals and societies and how they change, then we must accept how, 
with changing social experience, people's moral conceptions and their views of what is 
reasonable and possible, and what is necessary or inevitable for social justice to ensue, 
also change. I cannot accept any theory which suggests that existing motives, interests 
and values are permanent features of our social existence. Thus, we can take issue 
with the argument that a fuller democracy must founder on the rocks of human nature. 
A more generous conception of the democratic citizen can be supported, not only 
through a radical reconceptualisation of past social movements which have highlighted 
the possibilities for democratic communities (see E. P. Thompson 1983), but also 
through current example, such as a deeper exploration of everyday life. 
It follows that I am supportive of the explanatory theory developed by Marx which is 
closely linked with a theory of change: it provides grounds for confidence and 
suggests appropriate political strategies such as universal suffrage and the collective 
power to implement such change. However, it must be acknowledged that democratic 
structures provide a necessary precondition for popular control and political obligation, 
but are not in themselves sufficient. Their aim is only manifested when widespread 
participation actually ensues, that is, the opportunity not only has to be there, it has to 
be continuously taken up. Thus, we need to appeal to individuals as rational, moral 
agents and encourage them to identify and locate their common interest through the 
morality of the collective. In order for political obligation to 
be self-assumed 
obligation therefore, citizens must collectively create their political obligation and 
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polity through participatory voting in a democratic community. Moreover, the practice 
of political obligation requires that individuals develop the capacities that enable them 
rationally and self-consciously to appreciate the aims and objectives of their political 
collective. At present, the liberal democratic reification of existing institutions 
prohibits the development of such critical thinking. 
In conclusion then, an essential feature of a horizontal view of political obligation in 
my new democratic 'good society', is that the 'political' is no longer conceived as 
separate from the other spheres of social existence. It is in the area of collective life 
that individuals voluntarily cooperate and strive to sustain a system of fairness and 
equality. Only in such a system, where all individuals enjoy equal citizenship and 
participation, can a political obligation as a relationship that individuals voluntarily 
take upon themselves and so refuse, reject or change, be conceived. We can follow 
Aristotle and say then: 
"... that the citizen, like the sailor, is one of the partners in a society. 
Sailors are unlike each other in capacity: one is an oarsman, another a 
helmsman, another a bowman, and others have other such names; but it 
is clear that, while the most precise account of each one's goodness will 
be peculiar to himself, there will also be some common account fitting 
them all alike. The safety of the voyage is the business of them all, for 
each of the sailors aims at that. Similarly, the citizens, though unlike 
each other, have the safety of the society as their business. " (Tolitics' 
Chapter 3. Part 4. ý 
Thus, only under the banner of a just, democratic society can we be called upon to 
defend such a system. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND THE JUST WAR. 
I want to pose a number of questions, by way of introduction to this chapter, which I 
believe any discussion of political obligation in the context of war needs to address. 
First, we need to examine the meaning of justice in the context of war and discuss the 
citizen's obligation to the state in such a situation. As we have seen in the preceding 
chapter, one of the great issues of political philosophy is that of legitimacy and 
political obligation, now we turn to discuss that obligation under severe pressure of 
circumstance. What conditions, if any, must a government satisfy in order to merit the 
obligations of citizens to risk their lives in periods of war? Is it our absolute patriotic 
duty to risk death or kill others on behalf of a political authority or do we have a right 
to express conscientious objection and exercise civil disobedience? 
Second, it is necessary to construct a philosophical critique of the rationalisation of 
war. Individuals have to justify war by appeal to exceptional circumstances and 
overriding principles, the justifications often based on appeals to utilitarian 
consequentialism. This idea (of a necessary means to a desirable goal) can be 
supported on a number of grounds. For example, it can be argued that one is fighting 
not for economic gain or territorial acquisition, but in self-defence or to defend others 
(for example, the weak or innocent) from an aggressor. If you witnessed an attack on 
your neighbour would you not rush to his or her defence, using any force necessary to 
quash the aggressor? But if we apply this argument to nations, how do we explain the 
principle of non-interference upheld by sovereign states? Another defence of means 
justifying the end is connected with idealism. A given war, the argument goes, is the 
only way to preserve great ideals and values without which 'life would not be worth 
living'. Could we argue that those who lost their lives in World War 11 preferred death 
to life under a Nazi regime? Is it possible to identify values which are more valuable 
than 'life itself (a problematic and misleading abstraction, as we shall see) and thus 
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need to be preserved at whatever cost? Whether this is a relevant argument requires 
cautious philosophical exploration. 
Third and linked to the above, is the philosophical problem of reconciling the conduct 
of war for the desired goal of promoting human values, with the fact that modem 
warfare violates all personal values. Returning to the consequentialist doctrine for the 
moment, is it possible to argue that certain horrific acts such as the Coventry and 
Dresden saturation bombings and the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki can 
be ethically defended on the grounds of promoting human values? In the name of 
'freedom' and preserving 'cultural identity' nations have used anti-personnel bombs and 
napalm, have contemplated the use of nuclear weapons and continue to develop 
techniques for biological warfare by means of which whole populations would be 
decimated by disease. How can we justify such conduct on the grounds of promoting 
human values? 
Finally, we need to question the conventional means of dealing with enemies and 
conduct a rational investigation into what an enemy is. Could it be that war itsey, is a 
greater enemy to human beings than any nation? If so, what are the alternatives to the 
'military method' for resolving international disputes? E. A. Burtt (1969) attempts to 
address this question by pointing to the contributions philosophy can make to settling 
conflict between opposing parties. (p. 30-47) In his view, philosophers need to return 
to the mutual search for enlightenment and away from a method of disputation based 
on victory and defeat. If philosophers resisted the urge to overthrow competing 
arguments and concentrated on striving for truth, they could see opposing philosophies 
as a valuable resource and look for and benefit from the true insights of others. But 
could we realistically envisage the possibility of replacing armed conflict between 
nations with recognition of common interests, active sharing of different values and 
peaceful acceptance of negative criticism? Could we in all seriousness view 
philosophy as the moral alternative to war, and philosophers as Burtt's 'new warriors' 
in a post-military society? 
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THE POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO DIE. 
Individual security is affected both positively and negatively by the liberal democratic 
state. On the one hand, individuals depend on the government for their general 
security (through institutions such as social security, the courts etc. ), yet on the other, 
may view the government as a source of threat to their personal security, for example, 
through tolerance of systems which predictably yield economic exploitation, 
miscarriages of justice and threats arising from the government's external security 
policies. The government is supposed to provide a measure of protection to its citizens 
from foreign interference, attack and invasion, but it cannot do so without imposing 
risks and costs on them. Indeed, as Walzer (1977) points out: 
"There has never been a more successful claimant of human life than 
the state ". (p. 77) 
However, the risk of war is usually accepted by citizens as a fair trade-off for the 
broader measure of security provided by the government. Nevertheless, modem war 
produces enormous risks and severe casualties and it is whether citizens have an 
obligation to take such risks for the sake of national security that I want to discuss 
here. This involves first, an examination of the contradictory relationship between 
individual security and national security. 
It needs to be stated at the outset that absolute security is impossible for any individual. 
Even the most privileged in society who can protect themselves from such threats as 
preventable disease and economic exploitation, share with the less fortunate other 
threats such as unavoidable terminal illnesses and the potential horrors of nuclear war. 
Moreover, we must remind ourselves that life for its own sake is often not ranked first 
among individual values. People often place their lives at risk in pursuit of other 
values such as the thrill of achievement (eg. as might pot-holers and sky-divers) or for 
the pleasure of authority and power (eg. possibly policemen/women and prison 
officers) or for financial gain (eg. many mercenaries). Thus, it is not unusual to find 
political questions raised about individual versus national security in cases where 
armed forces are raised by conscription (eg. Vietnam war) and very few in cases where 
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professional soldiers are involved (eg. the Falklands war). In the former, policies 
require citizens to place themselves at risk in the service of their government - in the 
latter,, citizens have already made a free decision to place other values higher than their 
own lives in some circumstances which might arise. Thus, the purpose of this section 
is not to discuss risk-situations in which free choices have been made, but situations 
whereby citizens are legally obligated to risk death because their government deems it 
necessary. Moreover, we need also to explore the source and strength of any moral 
obligation to do so. 
ABSOLUTE PATRIOTISM. 
"Whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place,, (a person) 
must do what his city and country order him: or else he must change 
their view of what isjust". (Plato 'Crito ý Trans. Jowett B. 1937. p. 434-5) 
The above quote from Plato's 'Crito' is a powerful statement of the idea that national 
security ranks higher than individual security, and that individuals must be prepared to 
give their lives for their country, whether in battle or in obedience to the law, even 
when they believe that erroneous judgements have been made. This view of 'my 
country right or wrong' we may call 'absolute patriotism' - the belief that one's country 
is entitled to use whatever means necessary to further its view of justice or national 
interests, and that the citizen has a powerful obligation to obey the government in any 
way justified in these terms. In order to explore further the beliefs relevant to absolute 
patriotism we need to place the above quote in its proper context and focus some 
attention on the arguments put forward by Socrates. 
In Plato's 'Crito' Socrates has been convicted of preaching false doctrines and has been 
condemned to die by the Athenian court. While awaiting execution Socrates friend 
Crito offers to help him escape. Socrates however, despite maintaining his innocence, 
refuses Crito's offer, insisting that he is willing to accept the erroneous judgement of 
the law and die for a crime he did not commit, because he has a moral duty to obey the 
laws of Athens. In sum then, for Socrates, being a good citizen requires obedience to 
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the law even when due process has wrongly convicted them and even when such 
obedience requires a great sacrifice by the citizen (in Socrates case, life itself). Thus, 
we can call Socrates an absolute patriot for he believes that there is a powerful 
obligation to obey the law, even when those laws are unjust. But what precisely are 
the arguments Socrates puts forward to justify this view? In the 'Crito' Socrates, 
imagining that the laws are directed at him, states: 
FF ry- 
he who disobeys us (the laws) is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, 
because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because 
we are the authors of his education (i. e. his benefactors); thirdly, because 
he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey his commands; 
and he neither obeys them or convinces us that our commands are 
wrong. " (ibid. p. 435-6) 
Let us examine each of these arguments in turn, first the idea of the state as a parent 
and the assumption that children ought to obey their parents. In the following chapter I 
will be discussing the implications of paternalism in the context of childhood 
autonomy, and challenging the view that natural parents are necessarily the most 
suitable custodians of the interests of a child. But in the context of the state as parent, 
Socrates argument has some persuasive elements. For example, we did not choose to 
be citizens of the society into which we are born, just as we did not choose our parents. 
Moreover, the notion of the state as parent is reflected in our language - consider such 
phrases as 'mother tongue' and Tatherland'; indeed, 'patriotism' itself derives from the 
Latin word for father. Thus, the assumptions which lie behind our linguistic heritage 
may lend some support to the 'parent view' but it is an argument not without its 
problems, particularly in relation to political obligation. 
First, implicit in Socrates argument is the assumption that all parents feel love, concern 
and offer protection to their children, yet there are good and bad parents (the problem 
of child abuse bears clear testimony to this fact). We could suggest, that if we have 
any obligation at all to our parents (and this is not necessarily the case), it depends to a 
large degree on how they treat us, that is, it is not an unconditional obligation. The 
same applies to the relation between citizen and state - when a person justifies his or 
her loyalty by saying 'I was born here, this is my country' we should consider such a 
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statement incomplete because there is no reason to suggest that this loyalty is 
unconditional, it is an obligation subject to certain conditions (eg. whether society has 
treated its citizens fairly etc. ). Neither is this obligation an unlimited obligation. 
Consider the following example. Suppose that my parents have loved, protected and 
cared for me to the best of their ability. When I am 15 years old, my parents join a 
bizarre religious cult and we set up home within the confines of the cult's headquarters. 
However, in time,, the cult is threatened by external forces and the leader orders all 
members to commit suicide. My parents are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cult 
and command me to do the same. Should I obey this command? It is extremely 
difficult to accept that merely because my parents order my voluntary death I should 
carry out this action - the fact that they are my parents does not make it right or an 
obligation to sacrifice my life for them. This may serve as a rather extreme example, 
but its purpose is to show that there are limits to what parents may legitimately 
command. Thus, any obligation here (assuming it exists at all) is not absolute but 
subject to limitations. Overall then, I reject Socrates claim that there is an 
unconditional and unlimited obligation for children to obey their parents and , 
by 
extension, that there is an unconditional and absolute obligation for citizens to die for 
the paternal state. 
Socrates second argument appeals to the good he has received from the state which has 
enabled him to pursue a worthwhile life. Having benefited from his relation to the 
state he therefore has an obligation to obey. This is similar to the 'benefits' argument 
discussed in the previous chapter which stated that, as citizens have benefited from 
state institutions and practices, they therefore owe a political obligation. I have already 
challenged this view in relation to the liberal democratic state by pointing out that an 
unequal distribution of benefits in society can only, at best, (and this is by no means 
conclusive) give rise to unequal political obligations. However, for the purpose of 
S -, I ocrates' argument to work with the assumption that society's benefits are equally 
distributed but question whether such goods received give rise to a political obligation 
to risk one's life for the state. 
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It is true to say that we often feel grateful to those who have made it possible for us to 
enjoy significant goods. However, although I may be grateful for the goods I have 
received (eg. education, health care etc. ), I did not ask for them and might not have 
known that they came with strings attached. For example, as I began to receive state 
education at the age of 4,1 was too young to understand that something would be 
expected of me in return, nor was I yet able to make a rational judgement about 
whether to accept this benefit. In other words, I did not consent to this arrangement. 
Because of my age I was in no position to understand or consent to the fact that there 
might be occasions on which it is for me to owe an obligation for the good received 
(including the obligation to risk my life when commanded). However, leaving aside 
the question of consent, it could be argued that I owe an obligation simply out of 
gratitude for the good I have been given. But this argument is also problematic. For 
example, from this perspective it is possible for me to view the good I have received 
(eg. education) as a gift rather than a benefit which has to be repaid at a later date. It 
follows that if I have received a gift, the possibility of my returning good for good or 
returning obedience for the good has to be a voluntary act, because such actions are not 
written into the transaction. Thus, I may be grateful for the benefit, but I cannot accept 
the idea that there is an obligation of gratitude - whether to show my gratitude or not is 
something I must decide for myself, it is a 'feeling' which has meaning only in a 
voluntaristic sense. Thus, gratitude cannot be enforced, only obligations. 
Furthermore, even if we were to accept that there are obligations that arise from 
society's benefits, there is nothing to suggest (as with the parent argument) that these 
obligations are unlimited. For example, if I have enjoyed the benefits of a free national 
health service it is hard to believe that this may give rise to an obligation to sacrifice 
the life of myself or others simply because my benefactor commands it. Such 
obedience would violate my own rights and possibly the rights of others, and if I am 
capable of moral reflection I may conclude that I ought NOT to obey. Thus, assuming 
that there is a general obligation to obey benefactors, the belief that there 
is an 
unlimited obligation is a false one. 
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Finally, Socrates third argument implies that everyone ought to keep his or her 
agreements. Agreement (or consent), as we saw in the previous chapter, can either be 
explicit (direct) or tacit. An explicit agreement is made when a person explicitly 
accepts the terms of an agreement (eg. by signing on the dotted line). A tacit 
agreement, as previously indicated by Locke and Plamenatz, is implicitly made by 
virtue of participating in various activities (freedom to travel the highway) or not 
openly objecting to something (non-voting). While acknowledging elsewhere the 
problems surrounding these criteria, it is sufficient to assume for our purposes, that 
simply by remaining a citizen, one consents (directly or tacitly) to be bound by the 
laws of a society. However, as previously stated, consent must be to something and in 
the case of a political obligation to risk one's life for national security, we need to 
briefly discuss two conflicting viewpoints within contract theory, notably those of 
Hobbes and Rousseau, before returning to Socrates. 
The notions of obligation, consent and the social contract is central to Hobbes 
'Leviathan' (1651), which is concerned with the process by which (i. e. the social 
contract) unrelated individuals in the state of nature create all their social relationships 
for themselves. During the social contract, individuals consent to exchange their 
'natural' freedom and equality for the status of civil subject with civil freedom and 
equality. However, in the state of nature fear produces in Hobbesian individuals a 
desire for security, but as 'naturally' free and equal individuals they must voluntarily 
enter a contract together to obtain the security of Leviathan's (the sovereign) sword. 
Thus, if one of the principal aims of the state or sovereign is the protection of 
individual life, it appears contradictory to talk of any obligation to die for a political 
authority whose central purpose IS the protection of individual life. The extent to 
which the authority improves security is not the issue here, that is another topic; the 
point I simply wish to make is that according to the Hobbesian analysis 
"... the state has no value over and above the value of the lives of the 
concrete individuals whose safety it provides". (Walzer 19 77. p. 
83). 
However, Hobbes suggests an exception to this rule: 
"... When the Defence of the Common-wealth requireth at once the 
help 
of all that are able to bear Arms, everyone 
is obliged; because otherwise 
62 
the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, 
or the courage to preserve, was in vain ". (Teviathan ý Chap. 21. p. 270). 
But Hobbes argues elsewhere that consent and obedience must last as long as the 
sovereign provides protection. If protection fails, then subjects must submit or consent 
to a new sovereign or face the state of nature. It follows then, that each subject has the 
right to desert the battlefield in order to preserve his life. Given the inconsistency of 
this argument, we can conclude therefore, that Hobbes' abstract individualism which 
proceeds to develop a social contract entered into for protection of individual life, 
cannot gain the consent of individuals to die for the sovereign, because the contract is 
no longer binding if this protection fails. At best, we are left with a risk assessment 
situation in the sense that individuals do not have the obligation to face a greater risk 
for the state than they would in its absence. Thus as Walzer (1977) points out: 
"The great advantage of liberal society may simply be .. that no one can 
be asked to diefor public reasons or on behatf of the state. " (ibid. p. 89) 
So much for the social contract of abstract individualism which clearly rules out the 
possibility of an individual, being bound by consent, to die on behalf of the state. 
However, in Rousseau's version of the social contract, citizens ARE obligated to risk 
their lives and die for a political association. 
It will be recalled that Rousseau's politics is not based on the separate wills of 
individuals but on the'common life'or'general will'of the political community. Thus: 
", Jn place of the individual personality of each contracting party, the 
act of association creates a moral and collective body. " Rousseau J. J. 
'Social Con tract'Bk. 1. Chap. 6) 
Moreover, if a decision is 'law' and benefits or burdens all citizens equally, then 
citizens know that they ought to assume the obligations consequent upon that decision. 
In other words, a moral transformation from the state of nature to the state as the 
common life occurs, and if the new political community is threatened, citizens are 
obligated to die on its behalf because 
11 if the citizen is alone, he is nothing: if he has no more country he has 
no existen ce ". (Ro ussea u J. J. 'Political Writings ý Ch ap. 
4) 
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It follows then that the state has supremacy over the individual citizen - citizens will 
willingly die defending those 'moral goods' generated by the good society - those who 
refuse can, according to Rousseau, be put to death for the sake of the state. This is 
because Rousseau regards those unwilling to die as traitors - they have previously 
consented to preserve the state, yet when called upon to do so they refuse. 
Walzer (1977) highlights a number of problems with Rousseau's argument, not least 
the fact that, if the moral transformation of the 'natural' individual is incomplete (a 
possibility acknowledged by Rousseau), then there is a sense in which he or she is not 
a citizen at all. If this is the case, then this 'non-citizen' or 'political stranger' cannot be 
called a traitor if he or she refuses to die on behalf of the state. Walzer's criticisms, 
although worthy of further exploration, cannot however be accommodated in this 
section. My only reason for touching upon Rousseau's theory here is simply to show 
how, in this version of the social contract, an individual may be obligated to die for the 
state by virtue of his or her previous consent. 
Now let us return to Socrates. The main indication of his agreement to obey the laws 
was his remaining in Athens throughout his life rather than choosing to go elsewhere. 
Thus, we can say that Socrates' agreement is a tacit one. But does residency constitute 
a tacit agreement to obey the laws of a country? 
For example, I have built a successful career for myself, moreover, my family and 
friends are around me and I appreciate the natural beauty of the place in which I live. 
But my country is governed by an extreme right-wing political regime whose policies 
and laws I regard as oppressive and immoral. However, I do have the right to leave the 
country if I wish, but in doing so I would lose my home, family and friends so I choose 
to stay. Under the threat of war I am then required by the government to make the 
safety of this unjust system the motive of my voluntary death. In this situation it is 
certainly questionable to suggest that I have an obligation to risk my life for a system 
which I consider to be immoral. Thus, it is implausible to argue that my remaining in 
the country indicates my approval of the system and constitutes a tacit agreement to 
risk my life in its defence. 
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However, let us again assume that residency DOES constitute an agreement to obey 
the laws - is it an unconditional obligation? Socrates believes he is innocent of the 
charges which have been brought against him, yet he is willing to accept the judgement 
of the law and the high price that obedience will cost him. But in making a prior 
agreement he was willing to obey the laws of Athens in return for certain benefits and 
the protection of his rights, including the immunity of innocence. How then, is he 
obligated to accept an undeserved punishment? To accept this is to accept the 
argument put forward by the US Supreme Court during the 1992 Herrera v Collins 
case which stated that 'Herrera might be innocent but could still be executed because 
his trial had been deemed constitutionally correct' (The Guardian. 8/5/95 p. 29) How 
can one accept an argument that may have regard for due process but so little regard 
for justice? Similarly in Britain, could we argue that the 'Guildford Four', the Maguire 
Seven', Judith Ward, Stefan Kiszko and other victims of miscarriages of justice have a 
duty to accept unwarranted punishment when commanded by the state? If Part of the 
agreement (tacit or otherwise) a citizen makes with the state is immunity of the 
innocent, surely it is plausible to suggest that all miscarriages of justice (which have 
failed to be rectified through appeal procedures) are violations of this agreement? 
Under these conditions, I would argue that citizens are freed of their obligations to 
uphold their part of the contract and cannot be called upon to risk their lives in defence 
of the state. Thus, in Hobbesian terms, we are back to the state of nature. 
The above analysis has attempted to show how each of Socrates' arguments fails to 
justify unconditional and unlimited obligations, and I am therefore drawn to the 
conclusion that absolute patriotism cannot give rise to an obligation to risk one's life 
for the state. However, I have NOT argued that we have no obligations whatsoever to 
a political authority -I have merely tried to show that they do not exist 
in the absolute 
sense that Socrates defends. Nor am I suggesting that those whose patriotism 
is 
absolute cannot be turned into holders of a more qualified version when confronted 
by 
certain questions. For example, we may ask how they assess the strength of 
their 
reasoning (based on the above arguments) relative to the 
importance of avoiding the 
horrors of war. It remains possible that absolute patriots who are capable of rational 
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thinking may be persuaded to qualify their beliefs, and put forward modified views 
such as 'one ought to risk one's life for one's country subject to some conditions, or 
that the war be a Justl or 'defensive' one. These arguments will be considered in 
greater detail later in the chapter. 
THE POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO KILL. 
The preceding section examined the obligation to die or risk one's life on behalf of a 
political authority, and I concluded that absolute patriotism, founded on views from the 
parent, benefits and contract arguments, cannot give rise to such an obligation. 
Nevertheless, I did not rule out the possibility that, in specific contexts, we may be 
obligated to risk our lives for our society. However, before moving on to explore 
situations and circumstances in which this may be the case, I want first to examine a 
perspective which stands at the opposite end of the absolutist spectrum on war, that of 
absolute pacifism. Thus, we move from an analysis of the obligation to die for the 
state to explore the obligation to kill for the state. 
ABSOLUTE PACIFISM. 
There are few among us who do not find the problem of killing morally difficult. 
Some think it is wrong in all circumstances, while others think there are occasions 
(say, in a just war or in self-defence) that some killing may be justified in order to 
avoid a greater evil. However, for the absolute pacifist, it is always wrong to kill 
people however evil the consequences (such as a tragic loss of life or threats to national 
security) of not doing so. Absolute pacifism can have its basis in various kinds of 
belief and here, I want to focus upon two - the first is grounded in a theological 
position and the second rests upon a'sanctity of life'principle. 
Absolutists whose pacifism is based on some kind of religious belief view it as a way 
of life that is inherent in Christian convictions about God. The Gospel is understood to 
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prohibit all killing - just as Jesus refused to use violence to further his cause, so must 
his followers. As Hauerwas (1986) states: 
"All people ought to be nonviolent not because of some general truth 
about humanity, but because allpeople have been called to be part of the kingdom initiated by Jesus of Nazareth. " (in Wakin p. 2 77-283) 
This commitment to nonviolence as a means asserts that we are all brothers and sisters 
and that we have a duty to love one another as such. 
However, for Elizabeth Anscombe (1963), the image of Christianity which this image 
of absolute pacifism projects is a false one. She challenges the conception of the so- 
called 'pacifist' New Testament as standing in sharp contrast to the 'vindictive' and 
harsh teachings of the Old. It is this false distinction between the Old and New (she 
argues the latter relies heavily on the teachings of the former) which upholds the 
misguided view that Christianity entails absolute pacifism. For example, Anscombe 
argues that there is no evidence in the New Testament to show soldiery as 
incompatible with Christianity and cites Christ's commendation of the centurion as one 
illustration of this. For Anscombe then, the selective nature of the Christian version of 
absolute pacifism distorts the true picture of Christianity, seeing it: 
ff... not, as in truth it is, a severe andpracticable religion, but rather as a 
beautifully ideal and impracticable one. " (in Stein. p. 45-62) 
The above discussion is an avenue I do not wish to explore further, given its 
theological and interpretative complexity; nevertheless, even if we acknowledge that 
the selectivity of Christian pacifism fails in an absolute sense, this does not discount 
the possibility of maintaining an absolute pacifist position. For example, one does not 
have to believe in a God or hold any religious convictions to argue that taking life is 
always wrong, particularly if one views every life as being of supreme value. 
What do we understand by the statement 'killing is wrong because it is the taking of 
life'? Should we take it to mean that we are attributing value to the mere fact of being 
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alive? This would be one version of the 'sanctity of life' principle - the idea that life 
has value because being alive is an essential precondition for pursuing any goal 
whatever. Thus, although we cannot refute this view absolutely, we can, nevertheless, 
think of examples where death may be preferable to life. If a person is in excruciating 
pain with no hope of cure, or in an irreversible coma, could we not argue that such 
people would be better off dead? If so, we can suggest that in destroying life, we are 
not destroying anything intrinsically valuable - being alive only has value because it is 
a necessary precondition for other things which are valuable in themselves. Thus, 
another version of the 'sanctity of life' principle refers not to the mere biological 
condition of being alive, but of that of having a'worthwhile life', or as Norman (1988) 
puts it: 
"... the ability of a normal human being to give a distinctive shape to his 
or her life as a whole ". (19 7-209). 
By this account, therefore, we would need to undertake the task of compiling a list of 
ingredients of a worthwhile life, an exercise I attempt in the following chapter. 
Overall then, we have seen that the doctrine of absolute pacifism may take different 
forms, and in this section I have briefly discussed the theological position and the 
pacifist account based on the 'sanctity of life' principle. The latter view can be further 
divided into two interpretations - one which places value on merely being alive; the 
other which views human life as something in which a person is actively engaged and 
therefore presupposes certain minimal abilities. However, some theorists argue that 
any lengthy discussion of absolute pacifism is both unhelpful and unnecessary, simply 
because it is a version of pacifism which can be quickly dismissed as being self- 
contradictory. 
For example, Narveson (1965) argues that pacifism is incoherent because what the 
pacifist is against is violence and in some situations the only way of 
being against 
violence is to use violence. In other words, absolute pacifism 
is inconsistent because, 
in saying that violence or killing is wrong, we are committed to 
the view that we have 
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a right to use violence or killing if necessary to protect our own right not to be the 
victim. So either the pacifist's opposition to violence is not genuine or he/she cannot 
be a consistent pacifist. Let us put Narveson's argument to the Christian pacifist by 
asking the question: 'If all Christians are obligated to love those in need (demonstrated, 
for example, through defending the rights of others), how can you uphold an absolute 
pacifist position in the face of injustice and violenceT One reply the Christian could 
make is that the attacked and the attacker are equally objects of God's love, thus we are 
equally obligated as Christians to love both, regardless of the tragic consequences 
which may result. On the other hand, a non-Christian answer may be that, to say that 
violence or killing is wrong does not necessarily commit us to the view that potential 
victims of such action or those defending potential victims, have an unrestricted right 
to use all means necessary to prevent such injustice. To think something is wrong does 
not entail that those harmed by that kind of act have an exclusive right to self-defence. 
Moreover, there is a problem in treating violence and killing as the same - if we define 
violence as unjustified killing then pacifism is trivially true, and allows killing where 
justified. Thus, Narveson's argument does not necessarily show absolute pacifism to 
be incoherent but there are, nevertheless, other considerations which highlight the 
problems of such a position. 
We have seen that the absolute pacifist may be committed to the view that it is wrong 
to destroy life, even if the alternative is to bring about other kinds of harm, no matter 
how serious. The problem with this 'no trade-off view is that society is then 
committed to giving the saving of life overriding priority over other social objectives. 
Thus, artificial respirators, dialysis machines and other life-saving services and 
equipment, would have a greater claim on societies resources than improved housing, 
better education, preventive health care, cultural and leisure facilities and other 
measures aimed at improving standards of living. The implications for the quality of 
life of citizens could be serious. But in reply, the absolute pacifist may say that it is 
not the saving of life that has moral superiority, rather it is the principle of not taking 
life. Thus, when faced with a situation in which we can only preserve one life by 
sacrificing someone else's (for example, when X is threatening to 
kill Y), the only way 
to maintain an absolute prohibition against killing would 
be to make a distinction 
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between killing and 'letting die'. For the absolute pacifist, a refusal to kill X would be 
seen as a failure to save Y's life rather than an act of killing him, and it is worse to kill 
someone than allow them to die. But is this really the case? To answer this question 
we need to consider the 'acts and omissions' doctrine. 
One of the consequences of the 'acts and omissions' doctrine is that we often 
(implicitly) regard omissions as morally permissible or at least less wrong, when a 
related act, in terms of its consequences, would be morally prohibited or more wrong. 
That is,, we tend to think of omissions in terms of examples drawn from the non- 
culpable end of the spectrum. Consider the following example. 
A close friend of mine suffers from a 'self-inflicted' illness which I know may result in 
his death. Having witnessed a number of life-threatening attacks on his health, and 
having made numerous futile attempts to persuade my friend to change his lifestyle, I 
finally withdraw my help and support. I refuse further appeals for help, justifying my 
action by telling myself that friends, relatives and other agencies will intervene to help 
him should he suffer another attack. However, no help is forthcoming and within 
weeks of my refusal he dies. Should I hold myself in any way responsible? Not 
according to the 'acts and omissions' doctrine which brings into play the idea of 
intention. I did not intend my friends death although I was aware that without constant 
care he might die. If, however, I had shot him through the head, then his death is 
inevitable and I would be judged morally guilty. Thus, probable death is preferable to 
certain death and so we have reason to believe that the act of killing him is worse than 
the omission of non-intervention. But is this really the case? 
It could be argued that some omissions create just as strong a probability of 
death as 
their corresponding acts. For example, if I knew that my continued support and 
assistance would have probably saved my friend from that 
fatal attack, or at least 
prolonged his life significantly, then my refusal to 
intervene could be viewed as a 
wrongful omission. It is important to note that what we 
feel when we remember our 
omissions, is different from what we feel about performing 
the related acts, and can be 
explained by the differential guilt assumed 
by the 'acts and omissions' doctrine. If we 
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questioned the theory, our tendency to feel less guilty about allowing someone to die 
than about killing him might be eradicated. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine insists that harmful acts are more 'God-like' than harmful 
omissions, and this assumption is grounded in the idea that we are all equals and we 
should therefore not place ourselves above other people. But this claim only holds if 
we presuppose the 'acts and omissions' doctrine - that is, if we hold the view that I am 
less responsible for someone's death where it is the result of my deliberate non- 
intervention than where it is the result of my act. But the problem of 'playing God' 
arises in both acts and omissions. It may be argued that killing one person to save 
nineteen is to act 'God-like' - what right have I to decide between taking one life and 
saving others? On the other hand, it may be better to act where the act is the killing of 
one person oneself, if the only alternative of not shooting is that someone else will 
shoot twenty. (Williams 1973 p. 98-99). 
'Playing God' also arises in the example outlined above. For example, it is suggested 
that given the self-inflicted nature of my friend's illness, I carry no responsibility for 
his death because, in a sense, he 'chose' death. But to follow this line of argument is to 
adopt a 'god-like' stance - who am I to judge who is and who is not morally worthy of 
help? Moreover, where do we draw the line? Should we refuse medical aid to 
alcoholics, smokers, drug addicts, people suffering obsessive eating disorders etc., 
simply because they 'brought their problems on themselves"? 
In sum, I seriously question the 'acts and omissions' doctrine on the grounds that it 
serves as a justification for indifference to the plight of others and as an excuse to 
prioritise our own material and psychological well-being at the expense of others (eg. 
we often enjoy the benefits of Third World exploitation, yet fail to contribute to famine 
relief when to do so would not adversely affect our own standard of living in any 
significant degree). Widespread unconcern and 'God-like' intentions as reflected 
in our 
omissions, plays as large a part in causing death, misery and degradation, as 
hostility 
as a result of our acts. I thus endorse the view of Honderich 
(1989) who states: 
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"It may well be because of tacit acceptance of the 'acts and omissions' 
doctrine that we acquiesce in the worst evils in the world". (p. 64) 
Thus, it is sufficient to say here that those who are not prepared to accept either the 
'sanctity of life' principle or the 'acts and omissions' doctrine cannot be absolute 
pacifists. 
Overall then, I would argue that the 'sanctity of life' principle cannot be an absolute 
principle because there are cases where peoples' lives do conflict - where one life (or 
many lives) can only be saved by taking another. Moreover, it is possible to think of 
other situations in which the taking of life may be justified, for example, killing in self- 
defence or killing in order to prevent oppression and suffering on a massive scale. 
Such cases will be considered later in the chapter. 
CONTINGENT PACIFISM. 
Despite the flaws in the absolute pacifist argument, there is a form of pacifism that 
rejects an absolute prohibition on killing in war, such that it is inconceivable that such 
killing could be justified. This view, which John Rawls has called 'contingent 
pacifism' says that while there is in principle the possibility of a war being justified, 
this is in practice a possibility so remote that it can be disregarded. (Rawls 1971. 
Section 58) Wasserstrom, a defender of the contingent pacifist position, focuses on the 
difficulty of justifying the killing of an innocent person in peacetime, and argues that 
an equally heavy burden of justification applies to the killing of the innocent in war. 
Leaving aside the problematic distinction between the 'innocent' and the 'guilty' for the 
moment, the comparison Wasserstrom is making is between killing in war and 
individual acts of killing. It is conceivable that in my private life a situation may arise 
in which my carrying out of a premeditated killing would be justified, but in reality the 
chances of this are so remote, the justification for my act so great, that the question 
does not merit serious consideration. 
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Moreover, the contingent pacifist further argues that since the horrors of war are so 
great, the establishing and maintaining of an anti-war tradition as a means of policy, 
outweighs, in beneficial terms, the most desirable outcome of any war. It is therefore 
worth forgoing short-term advantages to help establish such a tradition. But will a 
total renunciation of war by a nation always have better consequences than a decision 
to go to war? Can we argue with conviction that the awfulness of war is always worse 
than the 'wrong side' winning? What would have been the consequences of a pacifist 
policy towards Hitler? There is no guarantee that the pursuit of pacifism by some 
countries would not give unlimited power to those non-pacifist countries who would 
not hesitate to use it in the form of invasion or threat of invasion. Furthermore, the 
pacifist country which preferred defeat rather than go to war could be remembered in 
either of two ways: for its martyrdom and moral convictions thus earning respect; or 
for foolishly sacrificing the lives of its citizens by allowing success to go to those 
prepared to use force. Thus, although contingent pacifism puts forward a powerful 
argument, justified killing in war, like justifiable homicide, needs to be considered 
according to the merits and demerits of each particular case. 
Nevertheless, when a war begins, people living in the countries involved have to 
decide to what extent they are justified in participating in it., and we would be right in 
arguing that the decision to participate in large-scale killing should be given as much 
consideration as the decision about a private act of killing. This involves, in no small 
measure, the individual's commitment to military service, and his obligation to kill for 
his country. 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: UNIVERSAL AND SELECTIVE. 
Most countries that tolerate conscientious objection usually require three criteria 
for 
exemption from military service: absolute pacifism; religious training and 
belief, and 
conscientiousness. We are already familiar with the 
first two criteria but it is worth 
focusing some attention on the requirement of conscientiousness. 
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Throughout history there have been many deeply sincere individuals who, far from 
displaying cowardice or indifference to conflict and aggression, have believed strongly 
in conscience, that they are best defending true peace by refusing to bear arms. But 
what is 'conscience'? Putting aside the influence of religious training and belief, 
Walzer (1970) describes 'conscience' as being of two types: either a 'personal moral 
code' based on individual moral judgements; or a 'shared moral code' based on a moral 
knowledge which most citizens recognise. (p. 128-131). For Walzer, it is the latter 
interpretation with which we are most familiar today, and it is this interpretation of 
conscience that I will be using here. Individuals may challenge the state and their 
patriotic 'duty' but although the decision to object is a personal one, it is nevertheless 
based on the values and principles shared by many individuals. 
Thus, grounds for exemption of conscientious objectors (COs) include respect for 
conscience. It is deemed unfair to force an individual to act against his or her 
conscience, leaving them with the choice of disobeying the law and being labelled a 
criminal. But how can we be sure that the beliefs of the CO are genuine, that his 
conscientiousness is sincere? 
One solution is simply to take the CO at his word and accept his claims as genuine. 
But is this fair? After all, exemption from military service because of conscience is not 
like exemption from jury service on the same grounds - those who have to serve in the 
COs place obviously have to bear great risks of injury and death. So it is not 
unreasonable to have some tests of sincerity because COs are thought to gain some 
advantage over others in being exempt from military combat. It can be argued then, 
that the individual who claims conscientious objection should bear the burden of proof 
that his convictions are deeply held. But for some commentators, (eg. Broad 1952) it 
is deemed impossible to isolate one's conscientious motives from the motive of fear, 
thus the only clear and definite test of sincerity would be the imposition of the death 
penalty for COs - the sincere CO would prefer 
death to becoming an instrument of war. 
But this appears a rather extreme proposal. Surely procedures such as appeal 
boards 
and judicial reviews could assist in sorting out the genuine 
from spurious claims, rather 
than imposing such an ultimatum on the CO. Moreover, it could be that the CO 
is 
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objecting to the nature of the military act he is obligated to perform (eg. killing), and 
can thus be employed in other ways which contribute to the war effort. 
Another question raised by conscientious objection is the scope of opposition to 
participation in war. Should exemption from military service be granted only to those 
who are conscientiously opposed to participation in any war (universal conscientious 
objectors/UCOs), or should it also be extended to those who are conscientiously 
opposed to participation in a particular war. (selective conscientious objectors/SCOs)? 
SCOs are not absolute pacifists - examples would include non-pacifists who perceived 
the Vietnam war as unjust; Jehovah's Witnesses who are willing to fight in theocratic 
wars; Black Muslims in territorial wars etc. However, it has often been the case that 
only absolute pacifism counts as genuine moral grounds for objecting to war, whereas 
selective objection is a political question of non-support for a particular war. By 
comparison with the UCO, the SCO will often have more complex reasons for 
objecting to military service, based on specific analyses of particular aspects of the war 
rather than objection grounded in the dictates of 'God' or 'conscience. A further reason 
for the SCO being viewed as political is the fact that he criticises his own government. 
While the UCO condemns all governments for their policies of war, the SCO offers 
specific condemnation of his own government's policy. 
But we need to make a distinction here between the subject-matter about which 
judgements are made, in this case political or government policies such as war, from 
the nature of those judgements, in this case moral judgements. Gewirth (1974) 
concludes that: 
"A judgement may be moraL.. with respect to its motivation or the 
reasons on which it is based, bearing on considerations ofjustice and 
welfare, regardless of whether the subject-matter - that about which it 
judges - is political, social or economic 
institutions, or individual actions, 
or many other things. " (p. 99) 
Thus, both the SCO and the UCO may have moral reasons for being opposed to 
participation in a war, and to exempt the 
UCO while forcing the SCO to serve would 
be unjust. 
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Nevertheless, there remain a number of consequentialist arguments opposing SCO 
exemption which merit some discussion. The first points out that if a general 
exemption from the legal obligation to serve in the military were permitted, this would 
make it impossible to have any predictable, reliable outcomes and thus a society 
regulated by law. To drop the requirement of obedience for certain individuals in the 
face of their conscientious opposition would mean that laws no longer have universal 
coercive force. But if this argument holds for the SCO, it also holds for the UCO - 
both, for example, may also refuse to pay taxes that support military activities and thus 
demonstrate selective disobedience. But maybe the issue is that if society recognised 
the SCO's claim to exemption from military service, it would also have to accept 
conscientious claims for exemption from other legal obligations (eg. paying particular 
taxes or accepting particular policies). But it is useful here to draw Walzer's 
distinction between service and subjection. (p. 135-7) People selected for military 
service are clearly instruments of the law whereas as subjection requires all citizens to 
obey. Walzer contends that refusal of service is not a nullification of the law (the state 
can find other servants to carry out its policies) although disobedience might be (the 
state requires universal obedience). Thus, the government need not treat conscientious 
refusals of service and conscientious disobedience in the same way. 
A further consequentialist argument opposing SCO exemption states that broadening 
the criteria for conscientious objection would let so many people through the net as 
seriously to impair the war effort. However, there is little evidence to show that the 
number of individuals exempted would duly increase. The example of Britain's policy 
of SCOs during World War 11 illustrates the feasibility of pursuing such a policy 
without seriously undermining the country's military capability. (However, it should be 
noted that the widespread hostility to fascist Germany does not make World War 11 the 
best example). Nevertheless, in circumstances where a substantial section of the 
population view a war as unjust, this is in itself a powerful reason 
for a government to 
reconsider the war it has embarked upon. Indeed, 
having regulations which make it 
harder for governments to engage in a war in which its population 
is seriously divided 
on the issue of justification, seems 
likely to be a benefit rather than a loss. 
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But opponents of SCO exemption also hold that it would introduce a class bias 
favouring the educationally-advantaged and articulate. This claim implies that no such 
cultural advantage enters into the exempting conditions for UCOs. However, the 
greater knowledge and expertise of the SCO applies in a parallel way to the UCO who 
may have been influenced by a particular religious background inaccessible to others. 
Moreover,, it is possible, by raising the level of education in a society, to equalise 
claims for exemption from a particular war. 
I have examined the rights of conscience as grounds on which individuals may refuse 
to fulfil their legal obligation to serve in the military. However, a powerful argument 
from the opponents of conscientious objection states that the duty to serve is not only a 
legal obligation but also a moral one, a common moral obligation which all men share 
through their status as citizens. Thus, along with our right to vote and other rights of 
citizenship are certain responsibilities, duties and obligations, including (if you are 
male) the obligation to kill if necessary in defence of the society in which we are full 
and equal members. The idea that citizenship provides certain responsibilities, 
privileges, rights and duties is generally accepted, and if military service is a 
component of each citizen's political obligation (again, limited in most societies to 
males) rather than being a coercive influence in the lives of individuals, it may be 
plausible to view it as the enforcement of a moral obligation owed to the state. To test 
the validity of this view, it is worth recalling briefly the arguments employed to 
support the citizen's obligation to die for the state, for they are used also to justify the 
obligation to serve in the military. 
In Plato's 'Crito' we saw that Socrates argues for political obligation as that which is 
due to a parent (to which the state is likened). However, I argued that children do not 
have unlimited and unconditional moral obligations to their parents. A child clearly 
does not always act wrongly by disobeying parental commands or by breaking parental 
rules, which may be unreasonable. Moreover, moral obligations extend as one's 
rational powers and consideration of others' needs develop. 
My conclusion was that 
children do not, simply as a matter of course, 
have special obligations to their parents - 
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by implication the familial analogy cannot be used to demonstrate a citizen's alleged 
moral obligation to serve in the military. 
A second argument used by citizenship theorists (and Socrates) focuses on obligations 
arising from contracts and the giving of consent, tacit and express. However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, it seems clear that no widespread obligation to perform duties of 
citizenship (including military service) could be of this sort. I have refuted the 
suggestion that citizens freely consent or promise to obey a liberal democratic 
government simply through continued residence in the country or through participation 
in elections. Wherever emigration is the only viable option to performing the duties of 
citizenship, the idea of free consent to these duties is totally unacceptable. Nor does it 
seem plausible that political participation through the vote binds citizens to such 
obligations. I have set out to show that the political participation of the vast majority 
of citizens consists of making the best of a situation to which there are no options 
worth considering. Moreover, even if we accept that there are some citizens who do 
owe a political obligation, many others such as the poor and disadvantaged clearly do 
not. 
Finally, what about the argument from benefaction? One of the justifications for 
obligatory military service is that individuals owe services to the state in return for the 
benefits they receive from it. My critique of this view, based on Socrates argument, 
should now be familiar to the reader, but to recap: first, if individuals have no choice 
but to receive certain benefits (eg. education), then it is implausible to suggest that they 
owe anything in return. Second, it is questionable that the benefits received are so 
great as to justify risking life, limb or liberty. Finally, there is the problem of unequal 
distribution of benefits - it is difficult to accept that the disadvantaged and exploited 
owe any obligation to the state and it is a sad irony that it is these groups whose lives 
are most at risk - the 'cannon-fodder' of modern war. 
So can we view the legal obligation to serve in the military as a moral obligation? 
We 
have seen that the various theories of political obligation attempt to show why the 
citizen in general has a moral obligation to obey particular 
laws (eg. conscription) 
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independent of any further moral test for those particular laws. It is assumed that if the 
constitutional structure of a society meets certain tests of moral worthiness, then every 
legitimate act of the political authority is equally morally worthy. But we must ask 
first; is the system itself morally worthy - is it founded on principles of justice and 
equality? Secondly, is the particular law or policy both legally and morally 
permissible? Otherwise, all legal obligations, for example paying taxes which finance 
our nuclear arsenal, would also be moral obligations. 
But what if we view the obligation to serve in the military, not as an obligation to the 
state, but as a moral obligation to others? We could argue that the protection and 
defence of our family, friends and neighbours is something we are morally obligated to 
provide, and one way of fulfilling this obligation is through military service. But there 
is no guarantee that military service will protect and defend others any more effectively 
than deterrence, negotiation etc. In cases where it does not, then surely one cannot be 
morally obligated to perform a service which is both ineffective and futile. 
I would argue that military obligation as a moral obligation towards others cannot exist 
within the present nation-state s tem, which defines such an obligation using YS 
nationalistic criteria such as the state, territory and citizenship, yet is exploitative in 
terms of its economic, political and social conditions. We would be defending what 
does not deserve so high a price. Thus, military obligation under existing 
arrangements is at most only a legal obligation, no different from my legal obligation 
to buy a TV licence. I am inclined, therefore, to agree with Bedau (1974) who views 
the military obligation as 
FF 
... a creature of the 
law, so that once a certain law is passed, he has this 
(legal) obligation, but in the absence of the law he has no obligation at 
all". (p. 158) 
In sum, I have argued that the exemption of conscientious objectors is morally sound, 
and we should liberalise the restrictive criteria to include moral and ethical as well as 
religious objectors, and selective as well as universal objectors, given that such refusals 
are conscientious. In view of the principles 
involved, some mechanism is needed to 
determine the sincerity of conscientious claims. Furthermore, I conclude that within 
the existing nation-state system, any obligation to serve 
in the military should be seen 
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as a legal rather than a moral obligation. The theories of political obligation which 
argue from parent/state, consent and benefactors perspectives fail, in my view, to show 
that citizens generally have a moral obligation to serve in the military and a political 
obligation to kill for the state. However, I now want to place the act of killing in war 
within a sociopolitical context, and move from a focus on individual decisions for and 
against dying and killing for the state, to government decisions for and against 
participation in war. After all, individuals wage war as members of collective entities, 
and resistance to aggression and oppression in the context of war, only counts as 
resistance if it takes a socially identifiable form. We now need to examine the sorts of 
considerations which are normally thought to justify resort to war - particularly those 
which feature in the tradition of just war theory. 
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JUST WAR THEORY 
In my discussion of contingent pacifism I explored the idea that killing in war is 
morally on a par with other acts of killing. Yet it is surprising how many of us regard 
the former as less serious than the latter - for example, the soldier with blood on his 
hands is not regarded in the same way as a common murderer. To understand why 
this is the case it is important to view war as a complex phenomenon, and explore the 
many considerations affecting the morality of participation in war. For example, we 
have already addressed the question of individual decisions for and against 
participation in war, the reasons for refusal and the criteria on which conscientious 
objection should be based. However, there is also the question of whether a 
government is justified in committing a country to war in the first place. We need to 
consider therefore, the justifications used by states engaging in war, and the general 
policies and individual actions carried out while fighting a war - for example, whether 
the ends justify the means, the use of certain weapons, and questions about the criminal 
classification of certain acts of 'cruelty' carried out by members of the armed forces. 
Such issues will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
Yet some theorists (particularly those known as the 'realists) have insisted that a 
discussion of the morality of war is a futile exercise since, even if we accept every act 
of war as immoral, war itself can never be eliminated, for reasons having to do with 
biology, history or the nature of society. As Walzer (1977) points out: 
The defenders of realism claim that what we conventionally call 
inhumanity (war) is simply humanity underpressure. " (1977p. 4) 
Those who view war as part of human nature argue that there is in humanity, a 
prominent animal element, and this involves violence and conflict (Lorenz 1966). Our 
aggressive instinct is a legacy from the distant past when it was of advantage to 
preserve the species. A Darwinian theory of evolution suggests that by a process of 
selection, we have developed 'warlike virtues'. According to the view 
from biology 
then, war springs from human nature, the basis of which 
is biological and hereditary - 
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thus, because of genetic structure, war is inevitable. Lydio de Mello (1969) strongly 
endorses this view arguing that: 
"Study of human conflict reveals that there is a natural propensity of 
peoples for war, just as there is a natural propensity of species for 
struggle, and just as there is a natural propensity of individuals for 
crime. " 
The implication of this being: 
"Because crime and war being natural phenomena -phenomena arising 
from natural propensities and causes ... there will always be crimes and 
wars that Law and State will not succeed in eliminating. " (in Ginsberg 
p. 234-236). 
But the biological evidence is inconclusive and it is unclear that humans have an 
ineradicable predisposition to war. It is implausible to suggest that we have an urge or 
a need to wage war in the same sense as we have sexual urges or a need to eat or drink 
(and even these vary among people). Moreover, aggressiveness does not necessarily 
lead to war - aggression is a feature of many aspects of human activity, but it leads 
very few of us to kill anyone. Indeed, individuals are also capable of rational and 
spiritual thought, and can thus conceive the consequences of aggression and find other 
outlets for this element (assuming such a biological one exists) than one as harmful as 
war. This disinclination to kill was reflected in the findings of Marshall's study of 400 
infantry troops carried out during World War 11. He found that on average only 15% 
fired guns in battle, the vast majority replying that their decision not to fire was based, 
not on fear, but on a reluctance to kill unnecessarily. This helps explain the importance 
of military training for changing peoples' attitudes to indiscriminate killing. As 
Gwynne Dyer (1985) points out: 
"The business of armies, at the end, is killing, and so a crucial part of 
training people to be soldiers is teaching them to ignore the limits they 
normally place on the actual use o violence so that in the right !f9 
circumstances against the enemy, they will go all the way and actually 
kill hinL For the vast majority of people, killing has to be taught, 
although there are exceptions. " (p. 117-8) 
We can suggest then, that the fighting of war does not 
derive directly from human 
aggression, and so the origins and frequency of war must 
be traced to other factors. 
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Men have fought in wars for all kinds of reasons; excitement, adventure, sadism, 
escape from personal problems, recognition, wealth, a deep sense of patriotism, or 
simply because their governments order them to. Furthermore, states may go to war 
through motives such as territorial acquisition, struggles over resources or ideological 
or religious clashes. In the light of these various motives, I would argue that a more 
important influence for resort to war is not the biological determinism of the innate 
aggression of individuals, but the political implications of the transition from 
traditional states to the nation-state system of today. Although the events precipitating 
the outbreak of war might be varied, warfare is what happens when states clash and 
their disagreements cannot be resolved through other means. War is the ultimate test 
of power, a point made very clearly by the 19th century Prussian thinker Karl von 
Clausewitz when he declared that: 
"War is simply the continuation of political intercourse ... war cannot be divorcedfrom political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking 
about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed 
and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. " ('On War' 
1977. p, 605) 
By presenting a brief historical outline it will become clear that the fighting if wars is 
one of the most obvious features of the first developments of states. In antiquity, 
larger states were empires, usually founded on military conquest and subordination of 
less powerful groups - armies were fairly small, often primarily providing protection 
for the sovereign or emperor. Larger armies were raised by conscripting peasants and 
by forming alliances with other military leaders. Despite limited use of standoff 
weapons (eg. catapults, crossbows, slings etc. ), the basic mode of warfare during this 
period was face-to-face killing, and soldiers were armed with weapons (pikes, swords, 
axes etc. ) dependent on human muscle power and designed for close combat. Within 
Europe, military strength was a major factor influencing which states survived and 
which did not. In 1500 there were some 500 or more states in Europe; by 1900 the 
number had shrunk to 25. (Tilly 1978). 
From the early 18th century onwards, the armed forces of the leading states 
became 
larger than ever before. Soldiers became subject to regular 
discipline and training; 
armies, like other organisations, 
became bureaucratised. Moreover, just as mass 
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production became the core principle of industrial economies, mass destruction became 
the core principle of industrial age warfare. The 'machine age gave birth to the 
machine gun', to mechanised warfare and to entirely new kinds of firepower. The arms 
trade, in the modern sense, came into being in the latter half of the 19th century, as 
industrialists began producing weapons destined for both domestic and international 
markets. Large corporations devoted either wholly or partly to the manufacture of 
armaments and placing considerable importance on technical innovation, have played a 
leading role in military development and war ever since. 
The industrialisation of war has been a crucial factor in the transition from LIMITED 
to TOTAL war, by creating new modes of destruction of an indiscriminate kind. The 
other major factor has been the development of mass democracy (see Chapter 4). 
Before the 20th century, even when large battles were fought, they involved only a 
small section of the population, usually professional soldiers or those directly involved 
with fighting. But the two World Wars were not limited in this sense, as Pearton 
(1990) observes: 
Ff ... war had changedfrom being the concern of the army as an elite, to 
being the business of society as a whole, and from the limited and 
rational application offorce to unrestricted violence. " (Pearton p. 80) 
Thus, with the growth of the modern nation-state, there arose a social system that 
linked mass production, mass consumption, mass education, mass communication and 
mass democracy with weapons of mass destruction. In the 20th century, the 
Clausewitzian analysis of war as an extension of politics and the military as an 
instrument of policy was turned on its head, as military thinkers turned to discussion of 
'totaf war. Total war was to be waged politically, economically and culturally, and the 
entire society converted into a single war machine. For war to be total, the political 
order itself had to be subordinated to the military. And since everything supposedly 
contributed to a total war effort, then everything belonging to the enemy, both military 
and civilian, was a legitimate target. Today war could still be total, but not because of 
the political objectives of nation-states, but because of the type of weapons at their 
disposal. It is not surprising therefore, that in the nuclear age there have been calls, not 
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for the return of limited war, but for its abolition. This is a new phenomenon in the 
history of thinking on warfare and it will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 4. 
My purpose here is to show how a continued pessimism about the likelihood that war 
can be abolished has led theologians, jurists and philosophers, over the centuries, to 
speculate about the justification of war and how to limit its methods and effects. The 
result has been the just war' doctrine which has two components: the first is concerned 
with the morality of war Ous ad bellum), which sets out the conditions under which 
one may have recourse to war; the second is concerned with morality in war Ous in 
bello) which addresses the manner in which war is conducted. 
JUS AD BELLUM. 
When we ask about the morality of war, we want to know whether or not engaging in 
war is ever morally permitted or justified. If nations may legitimately use war as an 
instrument of state policy, then we wish to know when and what the conditions are that 
would provide acceptable moral reasons for waging war. 
It was St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) who first made a powerful case for the 
justifiability of war, arguing that a war to be just must be declared by a legitimate 
authority and have a just cause. Just wars, according to Augustine, are usually defined 
as those which 
fravenge injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike action is 
to be directed has neglected to punish wrongs committed by its own 
citizens., or to restore what has been unjustly taken from it. " (Eppstein 
1935. p. 65) 
Moreover, the primary objective of a just war is peace, so that "after the resisting 
nations have been conquered, provision may more easily be made 
for enjoying in 
peace the mutual bond of piety and justice. ' (ibid). 
Augustine's recommendations were improved and elaborated 
by the medieval 
theologian St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in 
his 'Summa Theologiae'. His three 
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conditions for a just war included Augustine's 'legitimate authority' and 'just cause' but 
he adds to these a third requirement of his own, that of 'pure motive'. In other words, 
in the case of resort to war, it is required that one have 'right intention' - one must 
intend to promote good and avoid evil rather than act out of hatred or to gratify a lust 
for revenge. Merely having legitimate authority and just cause is insufficient. 
How the justness of a war should be determined was examined even more closely in 
the 16th and 17th centuries by the Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria (1480- 
1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), who both added more prudential 
considerations. They were trying to counter the spread of holy war thinking that had 
come to pervade the just war tradition. In response to a large number of wars fought 
partly or wholly over matters of religion, they insisted that a war be just only if waged 
to correct some definite secular wrong (eg. defensive war would always be legitimate). 
Apart from this denial of religion as affording just cause, Vitoria and Suarez added that 
there should be a reasonable prospect of victory; every attempt should have been made 
to reconcile the differences by peaceful means; and the amount of force used should 
not be disproportionate to the end to be achieved. 
To then recap, the grounds of jus ad bellum. criteria are: 1) legitimate authority; 2) just 
cause; 3) right intention; 4) reasonable hope of success; 5) last resort; 6) 
proportionality. Now let us examine each criterion more closely. 
Legitimate Authority. 
The first criterion of a just war is right or legitimate authority, which determines who is 
primarily responsible for judging whether the other criteria are met. The requirement 
that a decision to go to war must be made by a legitimate authority 
is of particular 
relevance for our discussion of democracy and political obligation. 
What is 'legitimate 
authority'? For Augustine and Aquinas it was the prince, not private 
individuals. I 
would argue that today, a legitimate authority would 
be that arising from citizens 
collectively creating a polity through participatory voting 
in a democratic community, 
a community in which citizens 
have a self-assumed horizontal obligation to each other. 
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Within this democratic ideal (our good society to be outlined in the following chapter), 
it follows that if the polity has acted according to established democratic procedures, 
then the presumption ought to be that the polity's decision that the war is just is both 
legitimate and correct. 
Just Cause. 
Over the centuries, the issue of just cause has been the subject of considerable concern 
and much has been included in the concept. Classically, the requirement of just cause 
has recognised: to protect innocent life; to recover something wrongly taken; to punish 
evil; and self-defence which, in recent years, has been interpreted as 'response to 
aggression'. If the cause is just, then the nation will be responding to some prior wrong 
with the intention of righting that wrong. Let us look briefly at each of these four 
formulations. 
As we have seen, 'defence of the innocent' can be traced back to Augustine. Yet this 
formulation flies in the face of much contemporary moralising, particularly the 
principle of non-intervention in foreign affairs (eg. the rather sluggish response of the 
international community to events in the former Yugoslavia). This is not to deny that 
the principle of 'defence of the innocent' is not open to abuse (used to justify both 
Vietnam and Gulf wars), but there still remain cases in which limited and proportionate 
intervention may be the most appropriate means to preserve this value. 
'Recovery of something wrongly taken' must include some consistent and agreed-on 
means of identifying what belongs to one society and what to another, rather than 
assuming that what is one's own is simply whatever one says is one's own. The 
allowance of after-the-fact use of force to regain something wrongly taken is the source 
of the moral justification for Britain's military actions in the Falklands War. 
The punishment of 'evil' is, in my view, an unhelpful 
formulation of just cause, not 
least because of its highly subjective nature. Moreover, since states radically 
disagree 
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on the matter of the rights, duties and values of human beings, it is virtually 
impossible, under present conditions, to expect a moral consensus on what constitutes 
'evil' or 'wrongdoing'. This implies that this line of justification can become a 
justification for ideological warfare. This is not, of course, to deny the possibility of 
rational grounds for judging wars or acts of war as just or unjust, but it is necessary to 
point out that there is no moral consensus ready at hand about 'punishing evil' that is 
not itself substantially the reflection of the conventional views of states. 
The first thing we discover when examining the 'right to self-defence' is that it is not an 
absolute right. For example, one might oneself be wrong in a particular conflict. 
Consider an individual who knows his country's aggressive war is unjust but decides to 
participate nevertheless. It is implausible to suggest that the unjust combatant is 
morally justified in killing innocent victims of his country's aggression when they take 
up arms and threaten his life. This absolute right to self-defence would allow a 
murderer to justifiably kill anyone threatening his life to prevent him killing again. It 
follows that if the right to self-defence is not a moral absolute, then the means of self- 
defence may not be unlimited, as I will argue in my discussion of Jus in bello', there 
may be other values to consider. 
In the 20th century, just cause seems to have been narrowed down by many just war 
theorists to almost a single circumstance; response to aggression. In a number of 
international agreements such as the League of Nations Covenant, the 1928 Kellog- 
Briand Pact and the London Charter, the emphasis is on aggression. Thus, the notion 
of aggressive/defensive wars seems to have replaced the distinction between j ust/unj ust 
wars in recent years. Many people take the view that it is always wrong 
for a 
government to start a war, but always legitimate for a government to meet external 
aggression with force. But there seems no reason in principle why 
it should be wrong 
to start a war. As Anscombe (1969) points out: 
"The present day concept of 'aggression'.. like so many strongly 
influential conceptions, is a bad one. Why must it be wrong to strike the 
first blow in a struggle? The only question is, who is in the right? 
(p. 28 6) 
88 
Thus, it is wrong to assume that every initiation of fighting is automatically to be 
identified with unjust aggression. A more important consideration is how we are to 
define aggression. 
It is possible to identify three concepts of aggression (Holmes 1989 p. 146-182).. First, 
aggression may be understood in a neutral sense (when hostilities are initiated without 
consideration of jus ad bellum criteria, but on a 'who fired first' basis). Second, 
aggression can be understood in a normative sense (still concerned with the initiation 
of hostilities, but judged according to jus ad bellum criteria). Finally, aggression can 
be conceptualised as implicit, a concept used by the United Nations. This concept does 
not require the initiation of hostilities, only the threat (albeit a serious one) of 
aggression. This is the definition used by Michael Walzer (1977) who contends that: 
FF-aggression can be made out, not only in the absence of a military 
attack or invasion but in the probable absence of any immediate 
intention to launch such an attack or invasion. The generalformula 
must go something like this: states may use military force in the face of 
threats of war, whenever the failure to do so would seriously risk their 
territorial integrity or political independence. Under such circumstances 
it can fairly be said that they have been forced to fight and that they are 
the victims of oppression. " (p. 85) 
The problem with this 'implicit' concept is that when 'aggression' is narrowed down in 
this way to a 'threat of war' without the 'intention to attack', we are opening the way for 
every state that initiates hostilities to cite just cause on the grounds of response to 
aggression. It follows that if response to aggression is viewed as legitimate self- 
defence, then almost every war can be seen as just. In short, it is important when 
considering response to aggression as just cause, to be clear about which concept of 
aggression we are using. 
Walzer's theory (that war is justifies when it is the defence of a political community 
against aggression) has been subject to ftirther criticism by Norman (1988), who takes 
issue with Walzer's 'morality of rights'. Walzer presents an analogy between a state's 
rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty on the one 
hand, and an 
individual's right to life and liberty on the other. For Norman, this analogy 
fails to 
establish that the need to resist aggression 
is a sufficient justification for resort to war 
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for the following reasons. First, Norman argues that a state's loss of territorial integrity 
through foreign conquest cannot possibly share the same ethical status as the loss of a 
human life. Loss of life involves complete destruction of a human being whereas loss 
of territorial integrity does not amount to the complete destruction of a nation. After 
all, regardless of who wields political control, many institutions and traditions 
(cultural, religious, economic etc. ) are likely to continue, whether overtly or covertly. 
Moreover, even if a communal way of life is wiped out, it is still not ethically 
equivalent to the taking of human lives - communities may disappear but individuals 
live on. Indeed, it appears that Walzer's analogy is applicable only in cases of 
genocide and cannot work when applied to the crime of aggression. It should be noted 
however, that Norman's critique of Walzer is not an attempt to undervalue the 
importance of a 'common life' for individuals, but to emphasise that a 'common life' 
can only be realised in individual lives. He concludes that Walzer's analogy supporting 
military response to aggression fails to morally justify the wholesale taking of human 
lives. 
Right Intention. 
This criterion is related to just cause - war can be legitimately intended only for the 
reasons set out above as a just cause. But it also encompasses motives; for example, 
Augustine ruled out hatred and revenge, others insist that lust for power, the 
destruction of entire races and national populations can never be morally justifiable 
intentions. These criteria are important because of their implications for Jus in bello' 
(how war is conducted). If a nation's war aims are based, for example, on racial hatred, 
then the means employed may involve genocide. If, on the other hand, the ultimate 
object of war is peace (as Augustine insists), then the means employed and the duration 
of the fighting will also be affected, for there will be a duty to restore the 'normal' state 
of affairs as quickly and as surely as possible. Thus, if, as Rawls (1972) argues, the 
final objective of war is ajust peacethen: 
"... the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or 
encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves 
and of mankind in jeopardy. " (p. 3 79). 
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Analysis of intentions then is important for its close relation to jus in bello', that is, the 
choice of means in waging war. Yet such an analysis is problematic, as we shall see 
later. 
Fair Chance of Success. 
If the true object of war is to provide a better peace, then a war is only just if the 
conditions of the nation waging war (or of the nation it is supporting) have a decent 
chance of improvement after the fighting ends. In other words, before engaging in war 
there must be some fair chance of success, it would be irrational and futile if there were 
absolutely no possibility of winning. But is this really the case? For example, success 
could be interpreted as defending values and self-respect even when defeat is 
inevitable. Consider the condemnation, expressed by some thinkers, of the Jews who 
'died like sheep' in Nazi Germany, in comparison with the almost universal respect 
shown to those who vigorously resist oppression and perform heroic acts. Despite war 
being a horrific business, the concept of 'dying well' (usually retrospectively applied) is 
significant here, as borne out by the well-established practice of showing the nation's 
respect and gratitude through war memorials, 2-minute silences, solemn parades and so 
on. In some cases therefore, loss of life may be deemed justifiable by some, if it 
preserves significant values beyond the number of lives lost and defence of territory 
and sovereignty. 
Last Resort. 
For resort to war to be justified, all peaceful alternatives must have been exhausted, or 
at least be regarded as having little probability of success. The counterpart to this 
criterion is the requirement of a 'formal declaration of war' which are the 
'last measures 
of persuasion short of force itself (Childress 1986 in Wakin p. 
264). This reflects the 
responsibility of the legitimate authority to 
inform the participants (including its own 
citizenry as well as the enemy) and 
justify its decision for waging war. The 
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requirement that war be the last resort can, however, be difficult in the absence of an 
effective international mediator or in cases where the nation views the prevention 
rather than the advancement of a peace settlement as more advantageous to themselves. 
Proportionality. 
The final criterion of jus ad bellum' is proportionality (which is also a requirement of 
jus in bello'). This means that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war 
must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. Or as Ramsey (1968) 
puts it: 
"It can never be right to resort to war, no matter how just the cause, 
unless a proportionality can be established between militarylpolitical 
objectives and their price, or unless one has reason to believe that in the 
end more good will be done than undone or a greater measure of evil 
prevented. " (p. 195. ) 
But calculating gains and losses cannot be done with any precision - who in 1939 
could predict the full horror of Nazi concentration camps and the use of nuclear 
weapons? Similarly, to demand that people engaged in war preserve a sense of 
proportion is also difficult. World War I is a classic example of the loss of a sense of 
proportion - the difficulty of controlling the course of the war combined with the 
propagandist techniques which viewed the enemy as sub or super-human and the 
egoism of the war leader, led to such futile massacres at Verdun, the Somme and 
Passchendaele, all for a few kilometres of worthless territory. Moreover, the loss of 
millions of men merely led to repeat performances of failed offensives. Preserving a 
sense of proportion is to retain some sense of the humanity of all participants and to 
serve as a constant reminder of what the point of war is, and not get side-tracked into 
doing something else. 
As mentioned earlier, the requirement of proportionality is also one of the criteria of 
jus in bello' to which we now turn our attention. It should be noted from the outset 
that a war that otherwise might meet the jus ad bellum' criteria set out above could 
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become an unjust war if a nation, even acting defensively, employ evil means. Thus, 
in the period from the 17th to the 20th centuries, the development of the just war 
doctrine has focused on political theories of the state and the nation-state system, 
international law, and conceptions of military codes of conduct. 
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JUS IN BELLO. 
By the 18th century the concept of Jus ad bellum' had virtually disappeared and jurists 
concerned themselves not with the cause of a conflict but with its conduct. This was 
the golden age of Jus in bello' and the 'limited' war. Two developments contributed to 
this shift in focus; the emergence of nation-states raised questions about the actions, 
rights and obligations of states. Hugo Grotius, writing in the 17th century, defined 
external sovereignty in legal rather than moral terms (motivated partly by the 
opposition of merchants to unnecessary disruptions to commerce and colonial 
expansion), and it was now states rather than 'peoples' who became the subjects of 
international law. 
So what is international law? There is no clear-cut answer but jurists identify three 
sources: natural law, custom and convention. Briefly, natural law has been represented 
as a 'moral code' that transcends 'manmade' laws, it is part of our 'common-sense' or, in 
Aquinas' view, represents 'god's plans'. More generally, natural law is simply the view 
that, in law, moral considerations are paramount. Customary law is, obviously, a set of 
legal norms that develop through custom, that is, without design or legislation, a kind 
of international common law. Finally, conventional law refers to treaties and 
conventions which contribute to the establishment and acceptance of international rules 
that states recognise (although they are binding only upon states that are party to a 
particular treaty or convention). During the period of jus in bello, natural law 
gradually gave way to customary law which, today, is widely recognised as the major 
source of international law, which in turn is codified in conventional law. 
The 18th century jurist Vattel recognised all three sources of international law but, in 
addition, he recognised 'voluntary law' - one of the rules of which is 'that regular war as 
regards its effects, must be accounted just on both sides'. (Holmes 1989. p. 156. ) This 
does not mean that from the standpoint of natural law both sides are in the right, only 
that from the standpoint of legality they should both be accounted in the right. The 
reason for this, according to Vattel, is because 
in the state of nature that exists among 
states, none can dictate morally to others, there 
is no 'recognised judge' among nations. 
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He suggests, therefore, that territorial acquisitions should be regarded as legitimate 
(subject to claims to recovery) because such prohibitions cannot effectively be 
prohibited. This would seem to grant licence to states to seize whatever they want 
whenever the opportunity arises - something history has proved beyond doubt 
(consider the spoils of European colonialism, appropriation of N. America and 
Australia from the Indians and Aborigines respectively). 
Thus, for Vattel, the state of nature of natural law dictates that for the good of all, both 
sides in a war be considered just. These rules made up the 'voluntary law' of nations 
which together with conventional and customary law, makes up what he calls 'positive 
law'. But Vattel's emphasis on legitimate acquisitions in war led him to add one 
further humanitarian requirement. He argued that each state must consider the 
outcome of a war - that the civilians of the enemy may become one's own subjects, that 
the enemy's territory may eventually fall within one's own boundaries. Thus, there was 
an incentive not to treat civilians cruelly and to attempt to keep the economic base of 
the society intact. Hence, a focus on jus in bello. 
The second development contributing to the formulation of international law was the 
advance in weaponry brought about by the industrial revolution which I outlined 
earlier. The industrialisation of war and the development of weapons of mass 
destruction highlighted the need to mitigate its horrors - hence the formulation of the 
so-called 'laws of war. Thus, a focus on the obligations and rights of states and 
technological advances in the means of warfare constitute the jus in bello of just war 
theory. Today jus in bello deals with two aspects of the international law of war; 
discrimination and proportion. 
Discrimination. 
This principle dictates that just response to aggression must 
be discriminate; it must be 
directed against unjust aggressors (unjust in the sense of contravening 
the laws of war), 
not against innocent people caught up 
in a war not of their making. Thus, directly 
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intended attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets are not legitimate. 
Moreover, the principle also imposes restraints on the behaviour of combatants 
towards prisoners of war, the wounded on the battlefield and 'protected persons' such 
as medical personnel and chaplains. 
But, as we shall see, the requirement of discrimination raises a number of questions, 
not least about the term 'intentional', the category of 'non-combatant' and the meaning 
of 'military'. How easy is it to determine who is directly involved in a war effort and to 
what degree? Should munitions workers be classed as combatants? What about 
chaplains and medical personnel who serve the soldier thereby contributing indirectly 
to the war effort? Does the enemy soldier cease to be a combatant when wounded? 
Problems also arise with the prohibition against direct attacks on non-military targets. 
How do we decide what is and what is not a legitimate military target? To what degree 
do factories or a war office in a city centre invite attack, and who is directly 
responsible for the death of non-combatants in such attacks? The apparent 
arbitrariness of some of the rules of discrimination need to be examined. 
The principle of discrimination thus determines who are the 'proper players' in a war 
and who not, what is referred to in just war theory as the combatant/non-combatant 
distinction. We may recall that, according to Jus in bello, there must be no intentional 
killing of non-combatants (interpreted as the innocent) whether civilians or prisoners, 
yet the idea of non-combatant immunity continues to be a controversial subject. For 
example, some theorists (eg. Anscombe) see it as an instance of the prohibition of 
killing the innocent which holds whatever the consequences. Others (eg. Nagel) try to 
ground the principle in absolutism or accommodate it within utilitarianism (Brandt). 
So why is it morally acceptable to kill a soldier but not acceptable to intentionally kill 
civilians who may or may not contribute to the war effort? 
The fundamental difficulty with the principle of non-combatant immunity is 
determining who is, and who is not, a combatant. The combatant/non-combatant 
distinction is by no means clear, particularly in the context of modem war which 
involves the mobilisation of military, economic, political and social sectors. 
We need 
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to ask ourselves; are combatants those military personnel who are directly involved in 
the fighting, or should we also include munitions workers, members of the 
International Red Cross, army chaplains and so on? Some (eg. US Catholic Bishops) 
would discount farmers, schoolchildren, the elderly and hospital patients, others (eg. 
Childress) argue that those who serve the needs of combatants as people rather than 
military personnel (eg. medics, army chaplains etc. ) should be classed as non- 
combatants even though they may directly aid the war effort. 
Anscombe (1969) argues that it is murderous to attack innocent parties. She states 
that: 
ff-people whose mere existence and activity supporting existence by 
growing crops, making clothes etc.; constitute an impediment to him (the 
attacker) - such people are innocent and it is murderous to attack them, 
or make them a target for an attack which he judges will help him 
towards victory. For murder is the deliberate killing of the innocent, 
whetherfor its own sake or as a means to somefurther end. " (p. 287) 
For Anscombe, 'innocence' is a legal notion' but, in warfare, more often than not, this 
means that defining the 'innocent' will be controlled by each side's conception of 
justifying a given war, and the degree to which each perceives the enemy population as 
having a military dimension. Margolis (1974) emphasises this by pointing out: 
"The constraints on attacking this or that fraction of an enemy 
population depends at least on the clarity with which a distinctly 
professionalised army may be specified: talk about the people's militia, 
treat every infant as a budding soldier, organise the farmer as the 
nation Isfightingforce, andyou will have blurred the very basis on which 
the older distinction between combatant and non-combatant was drawn. 
(in Held. p. 252) 
But we still need to challenge the assumption that there is something about the status 
of combatants which makes it permissible to kill them, unlike killing non-combatants 
which amounts to killing the innocent. The implication 
here is if non-combatants are 
innocent, then combatants are guilty, but guilty of what? Suppose World War 
11 was a 
just war. Does it follow that every German soldier was 
in some sense deserving of 
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death in a way that no German civilian was? To judge a combatant 'guilty, seems 
wholly inappropriate so maybe we need to look more closely at the notion of 
'innocence' - in what sense can non-combatants be called innocent? 
Could it mean moral innocence? But if moral guilt and innocence are in question, it is 
possible that many politically active citizens may bear more guilt for a war than many 
conscripted soldiers. Consider the German pacifist, an opponent of Nazism, who 
accepts conscription only under duress and compare him with a fervent supporter of 
Nazism who avoids combat merely from cowardice. I may feel the latter carries more 
guilt than the former. Moreover, even if we assume that the combatant/non-combatant 
distinction is clear, there is the question of why it should be considered morally 
important. The death of a combatant is no less a tragedy for him and his loved ones 
than the death of a non-combatant. For Murphy (1986) the relevant distinction is this: 
"Combatants ... are all those of whom it is reasonable to believe that they 
are engaged in an attempt at your destruction. Non-combatants are all 
those of whom it is not reasonable to believe this. " (in Wakin p. 348) 
Combatants, for Murphy, include not only soldiers but their political and military 
leaders, and others who contribute directly to the war effort such as, perhaps, workers 
in munitions factories. Those who are not directly engaged in an attempt at your 
destruction are non-combatants and are thus innocent. But this still fails to explain 
why such a contrast should carry such ethical significance. 
Murphy appeals first to a theory of rights - when combatants are engaged in an attempt 
to destroy you, to violate your right against interference, he forfeits his right not to be 
killed by you. But merely being a threat to others is hardly a justification for forfeiting 
one's rights - surely one must be morally guilty of something? 
And the vast majority 
of combatants, even if fighting an unjust war, are not personally morally responsible 
for the attempt at your destruction (unlike, possibly, their military and political 
leaders). And it must be remembered that any willingness to kill you must take 
account of the moral constraints imposed 
by war. If we accept this, then the 
justification for their deaths because they have forfeited their rights cannot 
be upheld. 
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But Murphy adds one further stipulation. By appealing to the idea of self-defence 
(which, for him, is the only plausible justification for going to war), Murphy says that 
'one must in waging war confine one's hostility to those against whom one is defending 
oneself. (p. 350) But he himself admits that he is 'skeptical that the 'self to be 
legitimately defended must also be the nation or state (p. 351), and thus uses the 
concept of individual self-defence. But if the only killing which the combatant/non- 
combatant distinction can justify is face-to-face killing for survival rather than victory, 
then it is a great deal less than the theory is intended to justify. I may not kill anyone 
whose death would help to preserve my life or my comrades' lives, but only someone 
who is morally responsible for the threat. By extension then, I may justifiably 
assassinate those political and military leaders who initiated the war. 
Thomas Nagel (1974), in his absolutist defence of the prohibition of killing non- 
combatants also views combat as a personal relation. His account is a critique of the 
utilitarian view of which he says: 
"The policy of attacking the civilian population in order to induce an 
enemy to surrender (eg. Dresden, Nagasaki, Hiroshima), or to damage 
his morale, seems to have been widely accepted in the civilised world... It 
gives evidence of a moral conviction that the deliberate killing of non- 
combatants - women, children, old people - is permissible if enough can 
be gained by it. This follows from the more general position that any 
means can, in principle, be justified if it leads to a sufficiently worthy 
end. " (p. 7) 
Nagel notes in his absolutist account that the prohibitions in war are restrictions either 
on the people who may be attacked or on the means of attack. He suggests that these 
can be combined under the following principle: 
"... whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at 
him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject. It 
should manifest an attitude towards him rather than just to the situation, 
and he should be able to recognise it and identify himsetf as 
its object". 
(ibid) 
This principle of hostility as a personal relation seems to 
lay down two requirements 
which are rather vague; one about my attitude to 
the person I attack, the other about his 
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acceptance of my attitude as justifiable. But must I feel personal hostility towards the 
soldier I kill in combat? It may be that I feel more hostility towards enemy civilians 
who actively support the war. So does this make killing non-combatants right and 
killing combatants wrong? Moreover, why can I not offer a utilitarian justification to a 
civilian I am about to kill? I may feel that his death is a necessary means to the 
avoidance of a great evil, his side winning. If he considers this justification 
unacceptable, why cannot the combatant find it equally unacceptable? Indeed, why 
should his perception (or misperception) of my actions matter at all? Thus, a number 
of questions need to be answered before Nagel's principle should be accepted. 
So what of the utilitarian view? R. B. Brandt (1974), using the idea of the Rawlsian 
contract, suggests that people both impartial and rational would choose rules of war 
that would maximise expectable utility. Brandt's first rule on humanitarian restrictions 
causes no problem - where such restrictions incur no cost to military operations it is in 
everyone's interest to observe them. However,, where humanitarian restrictions may 
prove costly to military victory Brandt has this to say: 
"A proper (not ideally precise) rule for such operations might be: 
substantial destruction of lives and property of enemy civilians is 
permissible only when there it good evidence that it will significantly 
enhance theprospect of victory. " (p. 36) 
Implicit in this view is a justification of the loss of civilian lives which focuses on a 
morally significant distinction between bringing about the death of an innocent person 
deliberately, either as an end in itself or as a means, and bringing it about as a side- 
effect of something else one does deliberately. This principle of 'double-effect' is thus 
explained in terms of the difference between intended an foreseen consequences. 
One very important idea derivable from the principle of double-effect is that moral 
principles govern not so much action as intention. If you are blackmailing me and I 
poison you, then I intend your death as a means to ensuring my own safety. If, during 
a violent struggle, I hit you in self-defence and you die, this can be a foreseen but 
unintended consequence of my blow, rather than the intended means of my 
defence. In 
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application to war, the law of double-effect permits a certain number of civilian deaths 
as a side-effect of bombing munitions plants or attacking enemy soldiers. 
But how do we draw the line between intended means and a foreseen inevitable 
consequence? If one bombs a village which one believes is harbouring enemy 
combatants, and work on the assumption that if one kills most of the civilians one is 
likely to kill most of the combatants, who is to say that such an indiscriminate attack 
on the civilians is no more than a means of killing the combatants? Assuming that one 
would not have bothered bombing the village if other more selective means were 
available,, how can the civilian deaths be regarded as a mere side-effect? 
It is crucial for the doctrine of double-effect that it stipulates that acts which fall under 
certain descriptions are described accordingly. But this is problematic. Using the 
above example, that act may be described not as 'killing everyone in the village' but as 
'obliteration bombing of the area'. According to this interpretation, civilian deaths can 
now be viewed not as a means, but as a side-effect of that action. The setting of some 
limit on the description of acts in terms of their consequences (even if open to debate) 
thus raises some serious difficulties, yet without such limits the doctrine of double 
effect forbids nothing. This alone is a sound reason for rejecting the principle. 
In sum, it could be that an attempt to draw a distinction between combatants and non- 
combatants, and a fair line between intended and foreseen consequences is naive. 
Moreover, the indiscriminate nature of modern technological weaponry not only 
threatens to make a mockery of the combatant/non-combatant distinction, but also 
renders the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences as 
worthless. It is to the principle of proportion that we now turn. 
Proportion. 
We have seen that the principle of proportionality requires 
that response to aggression 
must not exceed the nature of the aggression - 
it is concerned, therefore, with means 
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and ends. So from the standpoint of proportionality we must ask: after calculating the 
gains and possible harmful consequences that will result from using the means, can its 
use still be justified? Such a requirement obviously rules out acts of 'cruelty' and 
'wanton destruction' if they are not deemed 'militarily necessary'. In practice, this 
requires warring parties to observe restraints on the means of war including weapons 
bans. For example, specific weapons such as 'dum-dum' bullets and explosive and 
inflammable projectiles weighing less than 400 grammes (anything under 400 
grammes is designed to incapacitate one person only) is prohibited, because it is to 
inflict unnecessary and superfluous injury to that one person. It is unnecessary 
suffering that holds no military advantage. 
Yet observing the principle of proportionality has become more and more difficult in 
recent years as modem warfare has increased in range, speed and lethality. Almost 
anywhere on the planet can now be targeted by intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
refuelled long-range bombers etc., and that is without even considering the potential of 
space-based weapons. Moreover, the US Alpha chemical laser developed in 1991 
demonstrates the speed capacity of modern weaponry - it is claimed that the laser, 
capable of producing a million watts of power, can reach an enemy missile at the speed 
of light. As for lethality, today's conventional weapons have a kill-capacity which 
threatens to make nonsense out of the notion of proportionality. Non-nuclear 
weaponry is now 10,000 times more deadly than it was at the beginning of the 
industrial revolution. 
One category of conventional warfare which has attracted a great deal of research, 
despite international agreements to ban it, has been chemical and biological weaponry. 
The widespread revulsion of this kind of warfare can be traced back to the chlorine, 
phosgene and mustard gas attacks of World War 1, which killed 100,000 people and 
injured another million. Biological warfare has a longer history - for example, 
in the 
1760s in wars against the Canadian Indians, the British spread smallpox using 
contaminated blankets. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use 
(but not the 
production and development) of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of 
bacteriological methods of warfare. Most countries adopted the Protocol although 
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some 40% of the parties reserved the right to use chemical weapons to retaliate in kind. 
Such countries therefore hold stocks of chemical and biological weapons and continue 
research and development in connection with them. This is borne out by claims that 
states have breached the more recent 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Treaty (eg. 
US with Agent Orange, Japan with plague bacteria, Britain with anthrax weapons etc. ). 
Although most opponents of chemical and biological weapons do not discriminate 
between the two, proponents point to a crucial difference which has implications for 
just war theory. It is argued that the military are not greatly interested in biological 
weapons for a number of reasons: biological agents tend to die quickly; their spread is 
exceedingly difficult to control; and they are often very slow to take effect. Chemical 
agents, on the other hand, are deemed by the military as tactical armaments - they are 
more predictable and they can be limited to battlefield use. Thus, from the standpoint 
of just war theory, chemical weapons can be justified, particularly as a limited war 
deterrent, but biological weapons cannot. Yet chemical and biological weapons do 
share one important similarity. Small nations could produce them cheaply in 
strategically significant quantities. Taking into account the inadequate health care 
systems of such societies, chemical and biological weapons can be regarded as 
potential weapons of mass destruction, made all the more dangerous if they proliferate. 
If chemical weapons can be justified by just war theory (and I am not convinced that 
they can), can waging war with nuclear weapons ever be justified? When great weight 
is given both to the principles of discrimination and proportion, it is difficult to 
envisage any circumstances in which nuclear war could be justified. However, for 
some of the theorists discussed below, this is clearly not the case. 
It is often pointed out that nuclear wars vary in scale. So could we suggest that while a 
nuclear war between superpowers should be avoided at all costs, a 
local nuclear war 
between small countries would be much less serious, as would war 
between major 
powers waged only with tactical nuclear weapons? 
It is worth pondering briefly on the possible outcome of a 
'less serious' limited war - 
for example, if such a war occurred 
in a populated region (eg. Central Europe), it might 
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result in 5 to 10 million immediate deaths, a similar number of latent deaths and a 
similar number of seriously injured, to say nothing of long-term environmental 
damage. (Barnaby 1984 p. 118). As if this prospect were not horrendous enough, there 
is always the danger of limited nuclear war escalating into all-out nuclear war which 
could result in several hundred million deaths, perhaps as many latent ones again, the 
collapse of civilisation as we know it and severe disruption of the natural environment. 
States do recognise that the effect of using nuclear weapons would be catastrophic to 
all, and therefore justify their possession in terms of deterrence. However, the 
disastrous effects of a major nuclear war on neutrals and future generations, the 
unavoidable loss of non-combatant lives, the disproportion between its disastrous 
consequences and any attainable objective, are all potentialities that demonstrate how 
deterrence works against the principle of proportion. But proponents of deterrence 
have put forward a number of arguments in its defence. 
The first is based on the hope that nuclear deterrence will be effective. I find this 
argument untenable simply on the grounds that trusting to luck and offering one's 
citizens as hostages carry little moral weight for justifying a policy of deterrence. 
Moreover, we have discussed the just war criterion which covers intention as well as 
action - if we view nuclear deterrence as the intention (albeit conditional) to wage 
disproportionate and indiscriminate war, then deterrence is morally wrong. 
Nevertheless, a supporter of deterrence may put forward a second argument: what if 
the other side do it first? But a question that reduces individuals to 'them' and 'us', 
ignores the fundamental rights we have placed so much emphasis upon: i. e. the right of 
non-combatant immunity; the right to be treated with a sense of proportion; and the 
right to have one's humanity treated as an end. The latter, as I argued earlier, is of 
considerable importance, because preserving a sense of proportion is to remember the 
rights of individuals, not states. But the proponent may respond by asking: as we are 
all individual members of states, are we not all legitimate targets? 
But at the risk of 
becoming repetitive, we need to, again, recall the political character of modem states 
and the role of the citizen within them. 
I have argued throughout that in liberal 
democracies there is an electorate which chooses, within very narrow limits, some of 
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the decision-makers (excluding senior civil servants and military leaders among 
others). We can argue therefore, that the citizenry does not take the relevant decisions 
on war and peace, and, in this sense, is non-combatant. The fact that military/political 
leaders declare that they 'act on our behalf does not violate the right of non-combatant 
immunity. But some theorists argue that jus ad bellum can override jus in bello in 
circumstances where they conflict. 
For instance, Walzer (1977) calls such circumstances 'supreme emergencies' and cites 
the Nazi threat of World War 11 as an example. For him, rules governing the conduct 
of war (including the killing of the innocent) may be violated in the promotion of a just 
cause (response to aggressive threats to political sovereignty or territorial integrity of a 
state). He states: 
"The very existence of a community may be at stake, and then how can 
we fail to consider possible outcomes in judging the course of the 
fighting. At this point if at no other, the restraint on utilitarian 
calculation must be lifted. " (p. 268) 
Thus, in cases of 'supreme emergency' (defeat likely to bring disaster to a political 
community), exceptional measures are called for precisely because they are 'militarily 
necessary' for the preservation of the political community, presumably meaning the 
nation or state. But the ambiguity of 'military necessity' can then justify any end for 
which one is fighting and any means for achieving that objective simply by being 
'necessary'. Thus, any side can use military necessity to justify resort to war or the 
choice of means used in its conduct. Indeed,, as Holmes points out, Hitler's 'Mein 
Kampf, by warning of Jewish and Communist 'threats' to the German state and 
German values, can be viewed, according to Walzer's criteria, as a declaration of 
supreme emergency. The point is, whether Hitler's perception of the Jewish threat was 
correct or not, what is important is that Hitler believed it so. Holmes (1989) sums this 
up nicely when he states: 
11 ... to justify the 
killing of innocent persons when necessitated by 
supreme emergency is to say, in effect, that nations may resort to such 
measures when the believe they confront such an emergency"; y 
moreover: 
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"it is always the nation proposing to resort to war that is the judge of 
whether it has justice on its side or whether a given emergency is 
'supreme'. ('On War and Morality'p. 169. ) 
In short,, if Walzer's principle of 'supreme emergency' is a moral principle, then he must 
be prepared to give it universal application, which may include its use by fascist 
regimes bent on genocide. Walzer is not alone in arguing that jus ad bellum may 
override or violate jus in bello where the two conflict. For example, Ramsey does not 
see the principle of non-combatant immunity as precluding the use of nuclear weapons, 
and employs the doctrine of double effect to justify the sacrifice of non-combatants. 
Similarly, J. T. Johnson (1986) assumes certain values to be so important that in 
situations of supreme emergency 'higher' values may be favoured over lower ones. For 
him: 
11 ... the values constituting the jus ad bellum'. having priority over those 
of the jus in bello ... have to be honoured in such a case, even at some 
expense to the latter. " (in William p. 48. ) 
The problems surrounding 'supreme emergency' and 'military necessity' also have 
implications for the use of unjustifiable means which constitute 'crimes of war', as 
defined by the 1945 Nuremberg Charter. 
The Nuremberg (or London) Charter, adhered to by 23 'united nations' formed the basis 
for the 1945-6 Nuremberg trials, under which 24 defendants (largely major 'war 
criminals' of the Third Reich) were charged with one or more general types of crimes 
of war: crimes against peace; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and conspiracy to 
commit any of the first three crimes. 
'Crimes against peace' (Article 6(a) of the Charter) were taken by the International 
Military Tribunal to pertain to the initiation of 'waging a war of aggression' and hence 
belong to that aspect of international law dealing with recourse to war Ous ad bellum), 
and limited to higher, more authoritative military and civilian officials. 
However, the 
idea of crimes against peace is problematic, not 
least because of the difficulty of 
defining 'aggression' in which, as I pointed out earlier, we have no workable definition. 
Another problem is that by upholding the 
doctrine of sovereignty (by making 
106 
'aggressive war', that is, a violation of sovereignty, a crime), Article 6(a) protects the 
sovereignty of all states, even criminal states, provided they do not launch wars. 
Given these difficulties, it is worth noticing that only I Nuremberg defendant was 
found guilty of crimes against peace and received 20 years imprisonment. The others 
were convicted in addition of war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
Crimes against humanity were defined by Article 6(c) of the Charter as consisting of 
various inhumane acts against 'any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal'. (Agreement by the Govt. of the 
USA, the Provisional Govt. of the French Republic, the UK, and the USSR for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 
8th 1945,, E. A. S. No. 472,82 U. N. T. S. 279) The significance of crimes against 
humanity (which include genocide) lies in the fact that international law here requires 
individual obedience to higher moral principles, and that these principles could prove 
binding even on actions directed solely against a nation's own populace or that of an 
ally. The charge made against this category, however, is that it constituted retroactive 
law - that is, such crimes were not violations of international law, they were not 
envisaged and there was no occasion to legislate against them. Yet given the enormity 
of the Nazi outrages, it has been argued that the Allies, in the name of justice, had no 
choice but to resort to the practice of retroactive legislation. A second difficulty is that 
this category undermines the doctrine of sovereignty and thus stands in sharp 
contradiction to Article 6(a) or crimes against peace. This may explain why the 
Tribunal was careful to restrict its attention to actions which occurred in connection 
with the war. Because, on its face, crimes against humanity are, in some 
circumstances, irreconcilable with the doctrine of sovereignty, the Tribunal's caution 
may have been partly a response to a genuine dilemma: prohibit certain peacetime 
actions as crimes against humanity and you may provide a pretext for intervention by 
one state in the affairs of another of the kind that the rules against 'aggression' were 
meant to prohibit. However, it could also have been partly a response to the need to 
ignore Allied atrocities. In this sense, the Nuremberg prosecutors laid themselves open 
to the charge that they were indulging in 'victor's 
justice'. a charge that undermined 
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their moral authority. The Allies were thus vulnerable to the 'dirty hands' defence - 
that they were conveniently ignoring their own actions. 
The third category 'war crimes' (listed second in the Charter) were taken to pertain to 
the conduct of war ) jus in bello) and constitute the following: 
"Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment of or deportation to 
slave labour or for any other purposes of civilian populations of or in 
occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment ofprisoners-of-war or persons 
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public and private property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity. " (ibid) 
These prohibitions formed the basis for the trial of many common soldiers who fought 
on the Axis in World War 11, thereby providing precedents for future wars, legitimising 
war crimes trials of individual soldiers based on their individual responsibilities. Fifty 
years on, an international criminal tribunal has been set up to try war crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and 
General Ratka Mladic have both been charged with being individually responsible for 
war crimes. A focus on the individual at Nuremberg was demonstrated by the fact that 
both Nazi perpetrators and their victims were seen not as states or collective entities 
(eg. Germans, Jews) but as individual human beings. To highlight the tension between 
individual and collective responsibility, it is worth examining some of the arguments 
put forward by the Nuremberg defence. 
For example, the defence argued that only states had customarily been considered the 
subjects of international law. The reasoning was that, even though it was true, as the 
prosecution pointed out, that acts of states were acts of men, nonetheless individuals 
were not personally responsible for such acts and should not be punished for them. In 
short, the defence was applying the 'act of state' principle, by which the political 
leaders of a country would not be held responsible for the actions of their state. 
The 
doctrine was, however, rejected under Article 7 of the Charter which 
declared that: 
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"The official position of Defendants, whether as Heads of State or 
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered 
asfreeing themftom responsibility or mitigating punishment. " (ibid). 
Again then, the classical concept of sovereignty is being undermined. By making even 
sovereigns legally liable for their acts, Article 7, in effect, denies that the sovereign is 
the sole source of law in his state. However, while I endorse the view that state 
functionaries should bear some responsibility for their actions (the higher the rank, the 
greater the culpability), I would question the dismissal of 'act of state' as mitigating 
punishment because it ignores the sociopolitical context within which the individual 
finds him or herself In my view, the background of individuals who had been brought 
up to obey absolutely state orders (that is, a state form that offered little or no scope for 
autonomous decision-making) and accept that they bore no responsibility for state 
actions, as in Nazi Germany, should be relevant to their punishment. This is not to 
deny culpability but to take into account a particular state form from which an 
individual takes orders as mitigating punishment. 
Similarly, the Nuremberg defendants argued that they had been under orders with 
regard to some of the alleged crimes. These orders were embodied in the 
'Fuhrerprinzip', according to which Hitler's orders were binding upon the citizens of 
Germany. However, the defence of 'superior orders' was ruled inapplicable in 
determining a soldier's guilt or innocence by Article 8 which stated: 
"The fact that the defendant acted in pursuant to order of his 
government or of a superior shall not free him ftom responsibility, but 
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determined thatjustice so required. " (ibid) 
Indeed,, with regard the doctrines of 'act of state' and 'superior orders', Robert Jackson, 
chief US prosecutor, went as far as to say in his opening address at Nuremberg: 
"The idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a 
fiction. " (The Guardian. 28111195p. 5). 
Yet if a person is responsible for actions taken 
by him under orders then a rather 
important question concerns the extent of such responsibility. 
For example, is it a 
soldier's duty to establish whether an order 
is in fact the commission of a war crime? 
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The Tribunal was vague on this point merely stating that "the true test which is found 
in the varying degrees by the criminal law of most nations is not the existence of the 
order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible. " (Nuremberg Tribunal Judgement 
42). But what does moral choice amount to? Should it take into account the dilemma 
faced by the soldier in combat - that if he fails to act heroically by placing his own life 
above others he should be penalised? Or should it take into account the degree of 
choice exercised by the individual which concerns the likely consequences of 
disobeying an order? In either case, what is missing from both these interpretations is 
the influence of military training which (by discouraging questioning) is clearly not 
conducive to autonomous decision-making, moral or otherwise, by common soldiers. 
A larger part of military training involves exerting pressure on the soldier to conform 
to specific orders - an insistence on absolute obedience ensures that military operations 
will not be hampered by discipline problems. There is very little scope therefore, for a 
soldier to disobey an order which is illegal on its face. Wasserstrom (1974) draws 
attention to the constraints imposed by military training, arguing that: 
... it is not sufficient to excuse 
him (the soldier) when moral choice was 11 * 
not present, he ought, perhaps, to be excused whenever he does what he 
is told to do because this is what he will have been trained to do. " (in 
Held. p. 59) 
For Wasserstrom, even in cases where superior orders are absent and soldiers engage in 
gratuitous violence (eg. My Lai), the typical combat situation and the morally 
corruptive effects of modem war, serve to diminish (but certainly not 
deny) culpability. 
The military environment encourages individuals to overlook distinctions which 
in any 
other context are of utmost moral importance. It follows that the more easily a military 
organisation allows orders to be questioned, the greater the responsibility of 
the 
common soldier to question them before carrying them out. 
When the choice an 
individual is forced to make is difficult because training discourages autonomous 
decisions, or because the definition of a war crime 
is vague, then I would argue that the 
obligation of the state not to place a citizen 
in such a position becomes that much 
stronger. 
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To complete our examination of Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter dealing 
with war crimes, we must return to the problematic concept of 'military necessity'. We 
have already explored its ambiguity when applied to situations of 'supreme emergency' 
and in the context of war crimes, we are still faced with the difficulty that'necessity' is 
a matter of infinite circumstantial variation. 
For example, Telford Taylor (1986) argues that the prohibition against the killing of 
enemy soldiers who have surrendered can be overridden in situations required by 
'military necessity. Through the operation of this principle he states: 
FF... no military or other court has been called upon ... to declare such killing a war crime. " (in Wakin p. 3 75) 
Similarly, according to Taylor, the aerial bombardment of population centres (eg. 
London, Coventry, Berlin, Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki) were not war crimes and 
therefore not punished at Nuremberg for two important reasons. First, since aerial 
bombardment was engaged in by the Allies, certainly more intensively than either the 
Germans or Japanese, it would be improper to punish the latter for what the former 
also did. Second, the bombing of cities is generally permissible because bombing is an 
important instrument of war. Yet it is difficult to accept the moral permissibility of 
aerial bombardment on the grounds that it was engaged in by all belligerents. Should 
bombing cease to be a war crime because it becomes uniform practice? With regards 
to aerial bombing being an important instrument of war, we could suggest that methods 
and instruments of war should conform to the rules of morality and not the reverse. 
To endorse the view of Wasserstrom (1974), applying the principle of military 
necessity to justify aerial warfare is to 'surround the practice with an aura of 
justification that is in no way deserved'. (in Held p. 55) A doctrine which legitimises 
almost any practice which has significant military value, thus allowing all moral claims 
to be overridden, is not an appeal to military necessity but to military utility. 
But 
should we be so concerned with the vagueness of the concept? 
After all, similarly 
vague concepts such as 'due process' and 'fair price' are 
in common usage, so shouldn't 
we have confidence in the capability of military 
leaders Oust as we leave courts and 
economists to their own interpretations) to take guidance 
from the rules employing the 
concept of military necessity? Possibly, but it is the killing of survivors, the torture of 
prisoners and the rape of captured cities that have been justified through application of 
the concept, and I find morally disturbing a principle which permits a general 
exception to almost all the laws of war on grounds of military necessity. 
It should be clear at this point, that the laws of war discussed in this chapter are, to say 
the least, very fuzzy around the edges. We have seen that their enforcement is 
spasmodic, and changeable in that the extent to which they are observed may rapidly 
be altered by the circumstances and techniques of warfare. But if the laws of war are 
so erratically enforced, and subject to change through the nature of war itself, we may 
ask ourselves whether they are worth having at all? Might it not be better to discard 
both jus ad bellurn and jus in bello and acknowledge that in war, anything goes? For 
example, some people would disagree with the claim that the present laws of war are 
better than no laws. They might argue that having laws forbidding some acts has the 
result of making the rest of war seem more legitimate than it is, and so the laws of war 
hinder progress towards its total abolition. If it can be shown that laws of war do make 
war itself seem more acceptable as a policy, this may be a very powerful case for 
rejecting just war theory and the rules of war. 
Telford Taylor believes (despite finding certain inadequacies) that the laws of war and 
the principle of military necessity serve moral and practical purposes and that they 
have to be preserved and enforced. Wasserstrom, on the other hand, argues that the 
laws of war 'have no special claim upon our attention or energies' being unsound when 
regarded as an embodiment of moral law, particularly with regards to their failure to 
prohibit all violations of non-combatant immunity. 
Taylor cites two reasons for preserving and enforcing the laws of war. First, they 
prevent moral corruption by imposing constraints on what is morally permissible in 
war (i. e. they work in part like civil Prohibitions on murder etc. ) and second; they work 
in the sense that they save lives. For Taylor then, acts of killing are carried out 
for 
state rather than personal reasons, thus refusing 
licence for gratuitous violence, and 
more civilians and prisoners would be 
killed without the laws of war. 
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What should we make of the claim that preservation of the laws of war prevents 
soldiers from becoming totally corrupt? In my view, our discussions of military 
training , which teaches the large majority of recruits how to kill (and when, given that 
it is, generally, on command in pre-set circumstances) and military necessity (which 
permits the violation of almost all prohibitions), cast serious doubt on the idea that the 
present laws prevent the complete dehumanisation of war. But what about Taylor's 
second argument in favour of the laws of war? It is true to say that they work in the 
sense that they save lives, if only those not 'necessitated' by military requirements, and 
it is better to save some lives than none at all. But to make such a statement is to 
overlook the fact that by endorsing the laws of war we are, nevertheless, legitimising 
morally indefensible behaviour. That is, we are legitimising behaviour which permits 
us to kill and maim almost anybody provided only that our actions can be reasonably 
related to some perceived military objective (albeit a means to a higher, possibly social 
objective). To quote Wasserstrom again: 
"There is something genuinely odious about a code of behaviour that 
says: if there is a conflict between the attainment of an important 
military objective and one or more of the prohibitions of the laws of war, 
it is the prohibitions that quite properly are to give way .. And there is 
something dangerous about a point of view that accepts such a system 
and directs us to concentrate our energies and respect upon its 
enforcement. " (p. 407) 
For him, the current laws of war do not make the moral distinctions often claimed for 
them, and they do not have the beneficial effects frequently attributed to them. 
It would not be difficult to draw the conclusion that the laws of war and criteria which 
constitute just war theory are so vague, imprecise and morally incoherent, that we 
should reject them out of hand. But I believe that some caution is necessary. 
To recap, we have seen that a war is justified if it meets the criteria of jus ad bellum. 
Traditionally, these have included just cause, legitimate authority and right intention, 
with various other requirements often added, such that the war be a last resort, have a 
likelihood of success and that there be proportionality in the resultant good and evil. 
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But we have also seen that a war cannot be just, however just the cause and right the 
intention, if it utilises indefensible means. Thus, jus in bello criteria are concerned 
with what is morally justified in the conduct of war, for example, who and what are 
legitimate military targets and observing restraints on the means of war, such as 
prohibiting the use of specific weapons. 
However, in my view, the fundamental problem with just war theory and the rules of 
war is the principle of military necessity which, in the last analysis, argues that if one is 
justified in going to war, one is justified in doing whatever is necessary to win. That 
is, the standards for judging jus in bello are already contained in the standards for 
judging jus ad bellum. I reject this viewpoint and suggest that there are standards, 
independent of jus ad bellum, for judging jus in bello - that is, there are limits (morally 
defined) to what one may do in conducting a war, whatever the justice of resorting to it 
in the first place. For example, I find it difficult to accept that the use of nuclear 
weapons, which have given humanity the capacity to destroy itself, can be employed in 
the pursuit of victory, on the grounds of military necessity, no matter how just the 
cause. If we were to suggest that the only legitimate object of war is a better peace, 
employing means that make subsequent reconciliation impossible, is a gross inversion 
of logic. To justify going to war then, requires showing that what one would be doing 
by waging it is justified - that is, to establish jus ad bellum requires establishing 
beforehand that those means are permissible. It is not enough simply to start with the 
assumption that war is justified and needs only to be waged humanely (subject, of 
course, to the dictates of military requirements) - to establish jus ad bellum one must 
justify, according to rigid moral principles, the actions necessary to waging war. 
Weighing the difficulties of predicting the means employed, whether resorting to war 
will achieve anything positive and what the long-term consequences will 
be, against 
the certainty of immense suffering and great loss of 
life, we may well ask, in the 
absence of these principles, whether war is ever 
justified in the first place. If we accept 
however, that moral considerations should govern the conduct of war 
(which precludes 
the provision of military necessity) then we 
have a strong case for enforcing these 
laws. 
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As a concluding note and as a way of addressing the issues raised at the beginning of 
this chapter, it is useful to view the phenomenon of war in both the context of the 
social and of the individual. In communitarian terms, we see war as a conflict between 
nation-states, different social institutions and movements, and if the only recognisable 
and organisable form of resistance to evil social practices or criminal states is military 
resistance, then war may seem inescapable. Yet this is not the end of the story. For 
whatever may be the causes of war, such causes operate through individuals, and if 
they are the decisive factor in causing wars, then they are the decisive factor in 
preventing them. If then, individuals are ultimately responsible for knowing and 
controlling such causes, then prevention will require locating them in our human 
situation in the world. But this is not to argue that war derives inevitably from human 
nature, for specific motives and ideas are not inborn and inevitable - must be traced 
back to a particular system of social relations and are thus the consequence of the 
power and decisions of ruling groups as they determine (or neglect) the ruling 
structures and processes of society. What forms of resistance are socially available is 
itself something that can be changed, over time, by social action. 
Whether we will prevent wars remains to be seen, and to aim for a permanent peace 
should be our ultimate objective. However, this also requires ridding ourselves of the 
misconception that 'war as evil' and 'peace as good' are moral absolutes. Resort to war 
may involve some purpose other than killing, maiming and destroying certain values, 
and this may be something of greater moral significance, such as the establishment of a 
just peace. I say just' peace because it must be acknowledged that not every 
kind of 
peace is good. A peaceful community may be so ridden with 
injustice, oppression, 
inequality and deprivation of freedom, that the situation may well 
be considered worse 
than war. And where such a situation can only be rectified 
by means of war, then it is 
crucial that it is conducted according to rigid moral principles which 
forbid the use of 
unjustifiable means on grounds of military necessity. 
In sum, I would argue that the 
only legitimate aim of war is the establishment of a 
just peace. Furthermore, in 
pursuing this objective, the laws of war should not, as 
Taylor asserts, be 'subject to the 
changing nature of war itself, 
but should stand firm against the requirements of 
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modem war and weaponry, and demand that 'war itself conforms to the rigours of 
morality. 
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CHAP 'ER 1HREE 
CONSTRUCING THE GOOD SOCIETY 
THE QUESTION OF HUMAN NEED 
In Chapter One, I argued that liberty (in a form integrating the negative and positive) 
and equality, is the foundation of democracy. I also argued that in any discussion of 
equality and freedom we first need to address the problem of socioeconomic inequality 
before attempting to resolve the problem of formal political inequality. This, in turn, 
requires defining a set of human needs which must be satisfied for liberty and equality 
to be maximised. However, it is necessary to first examine the concept of need. 
THE CONCEPT OF NEED. 
It is appropriate to start by drawing a distinction between needs and wants. Some have 
argued that there is no real distinction, a point that has been utilised by neo-liberals and 
classical economists to argue in favour of an extension of markets in welfare. 
However, leaving the critique of this argument until later, it is plausible to say that we 
can distinguish them as follows. For example, we could argue that wants are derived 
from individual Preference and cultural environment, thus, unlike needs wants vary 
from person to person and are therefore subjective. Some theorists have suggested that 
the difference between needs and wants should be sought in defining wanting as a 
psychological state,, but needing as a kind of objective fact about a person. (Miller 
1989. p. 109). Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out in 'Philosophical Investigations 
(1953), we must reject accounts of psychological states based entirely on the 
occurrence of an 'inner feeling' - to cite a want (intelligibly) one must make reference 
to an end, a reference which usually entails social standards and norms. 
Thus, if we accept that all need-statements are triadic in form (X needs Y for Z) a 
claim by X that Y is needed is only intelligible when the purpose 
for which it is needed 
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is specified. To say that Y is needed is to refer to an instrument - needs are means to 
ends. (Doyal & Gough 1991 p. 4) In short then, both the intelligibility of a need and 
the justification for its satisfaction will depend upon the purpose for which it is 
required (and, of course, if its assertion is to be given the moral approval of that 
purpose - for example, we would generally approve of a person's need for an axe to 
chop firewood but not for the purpose of killing one's neighbour). Thus, saying "I 
need 2,200 calories a day because Ifeel like 2,200 calories a day" is as unpersuasive 
as saying "I need a glass of water because Ijust do ". In both cases the use of 'need' 
is unclear. However, if I say "I need at least 2,200 calories a day in order to 
maintain physical health " or "I need a glass of water because if I don't have it I may 
dehydrate", I am drawing on a shared understanding relating to the idea of harm. If a 
person is held to need something, he/she lacks something and will suffer harin through 
the lack of it. Getting what one needs will overcome this harm, this is not so in the 
case of a want or desire. 
However, is it not possible to define a basic category of need which is intelligible as it 
stands and which does not depend for its justification upon some further specification 
of a particular purpose? For example, we could ask ourselves what people need simply 
to pursue any goal or purpose at all? By posing this question, it is then possible to 
define a class of basic needs. Albert Weale (1978) argues that assertions of need may 
be taken to refer to, ".. those goods and services which it is rational to want as the 
necessary conditions for any given level of welfare". (1978. p. 68). Similarly, David 
Miller (1976) isolates a category of 'intrinsic needs' - those needs which must be met if 
people are to be able to carry out their plans of life whatever these plans might be. 
However, we still need to define these goods and services or'intrinsic needs'. 
TWO BASIC HUMAN NEEDS. 
To live and act in a responsible manner requires first, the physical capacity 
to do so 
and second, a mind capable of rational thought. Thus, the most 
fundamental and basic 
human need must be human survival because, as Plant 
(1985) points out, we cannot 
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make sense of the idea of satisfying any other need without assuming the value of 
human life. (Chap 1) But is merely surviving a sufficient precondition for meeting 
other needs? For example, a severely brain-damaged person surviving on a life- 
support machine does not have the capacity to pursue goals and implement them. 
Therefore, it is some level of physical well-being that is necessary for human agency 
('well-being here being taken to mean the capacity to pursue (socially approved) goals, 
and having the needs associated with it met), and which should be defined as a basic 
need, rather than just physical survival. But what level of physical well-being? 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as 'Not merely the absence of 
disease and infirmity, but complete physical, mental and social well-being'. (WHO 
1955) This definition emphasises the interdependence of physical and mental welfare, 
stressing that feeling well is not just a physical experience. However, for the purpose 
of our discussion of physical well-being as a basic need, we can at this stage use a 
'negative' non-specific definition of health which is conceptually linked with the 
absence of biological disease (the 'biomedical' model). On this view, the physical 
health needs of persons have been met if they do not suffer in a sustained or serious 
way from one or more particular diseases. (Stacey 1988. p. 169-172). Thus, if a person 
wishes to lead an active and successful life, it is in his or her objective interest to 
satisfy the basic need of maximising life expectancy and to avoid serious physical 
disease. Obviously, this is not a satisfactory definition of health as it stands - (the 
concept of 'health' will be discussed more fully in the later section on 'intermediate 
needs') - however, its purpose at this stage of our analysis is to enable us to think of 
physical health in a transcultural way. In other words, physical health is a universal 
basic need, it applies to everyone, everywhere. 
If physical health is a necessary condition of understanding a commitment to other 
values and needs, so too is autonomy. I have already discussed the value of 
individual 
autonomy for political participation in Chapter One - nevertheless 
it is worth repeating 
that an individual's conception of the 'good' depends crucially upon 
his or her sense of 
what is achievable, and this can only 
be held by rational, responsible agents. Thus, 
autonomy is tantamount to 'agency'. 
But does this go far enough? 
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Doyal and Gough (199 1) cite three key variables which, they argue, affect levels of 
individual autonomy. First, the level of understanding individuals have about 
themselves, their culture and what is expected of them as individuals within it. This is 
a universal variable as all children must acquire language skills and learn to interact 
socially in minimally acceptable ways irrespective of specific cultural rules (for 
example, slapping people in the face every time I felt like it would not be considered 
acceptable in any known society). The second variable is the individual's 
psychological capacity to formulate options for him or herself (i. e. a prospective 
definition of mental health) which involves 'practical rationality and responsibility' for 
action. Finally, Doyal and Gough make reference to the objective opportunities 
enabling an individual to act accordingly (the opportunity to express both freedom of 
agency and political freedom). This last variable is important and relates directly to the 
value of autonomy both for political participation discussed earlier and to act 
collectively. Where the opportunity exists to question and participate in agreeing or 
changing the rules of a society, it will be possible for individuals to significantly 
increase their autonomy through choices unavailable to those denied political freedom, 
for example, those living under totalitarian regimes. 
The need for physical well-being and critical autonomy thus provide the logically basic 
human needs which have to be recognised in our good society. These two basic needs 
have to be satisfied whatever else is needed or wanted, and therefore constitute a basic 
class of needs which all individuals have in common. Those needs, I will argue point 
to a necessity to establish an obligation to provide welfare - an obligation in the 
strictest sense, because, to return to Plant's point, it is impossible to make sense of the 
possibility that those whose needs are not met in this sphere will be able to pursue any 
obligations or any ends. On this view then, welfare to this degree is an entitlement or 
just requirement and its provision a strict duty - however, this view requires 
further 
exploration before we can argue that it is the proper basis 
for regarding welfare as a 
right. 
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WELFARE RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS. 
In the context of welfare, it is pertinent to ask why we should speak of rights at all? 
One reason would be that to claim a right is to make a claim of special force. Rights 
are 'asserted' and their satisfaction demanded, consequently, rights to welfare would be 
free from the stigma so often attached to existing welfare provision. Also, rights to 
welfare involve provision by way of taxation, which in turn involves an element of 
compulsion. For some theorists, this requires justification. For example, Nozick 
(1974) argues that there is no genuine right to welfare and the specific resources which 
such a right would entail. For him, resource distribution via taxation is 'forced labour' 
and thus a curtailment of negative liberty. However, assertion of rights justify such 
compulsion. 
The neo-liberal critique of the 'rights-based' approach to welfare rests upon the crucial 
distinction between negative and positive rights and the issue of scarcity. Welfare 
rights are viewed as rights 'to' something (positive rights) - thus, rights to medical care 
for example, are rights to a resource which is subject to change and are therefore open- 
ended. Civil and political rights, (negative rights) on the other hand, are not rights 'to' 
something (because they entail abstinence and forbearance) and are, therefore, absolute 
because the issue of scarcity does not arise. However, as Plant (1980) points out, 
rights of forbearance also involve the allocation of scarce resources - the 
implementation and protection of negative rights through, for example, the effective 
operation of the criminal justice system requires positive state provision. Moreover, 
Plant draws attention to the fact that negative rights are as open-ended as positive 
rights. For example, were it not for the computer, would we need a Data Protection 
Act; if it were not for the development of sophisticated explosive material, would we 
require elaborate security systems at our airports? Thus, the neo-liberal distinction 
between negative and positive rights, based on issues of open-endedness and scarcity 
which characterise the latter, does not hold up to critical scrutiny. 
However, there are other grounds on the basis of which the distinction between 
negative and positive rights has been 
developed. Cranston (1973), for example, has 
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argued that rights must be universal if they are truly human rights, that is, they must 
not be culturally relative. He sets three 'tests for the authenticity of a human right' 
including the test of universality, and attempts to show that while negative rights pass 
these tests, welfare rights or socioeconomic rights do not. For him, welfare rights are 
culturally and group specific and are therefore not genuine rights. in the test of 
universality Cranston uses the example of the economic rights to holiday pay, 
applicable only to those in paid employment thus showing that it is not a genuine right. 
However, in his critique of Cranston's approach, Watson (1977) argues that the same 
could also be said of civil rights - for example, a right to a fair trial applies only to 
those who have been accused of a crime. Moreover, Watson goes on to state: 
"I-- the same form of argument the traditional rights to leave any -"Y 
country, including one's own, to freedom of religion and freedom of 
peaceful assembly, are excludedfrom the class of human rights, since 
each is 'necessarily limited' to those persons who are leaving a country, 
religious andpeacefully assembling, respectively. " (p. 39). 
Watson bases his claim of welfare rights as human rights by justifying their possession 
'simply in virtue of being human', (which, in my more specific definition is being 
capable of autonomy and a certain kind of well-being). Moreover, by pointing to the 
potentiality for finding oneself in specific categories or circumstances, including the 
potential for being accused of a crime or finding oneself in an unfavourable 
socioeconomic position, negative rights and welfare rights can equally be seen as 
universal human rights. Watson then, shares a view of human rights similar to that set 
out in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which states: 
"Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequatefor the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessar social services, and the right to security y 
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, 
or other lack of livelihood beyond his control. " (p. 33) 
The usefulness of this theory of rights is its importance for showing that there must 
be 
some feature or set of features which have to be universal 
in order to be human rights. 
Such features are to be found in the basic needs for physical 
health and autonomy, 
necessary for the pursuit of any purpose. 
Rights based on such needs would in general 
be negative (constitutional) and positive 
(welfare) rights (although it could be argued 
122 
that this distinction is not clear-cut eg. a positive (constitutional) right to vote; a 
negative (welfare) right such as parents' freedom from state interference in the rearing 
of children), and would also need to address the matter of democratic control and 
consumer participation in the administration of welfare and social policy in general. 
In recent years, successive Conservative governments have placed a great deal of 
emphasis on consumerism and consumer choice as the basis of a common identity in 
society (reflected in the 1990 pamphlet 'Encouraging Citizenship'), yet the same cannot 
be said for the encouragement of active consumer participation. The kind of equality 
of status implied in the idea of citizenship carries with it the right to take part in the 
planning of services which vitally affect people's lives and the right of enquiry into and 
criticism of existing provision and administrative arrangements. However, a question 
here concerns the weight to be given to the opinions and preferences of consumers, as 
opposed to those of officials and professionals in the planning and execution of policy. 
Obviously, the professional depends on skill, experience and specialised knowledge 
which the ordinary consumer does not have, but such a situation can be remedied to 
some degree by better publicity, creating channels for the expression of public opinion 
and setting up procedures for considering criticisms. Plant suggests citizen 
empowerment taking the form of a 'more explicit contractual relationship' between the 
providers of services and their clients, for example, performance indicators and 
limited-term contracts to ensure performance levels are maintained. (Plant 1990. ). The 
more powers of organisation that pass to public bodies, the greater their responsibility 
to the people they are set up to serve in order to safeguard the democratic rights of 
citizens. - 'people as citizens have rights to a given standard of services which 
is not a 
benevolent gesture nor an act of charity but society's obligation to supply'. (ibid) 
I have attempted to show that health and critical autonomy are basic needs common to 
all human beings irrespective of culture. This implies that the satisfaction of 
basic 
need in our good society applies to all societies everywhere. 
Plant and Lesser (1980) 
make this point clear by stating that : 
"... those who have developed moral outlooks, 
however different, that 
command certain ends or requires certain 
duties to be performed are 
logically committed to a conception of basic needs ... therefore any moral 
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view to be coherent must recognise the maintenance of human life and the development of autonomy as basic obligations. " (p. 3) 
Thus, if we have obligations at all, we have obligations towards anyone we are able to 
help, since if human life is of value at all, we cannot give rational grounds for saying 
that (in a non-instrumental sense) some lives are of value and some are not. It follows 
then, that moral imperatives know no national boundaries (a point I will develop 
further in the following chapter) - provided that those who proclaim their belief in the 
good society really do mean it. The measure of moral commitment is thus our 
willingness to take seriously its categorical character - its applicability to everyone and 
not just to those who already share this commitment. If our good society is the good 
society then we must believe that all individuals should strive to act accordingly and 
also accept that they have the right to try to do so. It also follows that they should 
have the right of access to those conditions and resources which make such actions a 
real emotional, physical and intellectual possibility. Thus, to the degree that 
individuals take any vision of the good society seriously, they have a duty to respect 
the right of all other human beings to do their best to adopt the same vision. This has 
implications for both the immigration and international aid policies of a society, as we 
shall see. 
The idea of universal human rights entails this right, even of strangers, to have the 
needs of physical health and autonomy satisfied. However, attempts at formulating a 
theory of universal human rights based on need have been heavily criticised by some 
writers, particularly those of a postmodernist persuasion. Postmodernists would argue 
that any attempt by those in one culture to impose their conception of basic needs onto 
any other amounts to nothing more than cultural imperialism - the pursuit of specific 
group interests. For them, human needs are socially relative not universal, stipulating 
only what some groups of individuals prefer over others. However, in order to 
examine the plausibility of the postmodernist critique, we need to explore this 
approach in a little more detail (given its popularity within academic circles 
in recent 
years) and an appropriate place to begin is with the work of 
Foucault. 
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UNIVERSALITY AS DOMINATION. 
For Foucault, the search for 'truth' represents authoritarianism and dogma, and he 
advocated its replacement by a 'genealogy', that is, the 'reactivation' of local 
knowledges which represent tolerance and resistance. This 'genealogy' will, Foucault 
states; 
ffentertain the claims to attention to local, discontinuous, disqualified, 
illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory 
which wouldfilter, hierarchize, and order them in the name of some true 
knowledge. " (Fine B. 'Democracy and the Rule of Law. 1986. Pluto. 
P. 199). 
The 'unitary body of theory' Foucault is thinking of here is Marxism, which he rejected 
for its supposedly 'scientific elitism'. Foucault also placed a great deal of emphasis on 
what he saw as the arbitrary nature of 'interpretation'; for him, the search for what 
people 'really' mean leads to an endless number of interpretations, none of which has 
any inherent superiority. It therefore becomes a matter of power which interpretation 
is correct. For Foucault then, it is the discourse of the interpreter which becomes 
elevated to a position of superiority, subordinating the discourse of others. This relates 
directly to the view that only particular social groupings can ultimately define the 
extent and substance of their needs. 
For example, following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffle argue that it is 'discourse' which 
constitute realities for different groups - as language is used in different ways and 
interpreted in different ways, the result is different realities which all have equal 
legitimacy. It follows therefore, that there can be no arbitrating 'truth' or 'universality' 
between these different interpretations. Thus, the postmodernist would re ect my 
account of the good society which implies, by definition, a more desirable form of life 
than any other. Similarly, another postmodemist attack would come from Keane 
(19 8 8) who argues that: 
"... the concept of democratisation would abandon the futile search ... 
fo r 
definite truths of human existence. It would teach us to live without an 
assumed 'historical agent of emancipation'as 
it would discard, once and 
for all, the indefensible ideological concepts - 
Order, History, Progress, 
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Humanity, Nature, Individual, Socialism". (p. 238). So where does this 
leave my good society? 
To follow Keane which, on his view, entails rejecting the idea of 'Humanity', my good 
society would founder on the rocks of relativism. This is because the relativism which 
characterises much postmodernist thought, denies the possibility of universal basic 
needs as well as the possibility that some approaches for need- satisfaction may be 
better than others. The Marxist writer Alex Callinicos (1990) makes this point well by 
noting that postmodernism renders itself incapable of doing anything other than 
defending one or another cultural status quo. For example, where is the sense or value 
in claiming that cataract sufferers in the Third World need not take advantage of the 
knowledge and application of Western medical technology which would restore their 
sight? This is not to suggest that Western medicine does not have its weaknesses and 
failings but to point out that it is capable of making a valuable contribution towards 
satisfying one basic need (physical health) which would inevitably increase the 
possibility of satisfying the other (critical autonomy). To cite another example against 
the postmodernist critique, what would be the point of suggesting that women need not 
pursue a more self-emancipatory form of education than that which is favoured by 
traditional and fundamentalist Muslims? In what sense could they not need to increase 
their individual autonomy through increasing their choices for purposive action? Only 
in the sense that they do not need what they do not want, and that brings us back to the 
anorexic needing food she does not want. Such confusion may (and does) court 
disaster. 
Is it a form of cultural imperialism to attempt to satisfy the basic needs of ourselves 
and others, particularly when the most practical methods for their satisfaction, 
whatever the cultural source, are within our grasp? If we follow Marx, who stated that 
humans possess the power to alter history and believed that the condition of 
humanity 
can be improved by the application of the best available 
knowledge, then it is our 
obligation to continue trying to bring about alteration aimed at satisfying 
basic human 
need at the highest sustainable levels. 
In sum then, the fundamental weakness of 
postmodernism is its relativism which, whether 
by accident or design, ends up 
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supporting those who wish to defend the status quo and prevent any moves towards 
universal human liberation. 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
To cite physical health and autonomy as basic human needs, and, therefore, as 
fundamental ways in which needs are fixed and classified, does enable us to form some 
idea of the structure and institutions of social life which would have to be present to 
satisfy these needs. In this section, therefore, the search must be for the societal 
preconditions which enable both maximum participation in the good society and allow 
those who believe their existing form of life to be wrong, to pursue their own vision of 
the good. It is this kind of consideration which really marks the transition from a 
discussion about basic or human need to an exploration of social need and its 
implications for structures, frameworks and opportunities. As we have seen, it is 
possible to give a relatively unproblematic definition of basic needs, the two most 
fundamental being physical health and autonomy, but, ahistorically speaking, it does 
not follow from citing these needs what level of medical care would be required for the 
former, or what type of legal framework or education system would be needed for the 
latter. It is no use appealing to a prospective abundance, for one can always envisage a 
set of goals too extravagant in the face of given resources, however richly endowed 
with these a society may be. What we must seek therefore, is a form of distribution 
through which resources may be allocated in the most fair and efficient manner. That 
is, we must advocate some form of distributive justice. 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. 
It is first necessary to draw briefly a distinction between retributive and 
distributive 
justice. In short, retributive justice is the sort of justice that 
is invoked in the criminal 
law. But not all matters of justice are matters of crime and punishment. 
In particular, 
the distribution of burdens and benefits can be 
just or unjust, though no question of 
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punishment arises. This is distributive or social justice. However, a question of social 
justice arises not simply where there is suffering and hardship, but where there is 
suffering and hardship alongside wealth and affluence. Indeed, some theorists, neo- 
liberals for instance, have used the former conception of justice to prevent the latter - 
for example, poverty as a punishment for indolence and wealth as reward for industry - 
an issue I will address later. Nevertheless, for others it is the comparison of the two, or 
more correctly, the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits that give rise to a sense 
of social injustice. Thus, the claim underlying social (distributive) justice is that all the 
major institutions of a society should be subjected to the test of conformity with 
principles of justice. What then, are these principles of justice against which 
institutions are to be assessed? Taking into account the conclusions of Chapter One, 
we could reasonably argue that a basic principle is one of equality between individuals. 
The implication of this is that all inequalities in rights and access to resources have to 
be justified in terms which should be accepted by everyone, including those, who in 
the allocation of scarce resources, stand to finish up with less that others in the way of 
rights and access. Two theories of social justice which attempt to justify such 
inequalities are those of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. 
NOZICK'S THEORY OF JUSTICE. 
It has been argued that our own ideas of distributive justice are powerfully affected by 
our perception of the prevailing relationships between individuals who are to 
be 
affected by that distribution (Miller 1976). Therefore, to simplify matters at this stage, 
let us imagine a 'society' made up of individuals who have no social relations with one 
another, each living an entirely independent and self-contained 
life. What would 
justice mean to the inhabitants of such a society? Nozick attempts to answer 
this 
question by constructing a historical theory of social 
justice which draws upon the 
work of John Locke. 
As we saw in Chapter One, Locke 
imagined a society or 'original position' in which 
there is no state or legal system and asked 
himself what rights people would have in 
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such a condition. One of these fundamental rights for Locke would be the right to 
private property. In short, what would make an item mine is if I expended labour upon 
it in appropriating it. Consequently, any attempt to take that item form me would be a 
violation of that right, or injustice. 
Nozick makes use of Locke's theory to argue that if everyone has come by their 
possessions (or 'holdings' as he calls them)justly, then the distribution of holdings in 
that society will be just. If this is the case, then this is the correct state of affairs from 
the point of view of distributive justice. For Nozick then, justice means non- 
interference with the rights (property rights) that each has acquired by his or her own 
'legitimate' efforts (legitimate in the sense of non-interference with others). Thus, any 
conception of social justice which establishes a pattern of ownership and calls it just 
without inquiring how it came about is, in Nozick's view, mistaken, precisely because 
such a conception would be ahistorical. In sum then, following Nozick, social justice 
will be a matter of rectifying past injustices rather than bringing about some egalitarian 
pattern of redistribution on non-historical grounds. A tall order indeed, so it may be 
that we would have to settle for doing what can be done. For example, in cases where 
the legacy of imperialism continues to affect societies and groups in disadvantageous 
ways (unfair discrimination etc. ) affirmative action strategies would help compensate 
for and eventually eliminate the inequalities they continue to suffer. 
Apart from acknowledging the immense difficulties involved in actually attempting to 
correct the past mistakes of any society, it is also worth looking more closely at the 
plausibility of individual property rights. I would argue that there is no obvious 
connection between the individual's part in creating a commodity (hence wealth) and 
his or her share in its benefits. For example, who is entitled to the greater share of the 
benefits which result from the sales of a popular model of mountain bike? Should the 
person who thought up the idea receive a larger share, or should it be the assembly 
worker, or the shop assistant who sold it? Is it plausible to argue that the 
individual 
with the initial idea deserves a greater share? Following the 
line of the 'first 
occupancy' argument, what we are asking here 
is 'who had it first'? After all, if the 
idea had not been formulated, this particular model of mountain 
bike would not exist. 
However, although the person with the initial 
idea may have had the intention of 
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producing the commodity, the actual carrying out of that purpose involved the 
contributions of others. Thus, one's actual contribution limits the share of the benefits 
one is entitled to through the production of the commodity. First occupancy, in this 
example, does not create a property right of full ownership or a greater than equal 
share,, only the liberty to occupy no more than one's share. We must, therefore, in 
justice, acknowledge the contribution made by society in general to the success of the 
imaginative individual, ideas after all are not conceived in a vacuum. In the case of the 
designer of the mountain bike, one must consider the contributions of prevailing 
fashions in styles of bicycle which may have influenced its design, as well as the 
contributions of those who laboured to supply raw materials for its construction. 
Clearly then, labour is social. It is thus plausible to argue that a great many people 
(possibly on a global scale) have had a hand in the entrepreneur's wealth so that 
thoughts of redistribution from the entrepreneur seem reasonable. Such redistribution 
would be just because it would amount to giving the rewards of industry to those 
entitled to a share. Add to this the fact that there is little practical prospect of breaking 
this down into individual contributions and it appears that what is needed is a 
GENERAL system of redistribution which will ensure that everyone gets a reasonably 
fair share of the rewards that living in a society brings. 
RAWLS AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE. 
One method for devising a system of rules and principles of justice is to posit a 
hypothetical negotiating situation marked by equality and freedom. Principles of 
justice are those principles that would emerge from a process taking this 
form. In 
Chapter One, I briefly touched upon Rawls' two principles of justice in my discussion 
of negative and positive liberty. Let us examine these principles 
in more detail. 
Rawls imagines that a group of individuals are asked to agree upon a set of social 
principles 'behind a veil of ignorance. 
In other words, they are required to agree upon 
a form of society they are willing to 
inhabit, without knowing anything about their own 
personal circumstances, that 
is, being unaware of whether they are intelligent or stupid, 
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industrious or lazy and so on. This 'veil of ignorance' is intended to ensure that the 
principles of the contracting parties are impartial. 
As discussed earlier, Rawls' first principle requires a society to allow the greatest 
possible liberty for the individual, compatible with a similar degree of liberty for all. 
This principle is obviously designed to capture and express the rights and liberties 
necessary to ensure a democratic polity. However, it is Rawls' second principle of 
justice which directly concerns us here. This principle, known as the 'difference 
principle' is divided into two subsidiary ones, the first concerning social inequality and 
the second equal opportunity. The difference principle is intended to capture the belief 
in the fundamental equality between citizens, that is, the equal claim of all to a share in 
the wealth which a society produces. But for Rawls, this does not mean that each 
citizen has a claim to an equal share. For him, some people are capable of producing 
more than others (consequences of genetic lottery, luck etc. ) and it is right for them to 
be richer than others if the less fortunate are caused to be better off as a result. Thus, 
the 'difference principle' endorses all and only those socioeconomic inequalities that 
either make the worst off better off or do not make them worse off. (The social 
minimum envisaged by Rawls would take into account wages plus transfers plus 
benefits from public goods, the level of which would be adjusted in accordance with a 
I just savings principle'). However, there is a second component to this principle - that 
of equal opportunity. Rawls argues that when inequalities are defended on economic 
grounds (eg. incentive argument) there must be equal opportunity for everyone to 
compete for the most desirable positions regardless of social status. Thus, 'equality of 
opportunity' would entail a system of procedural justice aimed at eliminating 
constraints on opportunity (eg. unfair discriminatory practices). It also follows that 
every individual will have access to sufficient 'primary goods' to ensure that those 
'similarly endowed and motivated'will be able to make roughly equivalent choices to 
pursue their projects and plans. At first glance, Rawls' theory appears a plausible and 
fair one. But does it go far enough? 
The particular propositions which are assumed 
in the doctrine before us, and which lie 
behind the difference principle, are to the effect that some 
inequality will indeed be 
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required in any society if all its members, including some who have a lesser amount of 
social and economic goods, are to be as well off as they can be. This is a variation, in 
one sense, of Hayek's 'trickledown effect' - they both share the 'productivist, premise 
that 'a rising tide lifts all boats'. (Barry 1993. p. 11) This proposal might reasonably be 
called cautious or even defeatist. Although in its concern for the worst-off it derives 
from a commitment to equality, it is so expressed as to bring into prominence the need 
for incentive inequalities. All this depends on a dogma which states that favourable 
inequalities are incentives for a higher production of goods. It may thus encourage 
those who in fact favour socioeconomic inequality that is against the interests of the 
worst-off. 
Cohen (1991) argues that the 'difference principle' can be used to justify economic 
incentives that induce inequalities only when the attitude of the talented or rich runs 
counter to the spirit of the 'difference principle' itself. they would not need special 
incentives if they were themselves committed to the principle. Let us examine this 
argument more closely. 
Proponents of the incentive argument say that when productive people take home 
modest pay, they produce less than they would otherwise do, and as a result, relatively 
poor and badly off people are worse off than they are when the exercise of talent is 
well-rewarded. But if the rich do not work as hard without economic incentives, is this 
because they are unable or unwilling? It is unlikely, I would argue, that such luxuries 
as Caribbean holidays, second homes and expensive cars are necessary to enable them 
to perform at a high level. So it follows that they are not unable to work hard as they 
would be if they lacked necessary goods. So is it the prospect of getting luxury goods 
which fuels the motivational drive deemed necessary for effort But if this is so, we are 
not speaking of a truth that reward is too low, but of a perception that it is, which in 
turn leads to disappointed expectation. But this only tells us how the rich will feel. 
socialised as they have been in a radically unequal society. All we are citing then is 
mere habituation to unequal rewards - habits can and do change and to cite them as 
justification of unequal rewards is wholly inappropriate. It follows then, that the rich 
are in fact unwilling to perform at a high 
level without economic incentives. This 
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renders Rawls belief that a just society honours the dignity of the worst-off untenable, 
for the worst-off are only as well-off as they can be given the self-seekingness of the 
rich. The stance of the rich then, is irrational and unjust by the very standard which the 
difference principle itself sets. Thus as Cohen states: 
"... th e differen ce prin ciple ... which does mandate the incentive policy, is 
not a basic principle of justice but a principle for handling people Is injustice. It is not a basic principle ofjustice, since it confers benefit on 
market maximisers who offend againstjustice. " (p. 326. ) 
We need also to deal with the second part of Rawls' 'difference principle' which relates 
to equality of opportunity. Should all members of society have an equal opportunity to 
gain any allowable positions of favourable inequality in socioeconomic goods? Put 
another way, should all members of society, whatever their natural strengths and 
weaknesses, have only an equal opportunity to benefit from society's resources? The 
question needs to be answered by way of reflection that certain kinds of favourable 
inequality of opportunity (of the type discussed earlier may be needed by some 
individuals if they are to avoid distresses which other individuals can easily avoid 
without having such opportunities. 
Thus, we can criticise Rawls for presupposing the existence of a class society in which 
inequalities are inevitable, and which proclaim the virtues of competition and 
incentives for the talented. We can also criticise him for ignoring the human cost of 
competition and incentives and his failure to deal adequately with the consequences of 
unequal power relationships, for example, the concentrations of corporate and 
managerial power which have more to do with the institutions of capitalist economies 
than with the laws of distribution. Such is the scope of this power in a market 
economy, that it is futile to expect capitalist vested interests to permit any real 
encroachments on its wealth and privilege. In the case of power, we could not appeal 
to the 'difference principle' to increase the power of the least powerful, for possessing 
power is always at the expense of others, because it is power over those others. As we 
saw earlier, in the good society power is a fundamental equality, and it would be a 
contradiction to suppose that by distributing power unequally we could increase the 
power of the lease powerful. 
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PRODUCTION. 
From a moral viewpoint, one of the goals of our good society is to eradicate the 
opportunities that are unequal as a consequence of unequal access to or ownership of 
the means of production. It endorses therefore, the Marxist view which advocates the 
abolition of private property (the means of production) rather than some form of 
'people's capitalism'; a system in which private productive property is retained and 
each person begins his or her economic life with a per capita share of society's capital 
stock and resources. Taking into account people's ownership of their skills and 
preferences, the emergence of large socio-economic inequalities within a generation 
would be inevitable. So what feasible allocation will respect the rights of shared 
ownership of the means of production and the private ownership of skills and talents? 
We could start by following other theorists of social justice and construct our own 
original position, which denies that the external world of the means of production 
should ever have been considered unowned. We could conceive of it as having been 
jointly or publicly owned by its initial inhabitants. (Cohen. 1986. p. 77-96. ) Viewing 
the means of production as jointly owned by its inhabitants - or all inhabitants present 
or future - is arguably as good or better than the supposition that the means of 
production were unowned. However, joint ownership is to be distinguished from the 
common ownership which, as we have seen in Nozick's theory, holds before 
appropriations take place. In common ownership, each may use the land as long as he 
or she does not interfere with others. With joint or public ownership, the means of 
production are owned collectively by all: no one may use them until all agree to the 
nature and distribution of the product. In this original position, which is morally 
appropriate for our good society, individuals own themselves and their skills but are 
trustees in public ownership with regard to the means of production. 
The idea of trusteeship implies certain restrictions which have to be observed for the 
good society to be operational. For example, we have seen 
in Chapter One that 
horizontal obligation entails duties towards others, also that our system of social justice 
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establishes a prior moral duty to contribute to the welfare of others. It follows then 
that an individual cannot work on his/her own behatf until that duty is fulfilled. 
Moreover, appropriation of scarce and finite resources and the accumulation of wealth 
which gives owners the power to influence political, economic and social institutions is 
prohibited. This is because such acquisitions constitute a loss to others both of the 
means of well-being and of competitive advantage which ultimately restrict their 
material liberty. 
However, the question of how the talented are to be rewarded in our good society has 
yet to be answered. 'Talented' here is to be interpreted in a broad way. It may be the 
capacity to work harder or study longer than the next person, or to be more charming 
or goodlooking and therefore acquire a more desirable job. Why shouldn't such people 
receive monetary reward? But we can turn this question around and ask 'why should 
they'? Why should the people with the advantage of talent (whether such talents are 
acquired by inheritance or by environment and which are themselves socially 
determined) gain competitive advantages over others? Have they earned the means 
which permit their acquisition? 
We have also to remind ourselves that what people are able to do depends on the 
reasons they have for doing it. It is far from easy to establish that those who carry 
forward certain occupations, and hence make larger contributions to the well-being of 
society, would not do so without the monetary rewards they receive. For example, 
many have enjoyed the talents of Bob Dylan as a songwriter, yet it may be that a 
worldwide appreciation of his skills rather than millionaire status is an adequate 
compensation for his contribution to popular culture. We could cite other examples 
such as the athlete who needs to compete in order to achieve his or her fastest time, 
people who work best under pressure or through challenge, or those whose purpose 
is 
just to produce useful or beautiful objects, or to discover the truth about things. 
Thus, 
many jobs and careers bring great satisfaction and are not 
done for financial fortune. 
Moreover, ideals - the sort of character traits which 
define moral excellence in the 
person and the sort of institutions and types of ownership a society establishes - 
are 
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important considerations. For example, in a capitalist society which fosters selfishness 
and preaches the gospel of the cash nexus, it is hardly surprising that monetary reward 
is placed on a high moral pedestal. But this tells us little about the nature of 
individuals only of the system itself, as Tressell's description of the selfish employer 
Rushton makes clear in 'The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists,: 
"No one had any right to condemn himfor this (his seyi-shness)., because 
all who live under the present system (capitalism) practice selfishness 
more or less. We must be sel(iish: the System demands it: The more 
seUi-sh we are the better off we shall be. In the Battle of Life only the 
sel(iish and cunning are able to survive: all others are beaten down and 
trampled underfoot. No one can justly he blamedfor acting selfishly - it is a matter of self-preservation - we must either injure or be injured. It is 
the system that deserves to be blamed. What those who wish to 
perpetuate the system deserve is another matter. " (1991. p. 122) 
Thus, the source of ideals - the question of which ideals are morally justifiable - is an 
important issue in the construction of our good society. In such a society the values of 
cooperation and creativity stand superior to selfishness and economic gain. The above 
examples remind us that the desire to achieve, to shine, can elicit enormous effort even 
in the absence of monetary incentives - all involve a drive to perform well, whether as 
an end in itself or as a way of impressing others. Thus the recognition, admiration, and 
gratitude of one's peers may be more fitting and certainly more in keeping with the 
ideals of our good society than either money or property. It follows then, that if virtue 
is its own reward in a good society, then money that will accrue to the possessor of 
talent under a market system, will be an unwelcome and unnecessary compensation. 
To summarise. We can identify the central ideal of the good society as equality of 
effective choice: people should have the rights, opportunities and resources that enable 
them to choose effectively how they are to live their lives. One societal precondition 
then, is collective ownership of the means of production - the more the citizens of the 
good society are associated in common institutions, the more likely they are to view 
themselves in fellowship and accept distributive measures. So how can my good 
society claim to be freedom-maximising? The answer 
is that freedom depends on the 
distribution of resources which needs a system of distributive 
justice based on equality. 
Thus, our view of social justice is one of egalitarianism and 
the people subject to it 
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must choose to be egalitarians. This stands in total opposition to the so-called justice 
of the market system -a system which involves production for profit rather than use 
and thus fails to provide goods and services that people really need; a system that 
stifles creativity and alienates workers from the fruits of their labour; a system that 
promotes privately purchased commodities rather than the enjoyment of goods and 
services in common. In sum, a system that fosters selfishness, competitiveness, and 
the values of the 'me now' philosophy rather than relations of cooperation and 
fraternity. How, in justice, could we argue that such a system is appropriate for our 
good society, which stands in opposition to a market morality both in terms of 
distribution of resources and the nature and content of human relationships? 
It is worth reminding ourselves, however, that our system of social justice in the good 
society will not be sustained unless people see themselves as tied together 
communally. It is here that politics enter the picture. People must engage in politics as 
citizens, that is, as members of a collective committed to advancing the common good. 
The purpose of Chapter Three so far then, has been to show that our system of social 
justice and its corresponding institutions, depend crucially upon the willing assent of at 
least the majority of the population, and that the rules of such a system should, for the 
most part, be complied with voluntarily. In sum then, one way of thinking of our good 
society is to turn to the opening pages of Aristotle's 'Politics', in which he views the 
body politic and its members as a perfect image of the relation between the individual 
human being and the community to which he (and, for us, she) belongs. For Aristotle, 
you could not be a human being outside society, only a beast or a god. Thus, to have 
citizens, you need a city, a polis, a good society -a place with common goals and a 
sense of its collective good. 
. 
SOCIAL POLICY AND NEED-SATISFACTION. 
We have seen that the principal goal of a system of social 
justice in our good society is 
the replacement of privilege and inequalities 
in the distribution of life-chances with 
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social and economic equality. Thus, the good life for our citizen is based on equality 
according to need, democratic freedom and citizenship. 
It follows then that production and distribution based on the satisfaction of the two 
basic human needs we have so far identified, should be measured by the resources 
required by individuals to enable them to participate firstly, in customary roles and 
relationships, and second, to pursue the good life comprising equality, mutual respect 
and fellowship. However, such a strategy does not imply a blank uniformity, that 
people are, or ever should be, the same,, but that their socioeconomic status and power 
based on need- satisfaction, should be. Consequently, such a strategy also requires 
planning - having identified our basic needs, we now need to specify the strategies, or 
socialpolicies necessary to achieve their satisfaction. What would'social policy'mean 
in our good society? First, it would signify the interdependence of the social, political 
and economic spheres. Second, it would provide the basis for planned social 
development and, governed by our system of social justice, would realise the goal of 
social welfare. Thus, social policy in the good society would be similar to Ferge's 
definition in that it would be: "... neither economic nor non-economic; its target is to 
reintegrate the economic and social sphere ", it is "more normative than corrective ". 
(Ferge 1979 p. 55-59). 
In the good society, therefore, social policy and the organisation of production and 
distribution would start with social need and social priorities based on need. The 
social organisation of work and the nature of production would thus be determined by 
these priorities, so that the decision of whether to produce a good would not rest 
simply on potential demand, but also on the priority (determined collectively) that is 
allocated to that good and the production of it. 
In the following section, we turn to examine the role of social policy in satisfying the 
human needs identified so far - or to be more precise, to explore the goals of social 
policy for the provision of need-satisfiers or 'intermediate needs', required 
to ensure 
that the basic needs of physical health and critical autonomy are met. 
The method 
adopted will be a comparative one - through attempting 
to expose the weaknesses of 
social policy as it is presently 
formulated and implemented, I hope, simultaneously, to 
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highlight the strengths of policies aimed at need- satisfaction and their compatibility 
with the system of social justice we have chosen to favour. 
NEED-SATISFIERS FOR MAINTAINING PHYSICAL HEALTH. 
It has already been argued that good health is one of the most important factors 
contributing to individual welfare. It is an essential prerequisite for enjoyment of 
almost every other aspect of life. Economic security or a good education yield little 
satisfaction to the chronically sick and, at the extreme terminal illness will make all 
other sources of satisfaction irrelevant. Hence, the maintenance of physical health 
must be seen as a universal basic human need. However, many factors contribute to 
individuals' states of health, and in this section I will concentrate on diet, the 
availability and quality of health care and housing. 
AN ADEQUATE DIET. 
In order to maintain bodily functions a minimum intake of energy is required. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the energy needs of a'moderately 
active' person are 3,000 calories a day for a man and 2,200 for a woman. This calorific 
minimum is necessary for preventing ill-health and for maintaining 'the activity 
associated with eating, washing, dressing etc., as well as minimum movement and 
other activity needed for communication'. (FAO. 1989. p. 19. ) If someone consistently 
falls below this level, then undernutrition will lower resistance to illness and disease, 
produce weakness and debility and an increasing incapacity to do anything about it. 
We can argue then, that an adequate diet is essential for satisfying the basic need of 
physical health and thus constitutes an 'intermediate need'. In view of its importance, 
we would thus expect its satisfaction to be the first priority of governments who 
express concern for their citizens welfare. However, a brief examination of existing 
arrangements in the world today reveals that this is far from the case. 
For example, in Britain large numbers of people suffer 
from under or malnutrition. 
The British Dietetic Association has considered the dietary problems of special groups 
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at risk of malnutrition - children, pregnant women, ethnic minorities, the disabled and 
elderly - and concluded that existing benefits for some members of these groups were 
insufficient for their dietary needs. (Haines & de Looy 1986. ) Another study, basing 
the 'healthy diet' on the advice of the National Advisory Committee on Nutrition 
Education, calculated that the recommended diet could cost up to 35% more than the 
typical diet of a low-income family. (Cole-Hamilton & Lang. 1986. Without further 
exploration we can conclude then, that lack of money is a major factor restricting food 
choice as well as limiting the quantity of food consumed 
However, to fully appreciate the magnitude of the problem of malnutrition, we need to 
adopt a global perspective. A World Bank Report by Reutlinger and Pellakaan (1986) 
estimated that 3 4% of the populations of 87 'developing' countries (73 0 million people) 
had diets which did not provide enough calories for an active working life; and 16% 
(340 millions) did not have enough calories to prevent stunted growth and serious 
health risks. So why so much malnutrition in the Third World? Can it be attributed to 
'natural causes' such as droughts and floods which result in famine? 
No one would deny the fact that droughts and floods can cause substantial reduction 
and disruption in food supplies. However, if the causes of famines are 'natural 
disasters', the effects of famines would be indiscriminate, yet evidence shows that the 
rich and powerful never starve, even during famines. A. K. Sen's analysis of four major 
famines led him to formulate a 'legal entitlement to food' thesis, which suggests that 
people suffer from famine because they cannot establish their entitlement to food in 
legally enforceable ways. A person's legal entitlement to food "... depends on what he 
(sic) owns, what exchange possibilities are offered to him, what is given to him free, 
and what is taken away from him. " (198 1. p. 154-5) In other words, people's legal 
entitlement depends on their economic power which, in turn, involves political 
considerations - in short, it is the poor who are victims of 
famine. 
While Sen's approach is useful, it is not without its weaknesses. By concentrating 
exclusively on the power of individuals he tends, therefore, not 
to take adequately into 
account the national and international political economy, 
that is, the influence of class 
structure, the state, international agencies and 
transnational corporations for an 
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explanation of famines. Such structural factors are important for explaining why, even 
in times of famine, it is frequently the case that the very same countries experiencing 
such disaster are exporting food in order either to pay off international debts or satisfy 
the demand for certain products in rich countries. Moreover, malnutrition and death 
through starvation is happening at a time when food stocks in rich countries are so 
plentiful that they are being destroyed or piled up at great cost to individual 
governments. It is objectively an unnecessary waste of human life because the world 
produces more than enough to feed everyone. Despite a fall in global cereal stocks in 
the late 1980's, there is currently enough food in the world to provide the average 
2,600 calories per day to keep us fit and healthy. 
Access to basic foodstuffs should not depend on income to buy it or land to grow it on. 
In the good society, a healthy diet constitutes an intermediate need, the satisfaction of 
which is crucial for any purposive action, and the provision of which is not based on 
one's ability to pay, but as a fundamental right of every citizen. However, this right 
must be viewed as a universal right for all human beings, thus citizens of the good 
society must make positive efforts to ensure that others in less fortunate societies enjoy 
the same benefits. Such efforts should not be confined to exporting technical 
expertise; for example, any benefits of the 'Green Revolution' have largely been 
creamed off by the rich and powerful to bolster their own positions, rather than leading 
to a fairer distribution of extra food. Although technology has a part to play, fancy 
seeds and sophisticated machinery cannot alone transform power structures. As 
individuals it is possible to challenge the might of transnational corporations and 
international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank who ensure that the best the 
Third World can produce is exported to the West. Concerns about the cost and quality 
of food displayed on our supermarket shelves need to broaden into concerns about 
where food comes from, where it is produced and by whom - expressed in our active 
support for 'fair trading' initiatives, for example. In other words, we need to 
become 
critical consumers. Critical consumers can make 
life difficult even for the very 
biggest transnationals - transnational corporations 
(TNC's) are increasingly having to 
satisfy environmental criteria, so why should they not meet standards 
based on justice 
and humanity as well - and be penalised 
by the consumer for their failures? 
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HEALTH CARE. 
We have seen how malnutrition goes hand in hand with ill-health by lowering 
resistance to sickness and disease. Illness is incapacitating, it prevents us from 
pursuing our lives fully as autonomous agents and creates unfair inequality between 
the healthy and the sick. It is plausible to argue then, that the provision of a health 
system should be concerned not just with curing illnesses and promoting health, but 
also in promoting individual freedom. However, as long as economic inequality 
persists in a society, so will inequalities in health and freedom. To illustrate this, one 
needs only to look at the continuing picture of inequality in health in Britain, which 
acts as a barometer of socioeconomic inequality in general 
In 1986 the research of Margaret Whitehead revealed how an individual's 
socioeconomic position affects his or her ability to maintain a satisfactory health care 
programme. ('Health Inequalities in the 1980s') For example, those in non-manual 
social groups have less physically demanding jobs and more leisure and income than 
manual workers, and therefore are favourably positioned in society to take healthy 
exercise. Furthermore, as we have seen, income has a direct relationship with the type 
of food one is able to buy and time is a factor in meal preparation. The research also 
showed class differences in mortality and morbidity at every stage of life in Britain; on 
average death rates are twice as high for adults and children in Social Class V as for 
those in Social Class 1. According to Whitehead, differences in lifestyles between 
social groups account for some, but not all of the observed health gap. Thus, despite a 
national health service, in general, health inequalities are created by unequal access to 
resources which can be traced back to unequal distribution of wealth and income. But 
is this not a rather sweeping generalisation? 
Let us consider health and what it is. What counts as health and ill-health is not simply 
defined in biomedical terms, but also by what matters and does not matter to people 
and how it matters. For example, a person suffering 
from heart disease would not 
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consider someone with severe acne to be in ill-health, regardless of how distressed the 
acne sufferer may be by his or her condition. Moreover, despite the risks associated 
with drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes, many choose the pleasure of drinking 
and smoking over considerations of health. Thus, evaluation is built into the notion of 
health,, and if health is only one value amongst others, should we respect the autonomy 
of individuals to prefer other goods over health? More importantly, should such 
judgements enter practical decision-making about long-term provision for health? In 
other words, faced with a choice between health insurance and a new car, should the 
right to make that choice lie with the individual? If it does, then surely there can be no 
justification for a health service which provides uniform health care, funded out of 
compulsory health insurance? 
Here we need to address the question of whether choice in this instance is better than 
no choice at all. Individuals often make foolish and imprudent choices which have 
long-term consequences both for themselves and their families, and for their 
obligations to the rest of us.. Now, in the true spirit of individualism, we can argue 
that the freedom to choose brings with it the obligation to accept the consequences of 
one's choices as the price of freedom. However, a great many people are not capable 
of putting aside money voluntarily towards comprehensive health care, for both 
personal and economic reasons. Moreover, there is nothing in the individualist 
argument that says that individuals thennelves may not prefer the promotion of 
individual welfare over individual liberty. Thus, we may freely call into existence a 
system which considerably constrains our freedom of choice in particular cases, 
situations in which enlightened self-interest is, or likely to be, in conflict with our own 
immediate desires and interests. Where individuals elect to establish a system whereby 
a central authority acts on our behalf in our own long-term interest, surely the true 
champion of freedom must accept their right to do so? 
So what would such a system look like in the good society? The services of a 
comprehensive system would be made freely available to all, regardless of ability to 
pay, as one way of promoting the freedom and equality of 
individuals as well as 
ensuring the healthy functioning of the society as a whole. 
Health care policy would 
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be concerned primarily to prevent avoidable disease, to cure and care for those 
suffering from unavoidable disease and ensure equal access to routine health for non- 
threatening complaints. Moreover, policies would be aimed at 'deprofessionalising, the 
medical service to some extent, giving patients more say in their own health care. 
Health care in the good society would permeate every area of working and domestic 
life - issues of medical care would be redefined into issues of health which in turn 
would become issues aimed at providing an adequate diet for all, safe working 
conditions and transforming economic and social life in general. 
Extending our analysis to the Third World, evidence shows that basic medical 
resources are still lacking in the vast majority of these countries. Those which do exist 
are largely monopolised by the affluent urban minority, who may also utilise private 
health care in wealthier countries when sophisticated medical treatment is needed 
Once again, it is important to recognise the economic, political and environmental 
causes of ill-health. For example, conditions in many cities make the control of 
infectious diseases very difficult. Studies carried out by the World Health 
Organisation estimate that 17 out of 25 main water-related diseases rife in Third World 
countries could be cut by half or eradicated altogether simply by the provision of ready 
supplies of safe water. Only about one quarter of the urban populations of these 
countries have water-borne sewage facilities, some 30% have no sanitation at all. 
These conditions provide breeding grounds for diseases such as cholera. 
It is clear then, that a global priority should be to address the politics and practice of 
prevention as well as to identify and treat illness at an early stage. Yet for many poor 
people, the presence of health services means little if they are not accessible, owing to 
cost, environmental conditions or geography. The efforts of international bodies to 
improve rates of vaccination and immunisation have met with some success but as 
UNICEF recognises; "... protection against all illnesses and dangers of growing up 
in 
poverty will only happen when poverty itself is overcome". 
(1987. p. 43) 
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HOUSING. 
I have so far identified two 'intermediate needs' (i. e. adequate diet and equal access to 
free health care) which have to be met in order to satisfy the basic human need of 
physical health. However, one further need-satisfier requires discussion, that is, the 
universal need for shelter and the provision of a decent standard of accommodation for 
everyone. Undoubtedly, denial of access to a dwelling that is able to withstand 
climatic conditions and provide adequate sanitation and warmth is inimical to physical 
health - these housing characteristics apply everywhere and, as such, must be taken 
into account regardless of whether we are adopting a national or global perspective. 
Yet having cited these preconditions (albeit briefly), the question I wish to address here 
is whether, in the good society which views autonomy and freedom as principles to be 
valued, personal ownership of one's dwelling is to be the main objective of housing 
policy. 
Under 18 years of Conservative rule, owner-occupation came to dominate the housing 
scene in Britain. It was (and continues to be) argued that this form of tenure is to be 
highly valued for it expresses the result of personal commitment and endeavour, that it 
is just not the possession of the status of owner-occupier, but also the means by which 
that status is acquired (thrift and hard work) -'giving away' social housing undermines 
that status. Moreover, the 'drab uniformity' of social housing denies opportunities for 
individual personalisation of property - that is, it undermines personal freedom of 
expression. However, those who favour owner-occupation have also stressed its 
equalisation function. The Conservative goverm-nent, supporting its 'Right to Buy' 
policy in the 1980s, argued that, as well as the benefits stated above, as more people 
purchase their homes, the more wealth they accumulate, the value and incidence of 
inheritance also rises and wealth is spread more evenly throughout society. 
Furthermore, not only does inheritance carry with it a sense of continuity and stability 
but it also creates, through enhanced wealth, the potential for the exercise of greater 
choice by the beneficiaries. A number of writers have identified the way in which the 
increase in owner-occupation has led to a reduction in the degree of concentration of 
wealth in Britain. Thus, Atkinson argues that an 
increase in home-ownership brings 
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about a 'democratisation of wealth', that is, a spread of wealth amongst many more 
households. As a consequence, housing inheritance is an important and widespread 
phenomenon that will bring benefits to a large number of people. But is this process as 
simple and as clear-cut as it seems? 
Drawing upon empirical evidence it would appear that the above argument is seriously 
flawed. For example, a 1988 NOP survey found sharp class differences in housing 
inheritance. Statistics revealed that 17% of Class A and B households (professional 
and managerial) had inherited compared with 5% of D's (semi-skilled) and 4% of E's 
(economically inactive). Class A and B households were therefore 4 times as likely to 
contain a beneficiary as Class D and E headed households. (Hamnett 1991. p. 99-107). 
Moreover, the sale of a working class parental home will fetch a lower price than in a 
more prosperous middle class area and the proceeds will be divided amongst more 
people (working class families tend to be larger). For example, whereas the only child 
of middle class parents in a prosperous London suburb may inherit a house worth 
f 200,000 the children of working class parents living in a terraced house in the North 
of England may only inherit E40,000 between them. If the inheritance is shared 
between 4 children, they would only get f 10,000 each. Therefore, single beneficiaries 
of high-priced housing will do exceedingly better from housing inheritance than 
multiple beneficiaries of cheap housing. Thus, far from leading to a'democratisation 
of wealth', one is inclined to agree with Forrest and Murie (1990) who argue that: 
"A privileged minority will not only continue to hold their wealth in 
forms which convey real social and economic power (eg. stocks and 
shares) but they are likely to pass on disproportionately large amounts of 
accumulated housing wealth. " (in Morris & Winn. p. 54. ) 
In sum then widespread home ownership in Britain 
is far from being the great equaliser 
that has been claimed by many writers and politicians. In 
fact, a person's capacity to 
own is tied to one's class, tenure, region and most 
importantly, their income. Bearing 
these factors in mind, it is clear that wealth accumulation and 
inheritance are crucial 
elements in the social and spatial 
inequalities associated with the privatisation of 
housing. 
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So what form would housing policy take in the good society? First, it must be 
accepted that owner-occupation offers unfair appreciation to the owner as well as 
providing an unjustified source of income for professionals employed in the business 
of buying and selling houses, who, under the present system, profit out of someone 
else's housing need. Moreover, if we recall our discussion of property rights, we must 
take into account the restriction prohibiting individual ownership of finite resources, in 
this case, land. Thus, housing policy in the good society calls for collective ownership 
of land and collective responsibility for the housing finance and building industries, in 
order to provide housing according to need rather than income. The rights of 
citizenship demand that the process of designing, planning and building will no longer 
be the exclusive domain of professional 'experts' - instead it will involve all citizens, 
working together for each other and themselves, sharing skills and individual 
creativity. In this context, home ownership has a very different meaning from the 
individualist conception we are familiar with - it will mean that homes and towns will 
actually belong to the citizenry as a collective entity, who are their own owners, 
planners and builders. Thus, in the good society, the sense of home ownership will be 
universal for it will mean having security of tenure enshrined as a right -a security all 
the more real for having as its condition the equal security of all others. 
At this point, the inference should be clear - in each analysis of the intermediate needs 
discussed so far, time and time again we come up against economic insecurity as a 
major obstacle to their satisfaction. Thus, even if we support collective provision of 
basic foodstuffs, health care and housing - free to the user, we still need to address the 
problems of economic insecurity and poverty. But how should poverty be defined? A 
distinction is usually made between subsistence or absolute poverty and relative 
poverty. The former definition refers to a lack of basic requirements to sustain a 
physically healthy existence. It is a view favoured by neo-liberals who then argue that 
once absolute poverty is dealt with, what matters is not what the gap 
is between the 
rich and the poor, but whether the poor are better or worse off on their own 
terms as 
time passes. The latter definition, on the other 
hand, is participation based. For 
example, Townsend measures poverty 
in terms of the inability or incapacity to 
participate in; "... the activities and 
have the living conditions and amenities which 
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are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, because of a lack of 
resources. " (1979. p. 31) I would argue our discussion so far suggests that large 
numbers of people can be said to be in poverty as defined by either of these two 
definitions. However, although I acknowledge the many unfavourable forces affecting 
one's economic security, I wish to concentrate here on the distribution of income. 
THE CASE FOR A CITIZEN'S INCOME. 
In the advanced Western economies, the distribution of incomes has for the past two 
decades been growing more unequal. In Britain, for example, between 1979 and 1989 
the share of total income after tax of the richest 20% increased from 36% to 42%. 
Figures show that during the 1980's average annual disposable income of this richest 
group per person increased by as much af5,304 or 40%. Moreover, the after-tax 
income of the richest 1% increased even more dramatically, by 75%. (Townsend 1993. 
p. 12) However, during 1979-89 the share of total after-tax income of the poorest 20% 
in Britain fell from 9% to 8% even when incomes were rearranged to take account of 
family size and composition. Moreover, there was no gain at all in their disposable 
income, and in fact there was a fall in the income of the poorest 10% (ibid. p. 15) 
However,, this polarisation of incomes is not the product of national policies alone, it is 
also the product of long-term and deep-seated developments in the international 
economy. For example, the policies of international agencies like the World Bank and 
the IMF cannot be regarded as redistributive. Moreover, the EU was instigated to 
serve free market principles and its primary concern is to regulate the international 
market. More importantly, however, exploitation by global corporations (TNCs) have 
outgrown the capacities of national goverm-nents to deal with them. Recent 
technological developments and the power of TNCs to influence state policies, have 
combined to make overseas subsidiaries far easier to control. 
Thus, both 
manufacturing and service sectors are being 
drawn into a more complex international 
web -a process which 
is replacing predominantly male, full-time industrial work, with 
predominantly female, white-collar work, much of 
it temporary or part-time. 
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Moreover, the past 20 years have seen persistent high unemployment - such economic 
growth as occurs tends to rise from increased productivity, leaving the industrial 
reserve army untouched. In essence then, incomes derived from paid employment are 
becoming increasingly unreliable and inadequate as a method of supporting the 
population. So what is the alternative? 
Suppose we start from the idea that there should be a basic entitlement for all citizens 
which is unconditional, and that this entitlement should cover basic needs as thought 
proper by our good society. This idea has to be extended as entitlement of all citizens. 
Since all citizens would receive state benefits, all would be on an equal basis (without 
means tests which exacerbate social divisions and stigmatise service-users). All would 
have an incentive to work and all would be under an equal obligation to do so. A 
decent and secure life would be provided for all citizens and all would be encouraged 
to work to contribute to the common good. Of course, there will be citizens who need 
more than the basic sum to achieve the same level of well-being - for example, those 
with disabilities and families with children. Thus, as I have stated elsewhere, our good 
society has to recognise that to guarantee the same capability of being able to function 
as a full citizen, some may need more than others. 
However, the idea of a citizens income presupposes the necessity of 'sustainability' - 
that is, for this from of distribution to be successful we must aim at no or limited 
growth rather than a high-growth society where expectations are high. In our good 
society, egalitarianism requires that expectations be limited by the needs of equality. 
There is apparently little disagreement that the rates of growth we have come to expect 
cannot continue indefinitely. So the only question is how far they would 
have to be 
reduced to become sustainable. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that a society with fixed resources rather than an 
indefinitely 
expandable 'cake' must place limits on reasonable expectations. 
These limits will be 
determined by the resources of society and the accepted system of 
just distribution. 
However, sustainability (and our system of social 
justice) requires that the interests of 
future generations are given as much weight as 
those of the current generation. We 
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know, for example, that future generations will need an inhabitable planet with an 
effective ozone layer, fertile land, and minimal air and water pollution. These 
requirements have implications for present energy patterns, particularly in the 
industrialised world. The 1987 Brundtland Report illustrates this by showing that 25% 
of the global population consume a staggering 75% of the worlds primary energy. If 
energy consumption per head became uniform worldwide at current industrial country 
levels, then by 2025 a world population of 8.2 billion would require about 55 billion 
kW of energy per year - compared with 10 billion kW at present. (p. 169-70). This 
unsustainable level of energy and resource use is even more unjustifiable when it is 
considered that much of this consumption is used to satisfy insatiable wants rather than 
basic needs. 
In sum then,, the idea of a citizens income is significant not only for its direct economic 
implications, both for the present and future, but even more so for offering a non- 
productivist definition of citizenship. To make our good society a just and fair one, 
people have to hold a shared vision of the future and a determination to do that in a 
sustained way over the long term. 
Overall the policy goals of our good society so far include free distribution of basic 
necessities such as food, health care and housing; that such services should be 
democratically controlled by its citizens, and an adequate income for all without means 
tests. Such measures, in my view, go a long way towards satisfying the universal need 
of maintaining physical health. However, I turn now to a discussion of our second 
basic human need, that of autonomy. 
NEED-SATISFIERS FOR PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY. 
We have concluded that the kind of society we 
favour will give priority to the 
satisfaction of the basic needs of physical 
health and autonomy. Having dealt with the 
former, we now examine what steps need to 
be taken in order to promote the ideal of 
individual freedom; once again, through adopting a critical approach to existing 
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aspects of social policy. However, our discussion of autonomy has so far been from 
the point of view of what social structures will allow mature citizens to direct their 
own lives. But what of those members who are not mature - for example, should we 
promote the autonomy of children? How important is autonomy in childhood for the 
development of an autonomous adult personality? Thus, the issues I wish to raise here!, 
connected with the satisfaction of the basic need of autonomy are security in childhood 
and education. 
CHILDHOOD SECURITY: PARENTS OR GUARDIANS? 
It is almost a universal presumption that a secure childhood is crucial for the 
development of personal autonomy. The need for love and security in our early years 
(and probably throughout our lives) is applicable across cultures and is met, primarily, 
by the child experiencing from birth onwards a secure, ongoing relationship with 
parents or guardians. Furthermore, in the course of receiving this security, childrens' 
lives may be legitimately directed by others in a way that would be quite objectionable 
if applied to rational-thinking adults. Throughout the world, a great deal of 
paternalism is exercised over the lives of children and minors through forms of social 
control which limit their freedom as far as is necessary to protect them from 
themselves. How does such paternalistic protection promote autonomy? 
The generally accepted view is that childrens' inexperience of the world renders them 
incapable of making rational choices and, because of this, parents, legislators, social 
policy makers and teachers, must take decisions on their behalf. Examples would 
include the imposition of compulsory schooling, and the exclusion of children from the 
areas of contract law and the franchise. In short, the argument states that 
if children 
clearly lack autonomy, such restrictions, far from violating their autonomy, actually 
promote it. It is not difficult to accept that no child 
is capable of promoting the full 
range of his or her interests. Matters which will affect 
their lives in the most important 
ways have to be decided for them - 
during the early years, say from birth to the age of 
10, these decisions are largely made by parents. 
But why should they do the deciding? 
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It is a common belief that it is natural parents who should be responsible for and act on 
behalf of their child. Why? The answer is that parents are more likely to feel love, 
pride and concern for their own children than other peoples, and the presence of these 
emotions, which stem from a 'natural bond', obviously makes for better parenting. 
Thus, natural parents are likely to be better custodians of the interests and welfare of 
their own children than, for example, state-appointed guardians. In a sense theni 
children are seen as the property of their parents, an idea that still underlies much 
social policy in Britain. For example, the New Right rhetoric of choice in educational 
reform viewed parents as the consumers of education. Moreover, the reinforcement of 
parental authority over children can be found in the area of criminal law. Legislation 
has increased responsibility of parents for their childrens criminal activities,, which 
although limited to responsibility to pay their fines, is couched nevertheless in the 
rhetoric of parental authority and responsibility. Additionally, under the 1989 Social 
Security Act, the period of childhood was extended by three years. Where previously 
parents were responsible for under 16's, now that responsibility has been extended to 
under 19's, who are excluded from eligibility for social security benefits including 
Income Support and housing benefit. Such examples show how control by parents 
over their own (genetic) children is reinforced by society's norms and values. 
But is the mere fact of biology a guarantee of good parenting? It would be a sweeping 
generalisation to answer in the affirmative (I challenged some of the assumptions 
surrounding natural parenting in my discussion of Socrates and absolute patriotism in 
Chapter 2-i. e. obligations to one's parents). To repeat, there are good and bad parents. 
So by making the common assumption that biology is a sufficient reason for allowing 
natural parents so much control over their children, are we not putting some children at 
risk,, albeit a possible minority? To illustrate this, let us consider the concern generated 
about the emergency cover provided during the railway signalworkers strike a couple 
of years ago. Throughout, there were numerous attempts to reassure 
the public over 
the competence of those operating signal boxes on 
days of industrial action. Did they 
possess the relevant experience and qualifications 
to shoulder such responsibility? 
Thus, we appear to require, indeed demand, proof of competence and skill 
to ensure 
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the safety of commuters, so why are we so complacent about the safety of children? 
The idea of my operating a signal-box with no experience or proof of competence is 
absurd and a considerable risk to the well-being of others, but my decision to conceive 
and have a child (of which I also have no experience nor proof of competence) would 
not be questioned. 
The American philosopher Hugh LaFallette (1979) argues for the necessity of 
'licensing' parents. Thus, the presumption that everyone should be permitted to take 
charge of their children unless they show themselves unfit to do so, would be replaced 
by the presumption that no one will be allowed to be a parent unless they pass a test of 
competence. If we accept a licensing system for occupations which involve 
responsibility for the lives of others (bus drivers, railworkers, airline pilots etc. ) should 
we not, in consistency, also accept the necessity of licensing parents on the grounds 
that children are also at risk, if only in a minority of cases, from their parents? 
However, although I would accept that, in principle, licensing parents is an acceptable 
idea,, it is fraught with difficulties at the level of implementation. We are already 
familiar with the vetting of possible adoptive and foster parents and the conditions laid 
down for their acceptance (in some cases, refusal on the grounds of age, sexuality, 
even obesity and smoking habits). But it is not difficult to imagine the possible 
eugenicist implications of controlling who may or may not have children. Such power 
is obviously open to abuse on racial, religious and political grounds, as well as being 
subject to the influence of stereotypical ideas about specific groups and classes. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the above discussion is to challenge first, the common 
presumption that biological parents are naturally more capable of offering childhood 
security than other forms of guardianship and second, the widespread but rather vague 
notion that 'a child needs its parents'. No one would argue that children thrive without 
love and care, without security and stimulation or that they should be asked to do so. 
But the idea of parental property rights over their children belongs to a society which 
believes that children separated from their natural parents are separated 
from love, care 
and play. When these consequences are 
disentangled, there is justification for the 
153 
belief that children can develop wider attachments which promote their autonomy, and 
in which their care can be safely shared. 
In a good society, natural parenting will not necessarily be the prescribed form of 
childrearing against which all else is measured, and in comparison to which all else is 
found wanting. Nor is the nuclear family to be considered the most secure and suitable 
institution for children to be born into. If we care to redefine 'the familyl we could 
alternatively see it as an emotionally supportive network of adults and children, some 
of whom live together, some who do not, but who nevertheless share resources and 
care for those who need it. From the perspective of our good society, it is possible to 
view these relationships as promoting the autonomy of children through fostering 
cognitive, emotional and social development based on praise, recognition and positive 
feedback within a framework of clear rules perceived to be just. This view may still be 
unacceptable to some although I have not yet gone as far as to suggest removing 
children altogether from their parents and placing them under the guardianship of a 
central authority. Such a suggestion would undoubtedly meet with widespread 
opposition, yet for most of the year and for the greater part of the day, this is precisely 
what most parents do in the name of education. It is to this area of policy, and the 
extent to which it promotes individual autonomy, that I now turn. 
EDUCATION. 
The compulsion to attend school has been with us for over 120 years, so it is not 
surprising that such a restriction of liberty rarely strikes us. Throughout their school 
life, up to the age of 16, a large number of children go to school primarily 
because non- 
attendance is accompanied by severe sanctions. Moreover, the 
fact that such 
compulsion applies to children makes us less concerned about 
its justification. Yet, 
compulsory attendance at some one institution, 
day in, day out, for II years, is 
something which most people would object to. 
For example, Christians frequently 
expound the moral benefits of worshipping 
God, but would be highly indignant if daily 
church attendance were to be made compulsory. 
So what is so special about school? 
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I have emphasised elsewhere the importance of education for increasing autonomy - it 
enables us to make rational choices about our futures and increases our life chances in 
general. However, we may recall the argument which states that children are not likely 
to appreciate this because of their inability to make rational choices. Left to their own 
devices, children will prefer pleasure to schoolwork, and only as adults will they 
realise their mistake. Thus, the argument goes, compulsory schooling is not an 
infringement of individual liberty because it is not overriding the will of an 
autonomous individual but actually enforcing it. 
But this view is based on the false assumption that education and schooling are one 
and the same. The language we speak, to riding a bicycle, buying and selling, looking 
after animals and operating electrical equipment are all forms of learning that take 
place before or out of school. So formal schooling must be required for special skills - 
most obviously literacy and numeracy, without which it has to be accepted life in 
modem societies would be extremely difficult. But why should these skills be taught 
in school and why are children forced to attend long after these basic skills have been 
acquired? Nevertheless, it could be that the justification for compulsory schooling is to 
be found in the needs of society rather than the individual. If we want a prosperous 
society we will want a well-educated citizenry, thus people must be compelled to send 
their children to school. But would this justify the compulsion to study the whole 
modem school curriculum? To answer this, we need to take a closer look at present 
educational practices and whether they are consistent with the promotion of individual 
autonomy. 
In Britain, the 1988 Education Reform Act has encouraged the pursuit of educational 
excellence through an academic curriculum and the setting of particular standards of 
achievement; parental choice, greater centralised control and the notion of economic 
accountability. A National Curriculum consists of 3 'core' subjects 
(English, Maths, 
Science) and 7 foundation subjects (History, Geography, Technology, 
Music, Art, 
Physical Education and a foreign language). However, there is no mention of other 
areas of learning such as political awareness, economic understanding 
and little 
emphasis on vocational subjects. 
When so much importance is placed upon academia, 
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it is almost impossible to argue that the curriculum is fitting the pupil for life. At the 
very least, we can say that there are many pupils who will be better fitted for life by 
taking vocational subjects rather than, say, English Literature. Yet only I hour a week 
is devoted to 'Technology, compared with 5 hours a week of English Literature. Can 
anyone seriously argue that individuals of 14 and 15 years of age should be compelled 
to study Shakespeare's 'Macbeth' because they will themselves value it in the future? 
Ivan Illich in 'Deschooling Society' views the school as a custodial organisation 
because attendance is obligatory and children are 'kept off the streets' until their entry 
into work. Moreover, he also stresses thehidden curriculum'of schools - the nature of 
the discipline and regimentation which has nothing to do with the formal content of 
lessons. This inculcates an uncritical acceptance of the existing social order which 
Illich calls 'passive consumption'. Thus the hidden curriculum teaches children that 
their role in life is 'to know their place and sit still in it'. Moreover, it must be said that 
most forms of education perform an important socialisation function although the 
precise form it will take will vary according to different parts of the educational 
system. Thus, while certain values such as the superiority of reason over emotion may 
be universal, the values of punctuality, reliability and discipline will vary depending 
upon institutional and teachers' expectations of their students future destination in the 
social structure. Given the fact that capitalist societies require large numbers of people 
to spend their lives doing work which is menial, unstimulating and intrinsically boring, 
it is not surprising that most childrens autonomy is not properly promoted. As A. S. 
Neill (1972) states: 
"... kids who had been used to participate in a direct democracy (not a 
fake representative democracy) from the word go, would not grow up to 
suffer from apathy, alienation and blind submission to authority with 
inner-hatred and set(-hatred as the other side of the coin. " (in Adams 
p. 159). 
We have here a case where there is a structured necessity 
for a certain type of 
educational system, a system which at 
best serves the interests of only a minority of 
those who pass through it. 
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It is undoubtedly true that being made to sit still during lessons that one finds boring is 
good training for self-discipline. But in our good society we require an educational 
system geared to promote widespread autonomy amongst its pupils, and to provide a 
stimulating environment which encourages critical self-awareness and a desire to 
challenge received wisdoms. It follows that such a system which genuinely sought to 
promote autonomy would look quite different from present educational arrangements. 
For example, the content and length of compulsory education would require close 
scrutiny and the possibilities and value of other sorts of schooling considered. 
Moreover, education would have a structure which positively encouraged people to 
accept and reject views on the basis of having understood the reasons for them. 
Thus, in order to satisfy the basic need of autonomy in our good society, education 
must first provide everyone who wants to learn with access to available resources. 
Equality of opportunity in education should be a basic right, and equality of access 
would ensure that no student who is willing and able to benefit from a particular course 
should be prevented because of irrelevant or discriminatory criteria such as income, 
race, gender or religion. Moreover, those who wish to learn should be able to do so at 
any time in their lives and have personal choice over what they study rather than 
submit to a standard curriculum. This is consistent with our idea of a sustainable good 
society, where paid employment will become less central to social life and people 
might instead engage in a wider variety of pursuits. 
We can argue then, that access to appropriate education is a universal prerequisite for 
the promotion of personal autonomy and thus constitutes an intermediate need which 
must be met. It is universal in the sense that basic numeracy, literacy, general social 
skills, and vocational abilities are more or less the same for all cultures. Yet on a 
global level the reverse is happening - the absolute number of those who cannot read or 
write in the Third World is actually rising. (Coombs 1985. Chap. 9). The educational 
efforts of Third World countries have been restricted in scope by lack of money, yet 
some countries have promoted self-help education by which communities 
draw upon 
their own resources. For example, those who can read and write, or possess 
job skills, 
are encouraged to take on 'apprentices' whom they coach 
in their spare time. This is in 
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keeping with the educational objectives of our good society (and the ideas of Illich) in 
that education should bear some relation to the real needs of the population. 
In sum then, education should be concerned with achieving a good standard of 
education for all children, to empower them to confront the personal and social 
requirements of democratic citizenship in a way that allows them to go beyond the 
confines of their immediate experiences. This also requires a broader transcultural 
knowledge, for a good society must enable citizens to criticise and make choices 
between the current rules of one's own culture and the rules of another. Thus, 
education must include the transmission of knowledge of other societies and an 
understanding of the rules of comparative method. It is at this Point in our discussion 
that autonomy becomes 'critical autonomy', a notion which requires further 
explanation. 
CRITICAL AUTONOMY. 
One of the requirements of critical autonomy is a disposition to seek the truth, to 
ensure that one's beliefs are not false. This is not to say that a person will not have a 
greater interest in discovering the truth of some propositions than others, for their truth 
may be more or less significant to him or her. For example, an airline pilot should 
have weighty evidence that his/her plane is airworthy, whereas it is alright to rely on 
much less evidence before flying a kite on the common. Mill regarded a passion for 
truth as good in itself, arguing that it should be possible to hold and defend in public, 
without penalty, any opinions no matter how radical they may seem to the majority. 
(Mill J. S. 'On Liberty'. 1859. Chap. 2) The possession of false (though not necessarily 
irrational) beliefs may impose a serious limitation on the kind of control of one's own 
life which critical autonomy requires. Yet, information which people must use in their 
deliberations is subject, under the present system, to widespread manipulation. 
One dimension of government information concerns the right of the individual to know 
about and assess the accuracy of information 
being held. Two famous cases relating to 
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the issue of government secrecy were the prosecution of Sarah Tisdall in 1984 for 
sending The Guardian official documents on the timing of the arrival of cruise missiles 
in Britain; and that of Clive Ponting in 1985 for sending documents concerning the 
sinking of the Argentinean ship the General Belgrano to an MP. Another dimension 
concerns the extent to which government restricts or makes information available. 
This area too has profound implications for individuals to make their own choices. For 
example, the accident at Chernobyl generated immense public anxiety about 
government secrecy over environmental matters. Initial assurances that the British 
public were in no danger from radiation subsequently proved false as sales of 
contaminated lamb were banned. The Guinness affair and Government handling of the 
BSE crisis are other examples of information either being withheld or manipulated. 
The mass media represent another institutionalised channel for the distribution of 
social knowledge and information. The media both utilises and consensual image of 
society and help to reproduce it - events are selected and interpreted within the terms of 
this pre-existing consensus although this may not necessarily be consciously done. As 
Hall et al observe: 
"This consensual viewpoint has important political consequences .. It 
carries the assumption that we all have roughly the same interests in 
society, and that we all roughly have an equal share of power in the 
society... The media are among the institutions whose practices are most 
widely and consistently predicated upon the assumption of a national 
consensus. " (1978. p. 55) 
Thus, since legitimate political activity is seen to be conducted only through 
parliamentary democratic channels, the media tend to regard any activity going beyond 
this as not permissible, and its Perpetrators as consequently less credible. Non- 
consensual opinions, therefore, receive more critical attention or no attention at all: 
where such dissenting views do appear, they are frequently peripheral or portrayed as 
embracing a world-view which is unreal or unnatural - 
in other words, as a 
misunderstanding of reality. 
In sum, the ways in which government collatesi uses and regulates 
information are of 
great significance for critical autonomy, 
by raising issues of individual responsibility 
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and choice. People can make rational decisions only if they possess adequate 
information - inaccurate or unproven (or withheld) information may threaten a person's 
autonomy, social relationships, livelihood, or even life itself. Critical autonomy 
requires not just that people rationally pursue their goals as best they can, but that they 
actually not be deluded and misguided about the nature of their goals and the 
consequences of their actions. Thus, in a good society which refrained from 
manipulating information, there is little danger that individuals will adopt lifestyles not 
because they truly represent their best options but because they have not properly 
considered alternatives. On the contrary, individuals will be able to make choices 
within a clear framework of democratically accepted rules and norms based on 
principles of justice, rather than be carried along by the opinions of economically 
powerful groups. 
DEFENDING THE GOOD SOCIETY. 
In this chapter I have attempted to set out the first steps that need to be taken towards 
achieving the good society. Those steps include the acknowledgement of a universal 
set of human rights aimed at satisfying basic human need, which every individual 
should possess in order to pursue and realise their vision of the good. Further, I argued 
that our moral obligations are also universal, that is, they transcend all national 
boundaries - thus, to value human life we must value all human life. But what of the 
lives of those we consider our enemies, those who threaten our good society? If we 
really value humanlife how can we defend our society - in other words, can there ever 
be such a thing as a just war where there is a deliberate taking of human life? 
Consider two hypothetical situations. First. let us imagine that our good society 
(which is opposed to warfare, with the possible exception of the establishment of a 
just 
peace) were to be attacked by a totalitarian neighbour, either seeking to gain 
territory 
or to silence our calls for its inhabitants to pursue a similar vision of 
the good to our 
own. Would it be justifiable to return the attack? 
The answer would be yes - it would 
be justifiable to attack and incapacitate as many of its members as 
is strictly necessary 
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(i. e.: through observing the criteria set out by both jus ad bellum' and jus in bello'). 
But some may be killed - does this not violate the universal human rights to basic 
need-satisfaction? Possibly, but it must be remembered that the totalitarian attacker 
(by attacking first) is violating the rights of its victims (of both societies) to life and 
liberty. Moreover, not only does the attacker challenge the members of our good 
society, but also the good society itself, for it is only in virtue of the rights and 
obligations created by its members that there is a society at all. Thus, our good society 
has the right to challenge the aggression of the attacker and take whatever military 
action is necessary, and the members of the good society have an obligation to defend 
the collective entity of which they are part. To defend the good society is to defend the 
good life which it represents - to defend the good society is to defend themselves as 
citizens. However, military response must be appropriate to the circumstances of a 
particular case (violent resistance, as well as limited or demilitarisation of the attacker). 
As Walzer (1977) argues: "All resistance is law enforcement ... when fighting breaks 
out, there must always be some state against which the law can and should be enforced. 
Someone must be responsible, for someone decided to break the peace of the society of 
states. No war can be just on both sides. " (p. 59) 
In the second situation, we pose the question of whether the good society would be 
justified in attacking its totalitarian neighbour with the aim of replacing the regime 
with our own moral conception of the good? The answer in this case would be no 
because of what 'attacking' entails. To try to force agreement with a form of life 
through causing harm (threats to life and liberty) - rather than harming to defend the 
right to choose a form of life - will be counterproductive if the aim is to achieve moral 
consensus and respect for life and liberty rather than material gain. The good society is 
opposed to warfare conducted with the aim of imposing moral values - respecting the 
autonomy of others demands rational persuasion. But what if the inhabitant of our 
totalitarian neighbour ask for our assistance in bringing about the collapse of the 
regime? Depending on the extent to which it is believed that those who have asked for 
our assistance will commit themselves to the goals and strategies of universal 
basic 
need-satisfaction, not to intervene (through the provision of outside resources where at 
all possible, rather than armed intervention) 
in the face of such helplessness would be 
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morally wrong. Acknowledging that our vision of the good knows no national 
boundaries, non-intervention in this case would be as wrong as failing to assist 
someone who was being attacked in the street. Both cases demonstrate the right of 
those under attack to some defence, for both are experiencing a violation of their 
human rights. 
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CHAPTF. P MIT 
CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICI TION Ii TOTA 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to identify some key components of 
principle and policy structure for delivery of our good society, as well as identifying 
the duties and obligations of citizens within it. I have argued that citizens may owe a 
political obligation to kill or die in defence of such a society, on the grounds that only 
within this context can they enjoy the good life and fulfil their moral obligation to 
promote the values and principles connected with such an existence to the less 
fortunate living in their own and other societies. Given the benefits citizens of the 
good society receive, and the nature of the polity of which they are part, the political 
obligation to risk one's life for the collective may exist (depending on the satisfaction 
of just war criteria, for example), although I have argued that the citizen owes no such 
obligation to the liberal democratic state. 
Nevertheless, despite my conclusions many would continue to insist that such an 
obligation does exist - one only has to draw upon the empirical evidence highlighting 
the link between war and social reform to demonstrate the strengths of the benefactor 
argument. That is, the extension of social citizenship has reinforced the political 
obligation to die and kill for the state. Thus, I will be exploring two ideas: first, that 
social reforms create or justify the obligation to kill or die in war; second, that taking 
up that obligation generates more reforms which increase or reinforce that obligation 
for the future. I have challenged the assumptions of the benefactor theory in Chapters 
One and Two, let me do so again, this time in the context of war. 
Some commentators, for example Titmuss, have argued that the aims and content of 
social policy, both in peace and in war, are influenced 
by the need for acceptance of 
obligations and rights, made necessary by war. 
That is, social policies are largely 
determined by how far citizen participation is essential to the successful prosecution of 
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war. If this participation is thought to be crucial, then a reduction in inequalities and a 
levelling of the hierarchical class structure must occur. The aim of this section is to 
explore this claim by drawing on the historical evidence believed to support the impact 
of two world wars on social change in Britain 
However, from the outset, we must be aware of the difficulty of isolating a particular 
period of social and economic upheaval and attempting to apply it to the development 
of social citizenship. We shall see that the conditions of war cannot be treated in 
isolation from the historical development of a society and its socioeconomic and 
political structure. As Marwick points out in the opening chapter of 'War and Social 
Change' (1974): 
"there would be no point in studying the effects of war on any society 
without first grasping firmly the essential features of that society, the 
processes of change already in motion within that society on the eve of 
war. " (p. 44) 
Moreover, accepting that changes have accompanied or followed war, it does not 
automatically follow that they were caused by war. Nevertheless, we can plausibly say 
that we do have a prima facie case for an investigation, which will assist us in a critical 
evaluation of the propositions put forward by those who support the benefactor 
argument for political obligation, or identify a dialectical relationship between 
citizenship and war. Our investigation begins with the question of why so many 
changes occur within the context of war and why British social policies, particularly in 
the first half of the 20th century, were clustered rather than gradual. 
National experiences of total war were, until the 1950s, represented in historiography 
as having a purely negative impact, in so far as they were at all relevant to 
historical 
development. However, after this Period the work of social historians and sociologists 
was suggestive of the future approach to the question of war and social change. 
Richard Titmuss was among the first to make a connection between the two 
in 1950 in 
'Problems of Social Policy', while Stanislas Andreski offered the 
'military participation 
ratio' in 1954 which postulated a 
firm correlation between the extent of wartime 
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participation by society in the war effort and the amount of subsequent levelling of 
social inequalities. 
However, in the forefront of the change in historical perspectives with regard to war 
studies was Arthur Marwick who modified Andreski's formula to suggest that'wartime' 
rather than in the strict sense 'military' participation was the key. Marwick's study of 
British society in World War I 'The Deluge' (1965) was followed by 'Britain in the 
Century of Total War' (1968), but it was his comparative study 'War and Social 
Change in the Twentieth Century' (1974) which showed a full awareness of the varied 
forms of civilian participation and their social effects in different national contexts. 
Within this framework Marwick formulated his 4-tier model of society which 
attempted to explain how the active participation of citizens in wartime struggle 
resulted in a major process of social reform. Total war implied disruption and 
destruction on an unprecedented scale: first, it tested existing sociopolitical structures 
of states and societies; second, through participation, in the context of the total 
mobilisation of a state's resources; third, the consequences for previously 
disadvantaged groups in the war effort; and finally, its social effects as a 'colossal 
psychological experience'. (p. xvi). The cumulative effect would be real and enduring 
social change. 
Similarly, Richard Titmuss has argued in his history of social policy that the 
circumstances and experience of total war had a profound impact upon the British 
people and led them to accept and even demand social reform. Mann (1992) has gone 
further, seeing this clustering of social policy as a general tendency of 'the period of 
citizen wars' (1914-45). Such wars, he argues, while characterised by 'great attrition, 
destruction and draining of public resources' and hence 'irrational as a means to the 
stated ends' are nevertheless 'rational as a contribution to citizen well-being' (p. 8 7). 
It should be clear at this point that the idea of war as a 
determinant of major social 
change has had a profound impact during the past 
few decades. How far this concept 
has been overstated will be dealt with later in the chapter - the purpose of 
this section is 
to test the hypotheses of the above academics who all 
identify a strong link between 
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total war, citizenship and social policy. First however, we need to trace the 
development of citizenship and social reform within the context of 'total' war. 
NATIONALISM AND THE EXTENSION OF CITIZENSHIP. 
Inextricably linked to the idea of social citizenship is, of course, parliamentary 
democracy, yet the development of the latter is more often related to conflict within 
industrial capitalism (class struggle and a need for political security) than to 
preparations for total war. As we saw in Chapter 2, the development of a disciplined 
mass industrial workforce also, from the point of view of the state, made potentially 
possible the creation of disciplined mass armies. Since industrial capitalism developed 
within a framework of competing states, it inevitably had profound effects on the 
prospects for war. Virtually every aspect of the development of capitalism, from the 
rapid advance of technology, transport and communications to the emergence of new 
class forces and the political and ideological responses to them, had a major military 
significance. Moreover, Shaw (19 8 8) suggests that: 
"The development of state bureaucracy to administer a more complex 
industrial society was also the creation of an infrastructure for mass 
military mobilisation. The growth ofpress and parties, viewed as a new 
means of mass social control, was also the new means of patriotic, 
militaristic, ideological diffusion. " (p. 17). 
With states becoming quasi-democratic by the end of the 19th century, public opinion 
was mobilised. From this perspective then, it could be argued that industrial capitalism 
and parliamentary democracy were the social and political forms required by a new 
form of state militarism, and that both political nationalism and direct military needs 
would have social implications. Mann's thesis, for example, 
builds upon such an 
account of the development of class relations and citizenship, and 
in the following 
discussion I shall be exploring his ideas while drawing a 
distinction between both the 
middle and working class in terms of citizenship, and 
between the First and Second 
World Wars. 
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Parliamentary democracy with mass political parties, as opposed to parliamentary 
systems with limited suffrage based on property, only developed in a number of 
Western societies towards the end of the 19th century. Before then, citizenship was 
restricted by class and to men: the majority of the population were unable to vote and 
women were entirely excluded from the franchise. In the 1860s, Britain boasted an 
electorate of only 1.3 million - about I in 5 adult men. Moreover, Parliament, the 
Cabinet and local government were still dominated by the landed aristocracy. 
Elections were frequently uncontested because of deals between rival parties or 
interests, and were invariably marred by the extensive corruption and intimidation of 
voters. Finally, a good deal of power continued to be exercised by the hereditary 
House of Lords and the monarch. Consequently, the decades since the 1832 Reform 
Act had seen little change in the personnel of Parliament and many middle class 
radicals felt that, until the electorate was expanded, government would continue to be 
unrepresentative and uninterested in their grievances. 
Thus,, during the 19th century, the middle class was mainly concerned with obtaining 
formal citizenship - most importantly the franchise, as well as legal and religious 
equality and educational opportunity. It demanded meritocratic reform of institutions, 
a fair taxation system and protection from the 'dangerous classes' below. The 1867 
Reform Act increased the number of electors to 2.4 million but more importantly for 
the middle class, the government initiated a series of reforms which undermined vested 
interests. Several of these initiatives promoted individual opportunities by eroding 
established privilege such as the University Tests Act which opened teaching 
fellowships at Oxford and Cambridge to non-Anglicans, and the abolition of 
the 
practice which allowed officers to buy their commissions 
in the infantry. Overall, 
during the period 1860s to 1914, middle class experience was one of material, political 
and cultural progress - they became 
house-owners, servant-employers, voters, jurors 
and literate participators in national culture and commercial 
markets. But for Mann 
(19 8 8) these solid achievements had an even greater significance - 
they 'naturalised' the 
middle class in the sense that 
it identified its progress with the achievement of national 
citizenship. He argues that the consequence 
was a tremendous sense of national pride, 
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culminating in a rjoyous nationalism.... an implicit sense of identity, stake and 
community in the nation. 11 (p. 103). 
Meanwhile, alongside this development, a new external threat arose in the shape of the 
huge Continental armies of the post-1870 era, and whose capacity for rapid 
mobilisation underlined Britain's vulnerability, all the more serious in view of the 
naval building programmes of France, Russia and Germany. This sense of external 
threat began to make an impact: the relatively relaxed British patriotism and 'joyous, 
national pride gave way to a more aggressive and militarist nationalism which built on 
top of the notion of a progressive, prosperous, bourgeois nation in control of its own 
destiny. Through duty, sacrifice and struggle the nation would defend 'its place in the 
sun'. Thus for Mann, one of the main causes of World War I was the growth of 
'bourgeois nationalism', expressed through the successful pressure exercised electorally 
by middle class 'public opinion' which urged states on to further aggression when faced 
with a geo-political crisis. Mann, in my view, is correct in highlighting the influence 
of the middle class with regards to the expansion of citizenship rights, and studies of 
late 19th century nationalist, militarist and imperialist pressure groups appear to 
support his arguments. However, events elsewhere also played a part in the 
development of social citizenship, not least the Boer War. 
The Boer War (1899-1902) had the effect of exposing Britain's lack of friends in 
Europe and her military vulnerability: any serious challenge during the South African 
conflict would have been extremely difficult to meet. Consequently, there was 
widespread agreement that the war had exposed alarming deficiencies 
in Britain's 
military system. Additionally, it had also highlighted the 
inadequacy of the labour 
supplied to the armed forces, drawing attention to the 
health and diet of the working 
class and providing the stimulus to the movement 
for National Efficiency. In the 
Manchester district alone, only 3,000 of the 11,000 men attempting to enlist were 
found to be physically fit enough to carry a rifle and withstand 
the fatigues of 
discipline, fears began to be expressed for the future of the British empire. 
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Semmel (1986) argues that 'social imperialism, of which he identifies two types, begat 
20th century social reform. The first emphasised the need to maintain the empire and 
asserted the welfare of the working class depended on imperial strength; while the 
second started from the condition of the working class and suggested that it would be 
impossible to defend the empire without a healthy base. Sidney Webb, commentating 
at the time, advocated a minimum standard of life which he saw as essential to national 
efficiency and imperial strength, and Asquith made a similar point when he stated: 
"What is the use of talking about empire, if here, at its very centre, there 
is always to be found a mass of people stunted in education, a prey of 
intemperance, huddled and congested beyond the possibility of 
realising in any true sense either social or domestic life. " (in Hay 1977. 
p3 1). 
Thus, the National Efficiency movement was concerned with Britain's military 
weaknesses - hence the call for more professionalism in the army, reflected in the 
establishment of the Committee of Imperial Strength, the Officers Training Corps 
(1902) and the General Staff (1904). But generally, it looked to more extensive forms 
of military training, higher educational standards, and improvements in the physical 
condition of children. Combined with an awareness of a declining middle class birth 
rate and high infant mortality, the recommendations of a 1904 Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Physical Deterioration saw remedial action as a matter of national 
advantage, if not national necessity. Reforms such as the Education Acts of 1902, 
1907 and 1910, school meals for the needy (1906), notification of births and medical 
inspections (1907) and the Childrens Act (1908), all reflected a profound fear by 
goverm-nent that to neglect the physical welfare of the young was to undermine and 
positively endanger the security of the nation. 
Moreover, with over 60% of adult males having the vote after 1884, politicians 
had an 
incentive to introduce welfare measures, either to attract electoral popularity or to 
prevent workers turning to extreme socialist organisations such as 
the Social 
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Democratic Fe eration, the Socialist League and the Independent Labour Party. Thus, 
by linking imperial strength with social reform and by suggesting a necessary 
interdependence, the organised labour movement came to believe that such reforms 
were essential in order to create national efficiency, upon which imperial power 
depended. In one sense then, social reform succeeded in suppressing class 
antagonisms and subordinating class interests to those of nation and empire. However, 
unlike their middle class counterparts, the working class did not perceive themselves as 
having a 'stake' in the nation and were, therefore, not so aggressively militaristic, nor 
nationalistic - full citizenship had yet to be obtained 
Nevertheless, the working class could, when necessary, be rallied around the Union 
Jack, and in 1914 they went loyally to war, although the rush of recruits (1,174,000 
between August 1914 and January 1915) were only vaguely patriotic. Young men, 
particularly those drawn from the ranks of the working class, were driven more by the 
excitement, the status conveyed by a uniform, and anticipation of foreign adventures 
with fellow workers, rather than enthusiasm bred from nationalistic and militaristic 
fervour. In sum then, with full citizenship for the middle class, came greater social and 
political participation and a stronger identification with the state and its security, 
although for the working class with limited rights of citizenship, this identification was 
not so strong. Thus, it can be suggested that at the beginning of the 20th century, 
warfare and imperialism were recognisable motors for social reform. World War 1 
was to greatly accelerate this change, particularly by expanding expectations among 
working people themselves. But as the following discussion will show, these 
expectations were to be disappointed in the aftermath of war. 
WORLD WAR I 
By 1916, nationalism was no longer centred on just the middle class and sections of the 
upper class. The war was one of mass mobilisation of 
both soldiers and civilians -a 
case of 'the rulers needing the masses. 
Historians, who hitherto focused upon the 
negative aspects of World War I 
(eg. the loss of 750,000 British males) have, in 
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subsequent decades, emphasised its constructive effects. It was seen, with hindsight, 
as a new kind of war -'Total War'. Previous conflicts had usually involved quite small 
numbers of fighting men and made only a limited impact on society. 
Historians have described the late 18th century as a classic era of 'limited war', in 
which relatively small armies would manoeuvre with the intention of avoiding rather 
than engaging in battle. Campaigns would be designed to exhaust an opponent's 
economy by occupation in search of strictly limited political aims. Nevertheless, 
warfare was to become increasingly more total in its impact during the course of the 
19th century. For example, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
(1792-1815), the motive forces of nationalism and democracy combined to create a 
mass citizen army through the introduction of universal male conscription. Although 
the forms of universal service adopted were necessarily selective in practice, states 
were rapidly accepting the national birthrate as an index of military power. There are 
sufficient examples of the way in which the impact of war upon society was increasing 
through the 19th century (eg. the Crimean War 1856-56, the American Civil War 
1861-65, the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71) to suggest that World War I should be 
regarded as a natural progression from earlier conflicts rather than as unique. 
Although 'Total War' was still a relative concept since, as an absolute, it was 
unrealisable through a lack of instantaneously destructive weapons, this is not to 
suggest that belligerents did not attempt the absolute. The participation of many states 
on a global scale and their willingness to use extreme means to achieve wide aims 
resulted in destruction of life and property on an unprecedented scale compared with 
previous wars. By 1916, almost all the characteristics of 
limited war were obsolete - 
the only surviving characteristic being that people 
(i. e. the civilian population) were 
still somewhat isolated from the battlefield and 
thus, did not appreciate its full 
devastation. (In all, the First World War Is thought to 
have resulted in 10 million dead 
and 20 million seriously wounded, 
leaving 5 million widows and 10 million orphans). 
Nevertheless, during 1914-18, over 5 million British men enlisted 
in the armed forces 
and their support and maintenance required 
a huge civilian effort by both men and 
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women. At this point, we need to assess the impact of the war effort on the 
development of social citizenship. 
The necessity for mass participation has led many historians to argue that the political 
elite had no option but to grant a succession of concessions or rewards of both an 
economic and political nature which had the effect of levelling some of the inequalities 
in British society. But did war participation mean civic participation? This was the 
demand of the organised labour movement including the Labour Party which, as a 
result of war, seized the initiative from the Liberals at the grass roots. By 
concentrating on defending the interests of working class families over wages, 
pensions, wartime allowances, prices, rents and plans for the enactment of new social 
policies such as state-subsidised housing, Labour achieved concrete results. As Mann 
(19 8 8) comments: 
"There was rationality even in the slaughter: popular rule could be 
better advanced through militarism " (p. 175). 
Through the success of Labour, the experience of the middle class before the war - 
progress through the nation - now became more generalised to the people as a whole. 
The people were willing to sacrifice, but they wanted something in return. So what 
precisely did they gain in the way of social citizenship? 
The First World War did not fundamentally change the Edwardian system of state- 
financed social welfare, although it did help to expand it and indirectly strengthened 
the political foundations. For example, allowances and pensions to civilian dependants 
became necessary as a result of the mass enlistment of men and the resultant casualties, 
which laid the foundations of the later 'family allowance system' by recognising the 
crucial role of the wife and mother. The huge loss of male lives in wartime also 
fuelled concern to promote the health of infants, hence the 1918 Maternity and 
Child 
Welfare Act which compelled local authorities to implement nationally 
determined 
standards of care. Another example of wartime policy reflecting concern about 
children was H. A. L. Fisher's Education Act of 
1918, which made secondary education 
compulsory to the age of 14, proposed a complete system 
from nursery to higher 
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education and offered a 50% grant to local authorities. However, the most significant 
of social reforms during this period was housing policy because it was Lloyd George's 
government that promised to build 'homes fit for heroes' in 1918. Swenarton interprets 
this gesture as a government response to working class unrest - an 'insurance against 
revolution' (hence the elaborate design of the houses intended for the 'respectable' 
organised working class) rather than as recognition of the 'heroic' efforts of soldiers 
The 1919 Housing and Town Planning Act offered a generous state subsidy to local 
authorities to encourage housebuilding. However, the shortage of labour and the 
uncooperative attitude of builders resulted in only 170,000 of the projected target being 
met, which although representing a major advance in housing policy, fell far short of 
the promises made to returning war heroes. 
It is important to recognise that post-war social reform was extremely precarious, and 
the chief reason for this was, of course, economic instability. Vast social needs could 
not be met in a world market system whose inadequacies had been deepened rather 
than overcome by the consequences of war. By 1921, the 1919 Housing Act had been 
abandoned, the victim, alongside education, of the 'Geddes Axe'. Yet economic factors 
aside, the failure of social reform can also be seen as the result of political 
conservatism and administrative inefficiency. Many politicians interpreted 
'reconstruction' as a return to pre-war values (i. e. faith in the free market), and even if a 
more radical interpretation had been placed upon the concept, the machinery of 
government had not been overhauled enough to permit central direction. For example, 
the Ministry of Labour did not lack reforming zeal, but was not courageous enough to 
challenge the Treasury's views on economical government and ended up suppressing 
reforms which it had originally encouraged such as the extension of minimum wage 
regulations. Thus, the somewhat speedy reversal of large parts of the reconstruction 
programme and the continuing reverence given to classic economic orthodoxy 
in the 
post-war period, clearly suggests that it is at least an exaggeration 
to claim that mass 
participation in the war effort had a fundamental 
impact on official thinking; in many 
ways the rhetoric of reconstruction was 
designed to serve a temporary political need. 
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Nevertheless, in terms of citizenship, there was at least one solid concession granted in 
wartime and that was the extension of parliamentary democracy - this was a reform 
that could not be withdrawn in the event of changed political or economic 
circumstances. It has already been noted that prior to 1914 only 60% of men and no 
women enjoyed the vote, a situation that severely embarrassed the Liberal government 
who had failed to effect some reforms. The war exacerbated the problem simply 
because many men, through leaving home, lost their place on the electoral register, and 
government was fearful of holding an election from which large numbers of patriotic 
war workers were actually excluded. The 1918 Representation of the People Act 
succeeded in enfranchising virtually all adult males and women over 30 who were 
themselves, or married to, local government voters. As a result, the electorate 
increased from its pre-war figure of between 7-8 million to one comprising 13 million 
men and 8 million women. 
It is indeed the case that, despite wartime repression, parliamentary democracy had 
become more widespread in the aftermath of World War 1. But a political reward for 
war effort? It appears very doubtful that the 1918 Act can be explained in terms of 
fundamental changes in attitude brought about by mass participation in the war. 
Politicians certainly paid tribute to patriotic war workers, implying that the vote was a 
reward for, or in the case of women, a recognition that they had proved their 
capabilities as workers. But in reality, most politicians continued to disapprove of 
women as paid employees and had no hesitation in forcing them out of their new 
jobs, 
to say nothing of withholding the vote from young women who worked 
in the vital 
munitions factories. War had clearly failed to alter traditional 
ideas about the role of 
the two sexes - the typical female voter appeared 
to be the mature wife and mother 
primarily concerned with the preservation of 
her home life, not pursuing a career or 
fighting the feminist cause. 
To sum up: it may be that to some extent the entry of 
the working class into citizenship 
was accelerated by wartime participation, 
but it is also plausible to argue that the 
political reforms of 1918 were passed more 
to meet party political objectives than 
because of a radical change of heart with regards 
to rights of citizenship. Moreover, it 
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must also be bome in mind that the extension Of parliamentary democracy occurred 
within a society whose structures of wealth and privilege remained unaffected by 
modest reform. As for reconstruction as reward for war services rendered, it was a 
concept that came to mean different things to different people. The soldiers on the 
battlefield took it to mean compensation for the sacrifices of war, a land fit for heroes 
to live in . The King's Speech which opened the first post-war Parliament appeared to 
endorse this view: 
66-since the outbreak of the war every party and every class have worked 
andfought togetherfor a great ideal... we must continue to manifest the same 
spirit. We must stop at no sacrifice of interest or prejudice to stamp out 
unmerited poverty, to diminish unemployment and mitigate its sufferings, to 
provide decent homes, to improve the nation's health and to riase the standard 
of well-being throughout the country. " (Hansard 11/2/1919). 
However, for the politicians and civil servants, reconstruction meant a return to pre- 
1914 normality where workers were content and obedient and private enterprise 
flourished. Traditional social barriers remained, shrouded only by the mist of 
sentimentality which many observers of the time were quick to see through, including 
the economist Arthur Shadwell: 
"The war was generally expected to lead to a sort of Utopia, in which 
the lion would lay down with the lamb ... There was no substance in this 
sanguine vision; it was simply a nebulous hope, born of war excitement 
and fed by politicians phrases ... such as the nebulous word 
, 'reconstruction ýI can remember no such prolific begetter of nonsense 
as this idea of 'reconstruction ý" (in Waites p. 73) 
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Thus, although World War I may have produced an 'ideal', the reality of post-war 
Britain was not indicative of a state rewarding its citizens for the sacrifices of war - 
reconstruction bowed to the might of economic orthodoxy, and any social and political 
change was absorbed or contained within a society which differed little from the 
socially stratified model of 1914. 
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THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
In the period of 'total war' it is World War Two that has been inextricably linked to the 
development of social citizenship. It had been claimed by Richard Titmuss in his 
history of social policy that the experience of World War Two and the arrival of 
Churchill's coalition in 1940 led to a fundamentally new attitude on welfare issues. He 
argued that apart from concern for national efficiency, conditions of war also highlight 
the state's concern for civilian morale. Other historians, for example Marwick, argue 
that the effects of war were so radical and far-reaching they should be compared to a 
'social and economic revolution'. Paul Addison in 'The Road to 1945' reaffirms the 
significance of wartime policy and its close relationship with post-war reform, and 
emphasises the political consensus of the Coalition on social and economic 
reconstruction. Pelling, on the other hand, claims the Second World War was more or 
less irrelevant to post-war trends, most of which had their origins in the 1930s or 
before. A similar conclusion,, though from a different standpoint, is reached by Calder 
in his study 'The People's War', while Barnett (1986) takes the view that victory was 
lost to social instead of economic and industrial change - for him, the priority of the 
government should have been the reconstruction of British industry. 
However despite some disagreement among historians, it has been generally accepted 
that the emphasis on universalism during the 1940s stemmed from the unprecedented 
sense of social unity which had developed during the war. The years of common effort 
and sacrifice are believed to have brought about a fundamental shift in public attitudes 
and created an atmosphere in which a return to the social divisions and inequalities of 
the 1930s would not have been tolerated. During the critical period of the Slump, 
when economic and social conditions were very difficult, welfare measures had been 
demanded and provided piecemeal, with varying conditions of regulation and 
administration; 
ý.. a frightening complexity of eligibility and benefit according to 
individual boundaries, degrees of need and so jorth. ' (Briggs A. 'The 
Weffiare State in Historical Perspective ý p. 4) 
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The dole queue and the means test became the twin symbols of the inter-war 
Depression, and the focus for a collective determination not to repeat the failures and 
mistakes of those years. Despite the long-term trend towards a slight redistribution of 
income (through factors such as taxation, welfare measures, fall in the incomes of the 
rich etc. ), great inequalities clearly remained in British society. 
In the rest of Europe some countries such as Germany and the USSR were witnessing 
an acceleration of social reform, but such change could hardly be linked to the 
development of social citizenship. Shaw (1988) commenting on the 1930s suggests 
that: 
"Any virtuous dialectic of citizen rights and warfare were largely 
overtaken by a much more vicious relationship between totalitarianism 
and remilitarisation. True, Hitler and Stalin could boast full 
employment and some forms of welfare, and in Germany living 
standards were maintained, but these rulers did not offer citizenship, 
only (at best) the perks awarded to obedient slaves. " (p. 55) 
Shaw's point also serves to demonstrate the danger of adopting an ethnocentric 
perspective on the development of social citizenship - comparisons between states 
forces us to abandon an emphasis on a single cause and search for other possible links, 
a point I will return to later. 
Regardless of the general debate surrounding the effects of war on the development of 
social citizenship, it would not be controversial to argue that social reform in World 
War Two resulted partly from the disillusionment at the failure of social reform after 
World War 1,, and the need to overcome the resentments of the Depression. But in 
1939, a new external threat overshadowed the legacy of the inter-war years - fascist 
Germany. It soon became abundantly clear that to achieve the mobilisation needed to 
defeat Nazism, a much closer socio-Political linking of citizen to state was essential. 
There is little doubt that ordinary people detested Hitler and his fascist Reich, and from 
the very beginning, the war against Hitler's 
Germany was presented to the British 
people as a fight against' the forces of 
darkness' that 'threatened civilised society'. In 
Chamberlain's broadcast to the nation at the outbreak of war 
he warned: 
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"It is evil things that we shall befighting against: bruteforceg badfaith9 
injustice, oppression andpersecution. 11 (Pugh 1994. p. 111) 
Against this, Britain stood in defence of 'liberty', 'democracy' and the rule of law. 
Unlike the First World War, the purpose of which was questioned by many, World 
War Two was seen as an ideological rather than a territorial battle -a 'just war' which 
required nothing less than Hitler's unconditional surrender and the restoration of 
democracy throughout occupied Europe. For the Allies, German fascism challenged 
the moral order of Western democracy, repudiating the contractual basis of consent on 
which the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state depended. Nazi occupation 
brought exploitation, servitude, the loss of liberty and human rights. (Although 
Britain's hypocrisy with regards to treatment of its own colonial populations appears to 
have been lost on its politicians). 
Nevertheless, despite popular support for the Second World War, this did not obscure 
the fact that the 'freedoms' people were asked to defend in the name of 'democracy' and 
'liberty' were often more rhetorical than real. The same freedoms had been invoked in 
justification for World War I yet, as I argued earlier, poverty, unemployment and 
social deprivations remained constant companions of the working class throughout the 
inter-war period. The 'land fit for heroes' promised to volunteers had proved to be at 
least as inhospitable and insecure as British society immediately before the Great War. 
(Morgan & Evans 1993). The differences between classes and regions remained as 
great in the late 1930s as they were after World War 1, and little had been done to 
alleviate these unreasonable contrasts of prosperity and decay. The industrial working 
class remained a nation apart, yet were to become the 'ordinary people' upon whose 
qualities the defence of liberty relied. After years of hardship and neglect they were 
called to the centre of the national stage to fulfil their political obligations under 
conditions of total war. Not as members of an exploited class 
however, but as soldiers 
and workers in a patriotic struggle for liberty, 
justice and equality, against oppression, 
intolerance and brute force. 
The conventional view has been that public morale was 
boosted by firm official action 
and Churchill's inspiring speeches such as that 
broadcast on the 18th June: 
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"I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin ... Let us brace ourselves to our duty, and so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say 'This was theirfinest hourý " (Pugh 1994p. 225). 
Churchill's rhetoric was grounded upon his belief in the inherent qualities of the British 
people - their sense of community and fair play and duty to the state, their instinct for 
decency, justice and, above all, their determination to win the war. 
"No longer were the British workers seen as the idle, intractable 
troublemakers of pre-war years; they were now air-men, soldiers, 
servicemen, and civilians risking their life by 'doing their bitý (Morgan 
& Evans 1993). 
Heroism was no longer limited to the singular courageous act of combatants - it 
extended to civilians who were daily exposed to aerial attacks. Non-combatants were 
also praised for their courage and endurance - factory workers, miners, hospital staff, 
the rescue services and many others who all contributed to the war effort without 
questioning the dangers or risks. The Second World War has thus been identified as 'a 
people's war' 
With this 'demilitarisation' of the 'hero' and the 'heroic' deed, the welfare and safety of 
non-combatants became a major concern, and more attention was focused upon the 
civilian and his/her living standards. Amongst the urban populations, the Blitz and 
mass evacuation revealed the squalor of inner-cities and the hidden poverty of working 
class life. Benefits were extended to the sick, the young and the old as the state 
accepted wider responsibilities for citizen well-being. Again, these sentiments were 
captured by Churchill's deeply populist rhetoric - the struggle for 'freedom' and 
'democracy' incorporated not only those whose material and personal advantages were 
well established, but the majority who were socially and economically deprived. 
Collectively, the 'common people' became a moral as well as an economic category 
(ibid). However, the view that Churchill's populism appealed to all strata of society is 
subject to debate. For example, a Mass Observation survey suggested that the 
Churchillian rhetoric had a limited impact, particularly on women. As a group, women 
were less optimistic about the war than men, due partly to 
its disruptive effects on 
family and social life. Certainly much of the population became 
indifferent or cynical 
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towards the massive propaganda effort of the Ministries of Information, Food and 
Labour. Moreover, despite government attempts to identify the working class with the 
national interest, the divisions between 'them' and 'us' still remained. For example, the 
Ministry of Information's poster bearing the slogan'Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness,, 
Your Resolution Will Bring Us Victory' attracted so much hostility that it had to be 
withdrawn. 
The war also impinged upon civilians by stimulating the demand for labour - the need 
for essential supplies pushed unemployment below 10%, brought rising wages and new 
life to the industries of Scotland, Wales and the North. Food rationing, conscription 
and shortages of all kinds established the principle of 'fair shares for all', while the need 
to control productive resources transformed the economy with directives that 
'resembled the centralised command of a socialist state'. (Morgan & Evans 1993) The 
acute shortage of human resources brought home the fact that the strength and security 
of the nation depended upon the labour of the working class, and measures were 
introduced which improved conditions of employment and safety at work and raised 
minimum earnings (although few employers offered more than the statutory minimum 
through fear of prejudicing their dominant position within labour relations). In the last 
analysis, victory depended upon production and 'the will of the people to keep the 
factories going at full blast'. (ibid) 
Nevertheless, despite economic planning, production continued to be coordinated 
within the framework of free enterprise. With minimal competition, the state as 
guarantor against financial risk and the curtailment of labour mobility, conditions for a 
flourishing capitalism had rarely been so favourable. Managers continued to manage 
in the interests of shareholders and private firms, lending weight to socialist critiques 
that 'patriotism is another name for profits'. Indeed, the population in general showed 
little sympathy for those who complained that the 
lack of financial incentives during 
wartime was retarding production. For example, 
the overwhelming majority of 
respondents in a Mass Observation survey 
believed that efficiency would increase if 
essential industries were taken out of private 
hands, while 6 out of 7 favoured 
conscription of private assets and wealth. 
(ibid). 
181 
However,, it was not part of the government's programme to transform the established 
order or to redistribute property and wealth, although it did acknowledge that meeting 
the hopes and expectations of ordinary people was crucial to a war that had to be won 
on the home front. The war effort was raising questions about the directions and 
priorities of British society, and in whose interests the war was being fought - at the 
heart of these questions lay the future of employment and the conditions of working 
class life. This concern was reflected in a government White Paper of 1944 which 
stated: 
"In a matter sofundamental, it is rightfor all citizens to stand together, 
without exclusion based on differences of status, function or wealth. " 
Through universal schemes concrete expression would be given to the solidarity and 
unity of the nation which 
".. in war has been its bulwark against aggression, and in peace will be 
its guarantee of success in the fight against individual want and 
mischance. " (Jeffreys K. 'British Politics and Social Policy During 
WORLD WAR TWO 9. 
It was argued that after the large sums raised for warfare, smaller sums could be used 
to produce a 'Welfare State'. Universal entitlements to free education, free medical 
care and a civilised standard of domestic life would substantially enhance the status of 
citizenship, establishing principles of distributive justice as a democratic right. For 
Morgan & Evans (1993): 
"The shape of this new societyfound general accord: it was to be a social 
democracy harnessing the energy and dynamic of capitalism to the 
wetfare of the people as a whole. The pernicious and destabilising 
excesses of capitalism would be tamed by broadly Keynesian strategies, 
while publicly-managed programmes of distributive justice would 
balance individualfreedoms with the common good. " (xvi). 
The vision of the new post-war society was encapsulated 
in the 1942 Beveridge Report 
which called for a comprehensive system of social security 
based on subsistence-rate 
benefits, to be effective only if accompanied by full employment and a new national 
health service. The immense popularity of the 
Report suggested that there existed 
between political parties a common approach to welfare reform, a new and positive 
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social policy consensus. But again, total war concealed conflict at home and the 
Coalition government, symbolic of the patriotic front against Nazi Germany, obscured 
a diversity of deep-seated differences between political parties over social reform. At 
root, the differences were about whether social security was a minimum provision for 
the prevention of absolute poverty (the Conservative philosophy) or part of a general 
attack upon inequality (the Labour view). 
Thus on an ideological level, against the Tory belief that democracy should ensure the 
unfettered right of individuals to pursue their interests in the market place, there 
emerged the idea that a democratic state should provide a measure of collective 
security for every citizen in equal part - extending to minimum standards of welfare as 
well as to civil and political rights. These ideological differences and the influence of 
Conservative philosophy were reflected in a series of government White Papers on 
health, education and employment, indicating a consistent pattern of compromise, 
concession and continuity in social policy. In effect, the balance of Coalition forces 
did not advocate wholesale departures in social policy but believed in retaining a major 
place for private over public enterprise. Nevertheless, by 1948 Britain had established 
a 'Welfare State' which had two dimensions: full employment, to be achieved through 
Keynesian demand management policy; and an extensive range of public services (eg. 
education, health) and cash benefits available 'from the cradle to the grave'. It was an 
achievement indeed and of tremendous significance for the development of social 
citizenship - but was it the result of wartime conditions and mass participation, from 
which sprang a philosophy of universalism and egalitarianism? 
THE POST-WAR CITIZEN: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 
At the beginning of this chapter I cited a number of academics who, to a greater or 
lesser degree, viewed World War Two as instrumental in transforming the relationship 
of citizen to state. The 1939 Emergency Powers Act ensured that almost every aspect 
of social life was subject to state control and scrutiny. 
'Freedom' and 'democracy' 
under conditions of war thus meant state control and a political obligation placed upon 
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citizens to 'do their bit'. Yet promises of prosperity and future employment inspired 
visions of a better world and the idea of social planning became a political priority -a 
key to the aspirations of a 'people's war' and a condition of the free and equal society 
Britain was fighting for. But to gain a clearer insight into the reality behind the ideal, 
we need to clarify a number of concepts. 
First, what did "freedom' really mean? The 'freedom' of people 'to control their own 
destiny' which needed to be defended against Nazi tyranny was no more than an 
ideological abstraction to those who had suffered the deprivations of the inter-war 
period. The 'freedom' working class people were fighting for was the right to regular 
work - freedom from unemployment not freedom to control one's destiny (although the 
former, of course,, contributes to the latter). As for 'democracy' - what image of the 
good society were citizens fighting and sacrificing to defend? In Chapter One I 
concluded that 'democracy' in any meaningful sense implied horizontal relationships of 
duty and obligation between citizens and extensive political participation and 
representation. But democracy in the post-war visionary society was to be a 
continuation of 'democracy' in wartime - that is, 'democracy' from above. The better 
world was to be shaped by state planning and government 'experts' such as Keynes and 
Beveridge whose ideas and reports were hugely influential. Thus, 'democracy' implied 
a vertical relationship between citizen and state, offering very limited scope for direct 
popular initiatives and direct mass involvement. 
In view of the above conclusions regarding 'freedom' and 'democracy', it follows that 
the general concept of 'participation' also requires some clarification. Used in a neutral 
sense, it is undoubtedly the case that the population participated in total war - that 
is, it 
was mobilised, forced to work, fight, kill and die for the state. However, using a more 
positive definition, deemed more appropriate for 
inclusion within the ideal society 
outlined in previous chapters, we could argue that citizens 
did not participate in the 
sense of being able to influence the aims and conduct of 
the war, or of enhancing their 
post-war influence on social and economic organisation or 
their social rights. 
Moreover,, 'participation' in total war did not lead to any 
breakdown in class 
distinctions - if it achieved anything, 
the identification of World War Two as a 
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'people's war' has tended to disguise such differences. In sum, the British state 
throughout the period of total war, took for granted that any extension of social 
citizenship was mutually compatible with a capitalist system (and its attendant power 
relations). This assumption has led to a continuation of the contradiction between the 
formal equality bestowed by newly acquired rights of citizenship and the persistence of 
economic inequalities rooted in the free market. 
To conclude this section on citizenship and total war, I am willing to concede that the 
central role taken by the British state in social reform and the ideology of planning and 
intervention was strengthened by wartime experience. The shape of post-war Britain 
was forged in part as a consequence of a test of state and society; in which the state 
directly mobilised society and society was, in turn, able to secure some reforms. But 
there was continuity in the state, in the maintenance of modestly adequate living 
standards and in working class improvements. 
We know then, through reference to the historical evidence, that the British state was 
successful in mobilising society and the economy in both World Wars through winning 
the active consent (through participation in its neutral sense) of the mass of the 
population. But it is at this point that we become vulnerable to the charge of 
ethnocentricity, because it is this reliance of a liberal state on consent which brings the 
'participation' effect into play at all. If we assume consent through (neutral) 
participation within the context of a liberal democracy, then we can agree that Britain 
is an exceptionally strong case of what Mann calls 'the dialectic of development of 
civic and military participation'. But it also follows that we cannot expect to find such 
a dialectic in every national case. The effects of total war on citizenship and social 
change are also determined by the nature of the political systems involved. For 
example, the early post-war years in most of continental Europe and Japan were years 
of great hardship and desperate reconstruction measures. Social reform 
in most 
countries was not, as in Britain, shaped in part 
by wartime 'participation' but by 
conditions of full employment in the 1950s. Thus, the extension of 
democratic rights 
to include social rights and the subsequent development of a welfare apparatus rests 
more on the balance of political and economic 
forces at both national and international 
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levels. If this is the case, then we can also suggest that wartime changes and 
developments should be placed within the context of long-term social trends - 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. 
Nevertheless, I would concur with the generally accepted view that the experience of 
total war accelerated change and strengthened the identification of ordinary citizens 
with the values and objectives of a society as a whole. However, the status of 
citizenship was not granted as of right, it had to be earned through fulfilling one's 
obligation to the state, in terms of enduring the hardships and sacrifices of war. But in 
terms of satisfying the criteria of citizenship as defined in Chapter Three, the rights 
gained were of an extremely modest nature. The formal negative rights of citizenship 
were consolidated by the experience of the First World War, and the expectation that 
full employment would be maintained by the state was the most tangible concession 
the working class gained from the Second. In conclusion therefore, I suggest that 
'Participation' in total war as an explanation for the extension of social citizenship, is a 
relevant and instructive concept, provided it is subject to clarification and its 
limitations kept in mind. 
In the previous section I examined the impact of 'total war' on the extension of social 
citizenship, and concluded that war fuelled reform but within the existing 
socioeconomic relations of a capitalist society. Moreover, I attempted to show that the 
'national cohesion' and 'social solidarity' created by World War Two has proved to be 
an enduring myth. The war effort did little to change the underlying structure of 
privilege and class regardless of central planning - the distinction 
between 'them' and 
'us' was as sharp as ever despite the rhetoric of 'fair shares 
for all'. Nevertheless, the 
idea of citizenship did express a qualitative change in relations 
between individual and 
the state, a more caring/reciprocal relationship 
based on cooperation, fairness and 
distributive justice. Thus the expansion of citizenship after World War 11 was regarded 
as a social right. 
Here, I want briefly to identify the image of the post- 
1945 citizen as an analytical tool 
for the purpose of later comparison, 
by setting out his/her characteristics and the 
assumptions which shaped them. 
First, as I stated above, calls for 'fairness' and 
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'distributive justice' took no account of traditional structures of status and privilege. As 
a result citizen participation in any meaningful sense was severely limited. Hereditary 
peers, high court judges and senior civil servants continued to benefit from entrenched 
systems of deference and elite recruitment through closed social networks such as 
direct inheritance and education through private schools and ancient universities. 
Second, calls for social equality were confined to a modest levelling of income rather 
than a redistribution of private production property and no attention whatsoever was 
paid to sexual and racial inequalities. Thus, the 1945 citizen was male and white, an 
image which has endured and been reinforced through implementation of the 
Beveridge reforms. Finally, the 1945 citizen was hostile towards 'ideologies' and 
'revolutionary' ideas -a non-radical, pragmatic individual. To sum up the post-World 
War Two citizen: 
"He was the long suffering Tommy who had loyally served his country 
and the King in the expectation of afairer and better world" (Morgan & 
Evans 1993 P. 64). 
Undoubtedly, post-war Britain did offer the chance of a fairer and better world, albeit 
of a modest nature. But the roots of the post war reconstruction with its popular social 
reforms were to prove to be far from secure - not least because they rested upon the 
shaky foundations of full employment and sustained economic growth. Moreover the 
post-war political economy was rendered even more fragile by the assumption that 
Britain would remain a major military power, committed to defending the liberal order 
within which a welfare democracy could flourish. 
Britain has had considerable difficulty in relinquishing its grasp of itself as a dominant 
world power. Undoubtedly, Britain was hegemonic during the 19th century - 
its Navy 
dominated the seas, it led the Industrial Revolution for a 100 years. In 1860 Britain's 
manufacturers constituted half of the worlds, her exports were a quarter of 
those of the 
world. But towards the end of the century, Britains role as a world 
leader began to 
diminish. 
Mann offers a useful empirical analysis of 
Britains decline which for him, lies in the 
institutions of its ruling class. Lack of space prevents me 
from giving Manns thesis the 
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attention it merits, but to summarise, he argues that the British ruling class were 
committed first, to a global militarism, second, to a laissez faire economy, and third to 
the development of financial/commercial institutions. This led, in turn to a large 
proportion of public expenditure being devoted to military spending and research and 
development; the protection of sterling rather than encouraging domestic production; 
and channelling investment into commerce rather than industry. By the 1960s the 
British economy was far less efficient than the competing economies of Europe, the 
US and Japan. 
Britains over-commitment to militarism in the post war period was influenced in large 
part by the special economic and military relationship it was determined to maintain 
with the US, and its ideological commitment to the ensuing Cold War. After World 
War Two Britain had requested a five billion dollar interest free loan and expressed a 
desire to share Americas monopoly of nuclear research and technology- the US 
displayed reluctance on both counts. (Indeed, Truman's reluctance to share America's 
superiority was a formative influence upon Atlee's decision to build a British atomic 
bomb). However, by 1948, Anglo-American relations had improved as both countries 
were drawn together "to protect democracy and the freedom of the West against 
Communism " (p. 147). The signing of the NATO Pact not only committed the US to 
indefinite military involvement in Europe, but also tied Britain to American defence 
and foreign policies for years to come. Moreover, the perceived Soviet threat fuelled 
the imperial assumption of Britain as a major military power -a grandiose illusion 
almost universally shared by Britain's politicians, its military and civil service alike. 
Britain's commitment to military spending has been irrational for a number of reasons. 
Most obviously, because it is largely the result of delusions of imperial grandeur. 
Also, in terms of the proportion of total R&D expenditure going into military 
products only the US rivals Britain. But military demand in the US is large and is 
protected from foreign competition. Thus, Britain can rarely compete effectively 
in the 
US or equally on world markets. Finally, there have 
been few technological spin-offs 
from military products in recent years. Many economists, 
for instance, believe that the 
economies of Germany and Japan have 
flourished precisely because they do not devote 
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large proportions of GDP to military spending. In sum then, we can argue that the 
priority given to military concerns cannot be justified and counts as a significant 
contributory factor in Britain's decline -a deterioration exacerbated in the post war 
period by Britain's involvement in the nuclear arms rose. So what were the 
implications of such a narrow focus on defence for the extension of citizenship? 
Shaw argues that the Cold War phase indicated a shift from the 'mass militarism' of 
World War Two to the nuclear-dominated militarism of the late 1950s onwards. This 
transition, in turn, had implications for society and the state and the relationship 
between the two. In terms of the former, the nuclear arms race ushered in a period of 
protest groups and single-issue campaigns. For example, the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament became an influential model for many subsequent groups - from 
political rights to animal rights. However, the character of the state was also 
undergoing a transformation. We have seen how the centralised and bureaucratic 
character of the 'military-democratic state' of World War Two was based, to some 
degree on a bonding of state and society and a relative unity within the state of its 
military and social apparatuses. Military participation implied social participation 
(albeit of a distorted form or, at best, participation in its neutral sense). However, in 
the age of 'nuclear militarism', total societal mobilisation is no longer required, at least: 
"A nuclear war ... will mobilise society as a whole only 
in the sense of 
delivering it to mass destruction " (Shaw p. 104). 
This is because of the remoteness of nuclearisation - the nuclear state opens up a large 
gap between its military branches and the underlying society. 
In our previous discussion we saw how the period of total war accelerated social 
reform with regards to citizenship - the relationship between citizen and state was 
transformed as the latter became more interventionist. If we accept 
Shaw's 
observations, we can suggest that this relationship 
is undergoing yet another change. 
The political consequence of 'nuclear militarism' 
is that the 'nuclear state' cannot now 
be relied upon, as could the 'military 
democratic' model of 'mass militarism', to provide 
basic social needs. Because nuclearisation 
does not require societal mobilisation in 
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terms of large conscript armies and mass production munition industries, the link 
between the state's military and social apparatuses is considerably weakened, which, 
in turn, has implications for the state's obligations towards its citizens. One 
consequence of this is the reduction of services which individuals and groups cannot 
provide for themselves, reflected in the 1980s/90s welfare reforms discussed below. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore the extent to which, in the context of the 
nuclear age, the future of citizenship will differ from its past. 
For purposes of comparison, let us return to the 1945 citizen or more precisely, the 
concept of citizenship which helped shape the post war reconstruction. The expansion 
of citizenship was seen in terms of social rights -a view endorsed by TH Marshall and 
many of his contemporaries. In his famous essay 'Citizenship and Social Class' (1950) 
Marshall envisaged citizenship as involving three elements: civil, political and social. 
These, he argued, were developed, and struggled for, in successive centuries : civil 
rights in the 18th; political rights in the 19th and social rights in the 20th. To gain a 
clearer insight it is worth quoting him at length: 
"The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual 
fteedom - liberty of the person, fteedom of speech, thought andfaith, the 
right to own property and conclude valid contracts, and the right to 
justice .. the institutions most 
directly associated with civil rights are the 
courts ofjustice. 
By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority. 
The corresponding institutions are Parliament and councils of 
local 
government. 
By the social element I mean the whole range 
from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to 
the right to share to the 
full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised 
being 
according to the standards prevailing 
in the society. The institutions 
most closely connected with it are the education system 
and the social 
services. " (1950. p. 10-11) 
The 'social rights' Marshall identifies are what we mean 
today by the 'welfare state' and 
social democracy. 
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Marshall's thesis is evolutionary in its approach and is remarkably ethnocentric, 
suggesting that he may have viewed Britain as a typical illustration of the capitalist 
West. His general argument in that industrial society institutionalised class struggle 
through mass citizenship. This is true to the extent that all regimes have guarantied 
some citizen rights, but as I stated at the outset, if we adopt a comparative approach we 
can see that they have done so in very different degrees and combinations. Thus, the 
picture is much more complex. However, working within his evolutionary perspective, 
Marshall explores the tensions between economic inequalities and demands for popular 
participation, both generated by the development of capitalism. The post war 
reconstruction measures, particularly the introduction of universal services of social 
welfare, were the basis of his claim that World War Two had enhanced the 
advancement of citizenship through the expansion of social rights. These rights had 
been 'earned' through the collective sacrifices of war. In the same spirit, it was 
assumed they would be actively upheld. Indeed, this "Modern drive towards social 
equality" (p. 73) as Marshall called it, encouraged the belief that there were few limits 
to the extension of citizenship and the democratisation of civil society. 
It is only in retrospect, that we can call Marshall's vision of citizenship as some kind of 
'social glue', optimistic, if not romantic. His ideas of fairness, and a sense of 
community as forming the basis of social cohesion, a progression of enrichment that 
could not be impeded, belonged to a society emerging from war and imbued with a 
spirit of optimism and high expectations. 
Most certainly, they are proving increasingly inapplicable to society in the nuclear age. 
The relationship of state to citizen has changed to the extent that 
it is now plausible to 
argue that the state can no longer demand the obligation 
from its citizens to kill or die 
on its behalf. In the past, the state recognised 
its duty to support its citizenry (albeit 
reluctantly on occasions and with modest reform) 
through the extension of social 
rights. However, within the nuclear context, 
the state no longer requires the 
participation of its citizens in circumstances of war - 
the only participation required is 
in an economic sense - citizens as consumers and producers, 
citizens as markets. Thus, 
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the citizenry no longer has the protection of the state, only that provided by civil and 
political rights (and, as we have seen, this is questionable) and in consequence, has, 
therefore, no political obligation, (except to obey the rules of markets such as 
honouring contracts, paying taxes, abstention from fraudulent practices etc. ) 
That is why, in all fairness, Marshall's essay has to be read in historical perspective. 
We need only to look briefly at what citizenship entails in the 1990s to see that 
Marshall's conception of the post war reconstruction of citizenship as a'a new common 
experience' and his belief in its impeded expansion have not been realised, particularly 
within the realm of the 'social rights' he identified. 
The 'nuclearisation' of society, however, sits very comfortably with the neo-liberal 
reforms of the New Right, whose policies have radically transformed the concept of 
citizenship in recent years. For them, the post war reconstruction should be viewed in 
a negative light. Far from maximising liberties, the egalitarian ethic of the welfare 
settlement undermined individual freedoms through bureaucratisation, stifling private 
enterprise and increasing peoples dependence on the state through generous welfare 
measures. Citizenship in terms of social rights has been morally challenged by the 
prevailing ethic of individualism which in turn has raised wider questions of 
"freedom", "obligation" and the boundaries between the public and the private spheres. 
I have no need to reiterate here the nature and impact of New Right policy on welfare 
provision - these issues were explored extensively in Chapter 2. Briefly 
it will be 
recalled that strategies of privatisation and deregulation have transformed the welfare 
state, particularly in the area of health, housing and education, with the specific aim of 
increasing the role of the private sector and decreasing peoples dependence on the 
'Nanny state'. The key concepts are now'consumer choice, 'ability to pay', 'efficiency 
and competitiveness', echoed in former Conservative Prime 
Minister John Major's 
'Citizen's Charter'. which views citizens as 'customers' of the state. The Charter, with 
its emphasis on consumers paying aTair price' 
for efficient public services, setting out 
contractual obligations of purchaser and provider could 
have been written by Adam 
Smith himself. Moreover, the obligations discussed in the government's companion 
report 'Encouraging Citizenship' are primarily concerned 
with the voluntary services 
192 
and charitable works performed by 'active citizens' to protect citizenship 'which is a 
gift of history, which can be lost or destroyed' p-xv (or maybe withheld? ) and maintain 
social order. There is little discussion of the state's obligation to protect the rights of 
citizens (once won but apparently mislaid!! ) and responsibilities for the well-being of 
its people. Indeed 'reciprocity' (so important to advocates of the benefactor argument, 
and Marshall in particular) does not appear to be a key concept unless it is in the 
contractual relationships of private producers and consumers. 
Thus, the 'active citizen' of the 1990s is very different from the citizen of 1945. In the 
post war conception, the 'active citizen' implied having the ability to participate fully in 
society which in turn required access to a wide variety of social services regardless of 
'ability to pay', rather than the voluntary services of the economically successful. 
Moreover, the post war state assumed a moral authority representing real aspirations 
for a fairer society - today if not a technical abstraction, it has become little more than 
a protection agency for private property. The erosion of a sense of community and 
reciprocal obligations and responsibilities was also evident in Britain's reluctance to 
become a signatory to the European Charter of social rights, which proposed extensive 
improvements in living and working conditions. Britain's opposition to the Social 
Charter was indicative of its hostility to the expansion of social rights and a more 
interventionist state, and it is heartening to see that the new Labour government will 
rectify this situation. 
To sum up: I have attempted to trace the development of citizenship with the aim of 
demonstrating how government policies both in defence and social welfare, have 
altered the nature of citizenship and the relationship of individuals to the state. 
I have 
focused on the Cold War period and the social implications of the 
'nuclear state' in 
order to draw attention to the external influence of 
foreign policies and defence on 
Britain's development both home and abroad. Given the now tenuous links between 
state and citizen, I have further argued that real security 
lies in redefining political 
obligation as self-assumed horizontal obligations with each other. 
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In discussing Britain's decline as a world power, one must of course acknowledge the 
profound influence of structural constraints such as changes in the global economy. 
However, it is not implausible to suggest that since 1945, the cumulative effects of 
industrial decline have been exacerbated by a political commitment to foreign policies 
and defensive strategies that Britain could ill-afford. The long-term costs of 
international priorities was domestic decline - overseas commitment diverted 
investment away from civilian industries into foreign markets and defence. The 
consequence has been social and spatial polarisation. We are witnessing a widening 
gap between the haves and the have-nots in terms of wealth, income and regional 
variations whereas inner-cities carry the burden of mass unemployment and industrial 
decay, with the South living off an international economic sector which itself is split. 
Financial and commercial services provide well-paid, non-manual employment at the 
one end but at the other, is low paid service employment in shops, restaurants and the 
like. 
Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the impact of New Right policy, although its 
version of Britains decline is quite different from the one outlined above. From this 
perspective, years of socialism and compromise which characterised the post war 
period have sapped the vitality of the nation. Morgan and Evans (1993) sum up the 
New Rights narrative in the following words: 
"The mission of Thatchers government in 1979 was to 'rekindle the spirit 
which the socialist years have all but exhaustedý Her historical heroes 
were not the 'common people' whose collective efforts carried Britain 
through World War II, but businessmen, financiers and entrepreneurs - 
'the people who built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the worldý In 
their image, Britain was offered a new reconstruction inspired by a 
moral commitment to individualism and the extension of market 
principles to every corner ofpublic and private life". (p. 151) 
In conclusion, it is evident that Marshall's optimistic assumption 
that the progress of 
citizenship is irreversible cannot be upheld. 
Indeed, the 1990s reconstruction of 
citizenship demonstrates that far from social rights 
being extended, existing rights born 
out of the post war reconstruction are 
being eroded. It is my belief that these rights 
cannot be regained, nor extended, until society not 
only adopts a collective image of 
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itself but also that the reciprocal (horizontal) obligations of citizens to each other are 
recognised and acted upon. 
The threat of nuclear annihilation is now ever-present. Because of the nature of 
nuclear weapons, nations have the power to destroy the world as we know it. No one 
can be sure how complete the destruction would be, but it is possible to envisage 
Schell's scenario of the earth becoming nothing more than 'a republic of insects and 
grass' (Schell 1982 Chap. 1). With the implications of 'nuclear militarism' so 
cataclysmic, it is not surprising that discussions dealing with the prevention of war 
have been resuscitated. 
Many believe it is now possible to envisage a world without war. This is because 
some of the chief justifications which led to war in the past, particularly the acquisition 
of new territories, have become less and less relevant in the contemporary world. We 
are living in an era where nation-states are fully established, with national citizens 
belonging behind recognised boundaries, part of a network of states which, in the 
main, do not covet each other's territories. Moreover, as stated earlier, unlike military 
research and development during 'mass militarism', nuclear war preparations have 
become too sophisticated for there to be many industrial spin-offs. Any useful 
research and development tends to favour fledgling industries such as micro-biology. 
It is widely held therefore that the technological sophistication of war has brought 
about a situation in which armed conflict serves no rational purpose. In a basic sense 
then, nuclear weapons have so altered the prospects of war that the problem can 
increasingly be seen as war itself. 
But returning to the conclusion made in Chapter Two for a moment, I have argued that 
the possibility of war cannot be ruled out. I suggested that war may serve a rational 
purpose, if its justification and sole aim is the pursuit of a 
'just peace', and that it 
satisfies the criteria of Jus in bello'. But 
is it possible that a 'just peace' may well be 
established in the future without resort to war? 
195 
With the end of the Cold War, many commentators hoped that the period that followed 
would signify a real peace. One such optimist is Francis Fukuyama (1989) who views 
the victory of liberal democracy and the elimination of world war as representing the 
fulfilment of the Hegelian'end of history', namely: 
"... the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (p. 50). 
This achievement is based less on any international mechanism than on fundamental 
ideological, social and economic transformations represented by the victory of the 
market and liberal democracy. The ultimate triumph will be a 'universal and 
homogeneous state' which is Hegel's final goal in history. 
Fukuyama's vision of the 'end of history' is deterministic and remarkably optimistic. 
First, it does not adequately address the compatibility of liberal democracy with peace. 
It takes little account of armed intervention (direct and indirect) by liberal democracies 
in conventional wars during the past 50 years. Nor the perceived threat to liberal 
democracy from 'new fanaticisms' - seen by Samuel Huntingdon as culminating in the 
'clash of civilisations'. For him, the 21 st century will witness the 'conflict of religions', 
one possible scenario being military conflict between the West and 
Confuciani sm/I slam (Foreign Affairs 72: 3 Summer 1993). Moreover, we must also 
question the assumption that liberal democracy itself, as a universal state, will 
guarantee a world of order and peace. Pierre Hassner (1993) has this to say: 
"Liberal democracy is the regime which tries unlike all other societies, 
not to embody the unity of the community in a sacred leader and not to 
embody evil and violence in a scapegoat, domestic or externaL Precisely 
because of that, it is always in danger of being challenged by the thirst 
for absolutes, or by the need to find an enemy. The totalitarian 
temptation is the ever-occuring companion of individualistic democracy, 
just as the risk of blind self-destruction is the ever recurring consequence 
of the declining relevance o war"(p. 755) ýf 
Hassner's view takes on board Freud's notion of the 
'return of the repressed' In the 
context of war, civilisation leads to the aggressive or 
destructive instinct being turned 
inwards and transformed into self hatred, which re-asserts 
itself as destructive violence 
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against others. This approach has also been taken up by Michael Ignatieff in his book 
"Blood and Belonging" (1993) which points to the way in which homogenisation has 
encouraged the revival of nationalism. Could it be then, as Freud suggested that 
ffmen can substitute lovefor aggression within a community: as long as there remains another one on which they can vent their need to hate "? (ibid). 
I have already questioned the biological determinism of such a view in Chapter Two 
but to repeat for the benefit of the present discussion, I suggest that assuming the 
biological element of innate aggression does exist (and the evidence is far from 
conclusive) it does not necessarily follow that this 'instinct' leads to war, or the urge to 
kill. Of far greater significance are political and socioeconomic relations between 
communities and states. 
Thus, despite containing an element of truth (transitions to democracy have been 
taking place at a higher rate today than any other time in the twentieth century), the re- 
emergence of nationalist and separatist tendencies as well as the reassertion of 
religious fundamentalism continue to undermine the realisation of Fukuyama's 
prophecy. I suggest that far from speaking of the 'end of history', we should be 
focusing upon the 'sense' or course of history, that is, the nature of historical processes 
shaping the present phase of militarism and future directions. One philosophy which is 
founded on a historical conception is Marxism. 
Central to a Marxist perspective is the theory of historical materialism. For Marx, 
history has been above all, the history of class struggle, from the moment a division of 
labour and the principle of private property were established. I have discussed Marx's 
conception of social change elsewhere - here I want to apply the theory of 
historical 
materialism to war in the sense that the means of violence should 
be understood and 
judged within the context of the socioeconomic and political relations 
in which they 
are produced and used. Underlying the politics of war 
then, should be a historical 
understanding of the present phase of war. 
It is therefore a pragmatic approach rather 
than an absolute position either 
for or against armed conflict. If we adopt this 
approach, the kind of questions we need 
to ask would include; whether the political 
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goals to be achieved through resort to military action are legitimate in themselves; 
whether there are any other means of furthering them, and whether the means proposed 
will really achieve what is intended without causing new problems that will outweigh 
any positive results. These questions must be addressed within a historical context 
which recognises the present historical phase of nuclear warfare. So, in this age of 
'nuclear militarism', where do the greatest risks to security lie; and what should be the 
nature of our response? 
THR-EATS TO SECURITY: PERCEIVED AND REAL 
MILITARY THREATS 
The nuclear capabilities of states have imposed a kind of paralysis on the use of force 
among the major powers- hence the most useful application of this mode of warfare is 
seen in terms of deterrence. So does this imply that the military threat to security is 
diminishing? 
Because the use of force can have swift and devastating effects, and because of the 
continuing reverence given to the concept of 'national sovereignty', military threats 
retain a prominence in issues of national security, at least theoretically. Types of 
military threat may be direct (eg territorial seizures, invasions, bombardment of 
populations etc. ) or indirect, in the sense that they are directed at interests outside the 
state itself (eg threats to strategically placed territories, shipping 
lanes etc. ). A good 
example of the latter is the West's preoccupation with the security of oil supplies 
in the 
Gulf. However, territorial boundaries have become more or less firmly established 
within the international system, thus defence or acquisition of 
territory has become less 
relevant in recent years. Why then, 
does territoriality continue to be accorded the 
highest priority in national security concerns? 
The answer lies in the historical 
development of nation-states. 
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Throughout centuries of consolidation of the nation-state idea, the issue of non- 
intervention was considered to be a fundamental right of states. Military intervention 
has been deemed illegitimate by the right of self-determination of each nation which 
precluded foreign interference in their domestic affairs. It is a principle that continues 
to be endorsed by international bodies such as the LN which has traditionally 
intervened only when obtaining the consent of the government of the affected countries 
or warring parties. Despite some examples of decisions being over ridden (in the case 
of Iraq withholding consent), UN responses are far from consistent. UN action in the 
Gulf was swift, yet there have been a number of situations such as Bosnia, Somalia, 
and Rwanda in which the principle of non-intervention was (almost too conveniently) 
applied. 
The idea of territorial sovereignty, together with grandiose illusions of imperial might, 
help explain why, despite the end of the Cold War, Britain's international and defence 
policies reflect, (what I hope to show to be) an outdated view of the global situation. 
The Ministry of Defence is symbolic of the belief that wars are deterred by greater 
military strength and increased arms spending. In 1993/4, the UK defence budget was 
estimated at nearly f, 23.5 billion - f-200 per year for each man, woman and child. We 
spend about 3.7% of GNP on defence compared with the European average of 2.7%. 
A large part of this spending pays for the least useful element of Britain's defence 
commitments - nuclear weapons. The official estimate of the cost of 
Trident, for 
example, is f 10,518 million (f 33,085 million according to Greenpeace) and Britain has 
squandered billions of pounds on nuclear deterrence that is militarily useless. Indeed 
it 
is the proliferation of conventional weapons that is now recognised as a more serious 
threat to national security. 
Britain is one of the world's top six arms suppliers with 
its Defence Sales Organisation 
putting considerable resources into promoting arms exports and 
showing little regard 
for ethical issues. For example, 
despite the Export of Goods (Control) Order which 
9 aives the government the power 
to ban exports to governments responsible for 
sustained human rights violations, 
the Gulf War and the Matrix-Churchill affair show 
how this policy is subject to abuse. 
The recent scandal surrounding the Malaysia dam 
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project is yet another example of the corrupt practice of the arms industry using 
international aid to secure defence contracts. 
Simpson (1994) points to 4 failings in Britain's defence and security programme. First, 
by defining 'national security' in largely military terms; second, by exaggerating the 
effectiveness of a military response to threats to security; third, by extending beyond 
what is required in military terms to defend Britain, thus fuelling an international arms 
race; and finally, by refusing to acknowledge that the pursuit of peace and national 
security is a human rather than a military process. (p. 7) Simpson's first and final points 
are ones with which I wholeheartedly concur. Indeed, the remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to showing what, in my view, is the true nature of our security risks. I will 
argue that military considerations are no longer our priority on the security agenda - 
more important are economic issues and, by implication, ecological concerns. 
ECONOMIC THREATS. 
There are strong arguments that the economic system of liberal democracy (i. e.: global 
capitalism) can operate to increase the likelihood of the use of force - through the 
process of unequal development. Both within and between states, the operation of the 
market creates patterns of wealth and poverty, advantage and disadvantage, growth and 
stagnation. Could it be that the greatest threat to security comes from economic and 
ecological rather than military sources? This seems to be the view of the UN in its 
document'Agenda for Peace': 
"Poverty, disease., faminey oppression and despair abound, joining to 
produce 17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons and massive 
migrations of people within and beyond national 
borders. These are 
both sources and consequences of conflicts that require the ceaseless 
attention and the highest priority in the efforts of the 
United Nations. A 
porous ozone shield couldpose a greater threat to an exposed population 
than a hostile army. Drought and 
disease can decimate no less 
mercilessly that the weapons of war. 
So at this moment of renewed 
opportunity, the efforts of the 
(UX) Organisation to buildpeace, stability 
and security must encompass matters 
beyond military threats, to break 
thefetters of strife and warfare that have characterised 
the past. " (p. 7) 
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There is little doubt that the gap between rich and poor is widening. In 1960 the 
richest 20% of the world's population has 30 times the income of the poorest 20%. By 
1989, this polarisation had accelerated to 60 times the income of the poorest. Over 1.2 
billion people or 23% of the world's population live in absolute poverty, unable to 
satisfy even the most basic biological needs for food, clothing and shelter. This 
polarisation is the product of long-term and deep-seated developments in the 
international economy, particularly exploitation by global corporations (TNCs) who 
have outgrown the capacities of national governments to deal with them. The number 
of global corporations now have resources substantially larger than most nation-states, 
possessing the financial reserves and flexibility to shift their operations in search of the 
most profitable returns on investment. For example, TNCs have systematically 
transferred significant portions of their capital to European, Latin American and East 
Asian societies Vhere labour costs are lower or markets are better. Today we have a 
global market in which demand for the finished product is relatively insensitive to its 
place of manufacture. With their monopolies on technology, access to large amount of 
capital, and capacity to transfer factors of production from country to country, TNC 
expansion has generated multiple and volatile inequalities which create instability and 
insecurity on an international and national scale. In the pursuit of short-term profit and 
long-term power, the responsibilities and loyalties of TNCs are not to their workers in 
different countries in which they operate, nor to governments, but to their own 
corporate interest. 
A TNC-dominated economy exacerbates not only global inequality but also domestic 
income inequality. In countries of the 'developing South', the gains from trade and 
profit of the TNCs have tended to be concentrated in the higher income classes. 
Moreover, the political interests of foreign investors (backed by international agencies) 
have supported governments committed to inegalitarian 
domestic distributive policies. 
In the case of the 'industrialised North', TNC activity 
has made labour markets more 
unequal. Wages of manual and non-manual workers are 
becoming subject to 
downward pressures and recasualisation; large-scale unemployment 
has returned and 
national governments are becoming 
less interventionist because they are subject 
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themselves to the manipulative powers of TNCs and international agencies alike. 
Earlier I cited the example of London where the effects of intemationalisation can 
clearly be seen. London has become a service centre for TNCs and international 
agencies which has exacerbated the trend of inequality already in operation in Britain 
as a result of New Right social policies. Senior executives and professionals enjoy 
high salaries at one end of the international labour force while service workers suffer 
low pay and few employment rights at the other. 
The political and economic powers of the TNCs have had profound effects on 
international and national distribution. Also influencing the global distribution of 
income and wealth are international agencies, laws and conventions. For example, the 
policies of the IMF and World Bank cannot be regarded as redistributive. Add to this 
the system of international property rights which assigns exclusive ownership and 
control of territory and its natural resources to a recognised government of the society 
established on it, and we can see that redistributive policies at both international and 
national level are severely restricted. These factors which help fuel the insatiable 
appetite of the global market economy lead us to the final security risk examined in 
this chapter - the ecological threat. 
ECOLOGICAL THREATS. 
With the dramatic increase in the scale, diversity and pace of human activity this 
century, and with the rapid expansion of knowledge about the ecosystem, the 
environmental threat is no longer a background factor in security issues. The increase 
in human activity is beginning visibly to affect the conditions for life on earth and 
because the free market is the main force driving the expansion of human activity, we 
may argue that its continued operation is part of the ecological threat. 
Greenhouse gasses and ozone-eating chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) from industrial 
societies may change the temperature of 
the ecosystem. Pollution and direct assaults 
on the environment (eg. fishing, mining, 
forestry etc. ) resulting from economic activity 
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may eventually precipitate a disaster that will significantly threaten many species 
living on the planet. In terms of human cost, the greenhouse effect may bring about a 
rise in sea-level that will inundate many low-lying areas. For example, the inundation 
of the Nile and Bengal deltas alone would put at risk the homes and livelihoods of 46 
million people (Singer 1994. p. 268). 
However, attempts to combat the ecological threat need also to acknowledge and 
challenge the double standards of the industrialised North. For example, it may well 
be that economic participation by developing countries has exacerbated the 
environmental problem, but calls for restraint are not enough to halt the destruction. 
The deforestation policies of Brazil, for instance, have been met with condemnation by 
countries in the West (who have apparently forgotten their role in their own 
deforestation). Like industrialised countries before it, Brazil continues to claim the 
right to destroy their forests as part of their development process. For the Brazilians, 
the West's calls for restraint is simply a strategy to keep the former subservient to the 
latter. 
Having examined the major threats to security, I would argue that economic factors are 
a greater risk to stability and security than military considerations. Consequently, the 
pursuit of peace needs to address and transform the nature and operation of the 
economic system itself. 
The previous section drew our attention to defence and foreign policies that fuel the 
arms trade at the expense of peace-keeping and peace-building; to mass population 
migrations driven by poverty and persecution; to ethnic and religious antagonisms; and 
to environmental pollution and destruction. I 
have highlighted the ways in which the 
power of TNCs and international agencies maintain and 
increase the gap between rich 
and poor, North and South. I 
have further argued that we can no longer afford to 
persist with strategies and policies which 
have helped create a world where insecurity 
and unpredictability reign supreme. 
It is a world of turbulence in which economic and 
technological globalisation is undermining the ability of nation-states 
to manage their 
own affairs, including 
domestic markets. The post-Cold War world is still a world in 
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which foreign policies continue to be built upon division, under-development and 
domination, with even greater emphasis on economic superiority since the declining 
significance of ideology. With the end of the Cold War period, the role of new 
security pacts will be, in the words of former NATO commander Sir James Eberle: 
"... to serve as plafformsfor launchingforces to ensure our access to key 
resources in the Third World. 'The new divide is not one of ideology hut 
of prosperity'. Military alliances will still he needed to confront those 
who do not recognise the 'norms of civilisation' about who should be the 
haves, and who should be the have-nots. (New Zealand Listener 
817191) 
The assumption behind the above quote appears to be that the 'haves' can only live 
comfortably at the expense of the 'have-nots'. If this conventional dichotomy between 
rich and poor holds, most citizens of rich nations should benefit from the 
impoverishment of most citizens in the poor nations. I suggest that the more 
accurately we depict exploitative international relations, the weightier the moral 
obligations of the citizens of the rich nations to those of the poor will appear. We saw 
in Chapter 3 how this situation has led philosophers such as Peter Singer to advocate 
an 'obligation to assist' - that is, a natural duty of individuals in the rich nations to help 
the starving elsewhere. Thus, in view of the increasingly visible global distributive 
inequalities and environmental deterioration, it is apparent that the 'haves' can only live 
safely if the 'have-nots' do as well. The basis of survival in the future must be 
sustainable economics and redistributive policies rather than immoral exploitation. 
This, in turn,, implies a commitment to a system of global distributive justice, which for 
us, are the principles of the good society writ large. It follows that the legitimacy of 
national territory, identity and sovereignty, which inhibit the application of global 
principles Of justice, must be reassessed. 
The major justification for the legitimisation of national territorial 
boundaries has been 
based on a supposed cultural reality. 
That is, national boundaries enable culturally 
distinct peoples to build political 
institutions within which they live in a manner 
specific to that group, preserving, cultivating 
and transmitting their own traditions. 
Thus, national territorial boundaries 
foster national identities. So maybe territory is not 
the basic issue. What justifies the 
boundaries of territorial states is cultural identity, 
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including the historical investment of labour within those boundaries. It is because 
groups of people recognise themselves (and are recognised by others) as members (and 
workers) of one community, and view others as 'outsiders', 'aliens, and 'foreigners', that 
they can legitimately aim to establish states that are divided from other states by 
boundaries. This justification is reinforced by the supposed feeling of affiliation to 
nations and communities that is not merely a matter of preference, but the basis of a 
profound sense of self and identity of the persons so linked. Such a view can be traced 
back to Edmund Burke who argued that rights could only be said to belong to 
individuals as members of a nationality, not as individuals. (The Works' 1907) More 
recent conservative writers (eg. Scruton, Powell, Casey etc. ) define nationhood as an 
'instinctive' feeling of belonging to a common group, and being bound to it by 
sentiments of affection, piety, collective pride and loyalty. 
In short then, to have a national identity is to have certain beliefs and sentiments 
(including a sense of history) that are 'instinctive' and permanent - deeply embedded 
within us in a way that is much more profound than, say, our sense of national 
citizenship. We can say this even when national identity is construed along biological 
lines. For example, it may well be that the majority population have blue eyes and 
blond hair, or brown eyes and dark hair, but it is individuals operating within a social 
context who decide that genes matter. That is, it is we who choose to cluster people on 
the basis of their physical appearance. I would argue therefore, that states may make 
use of territory or biology, but they are not defined or constituted by them. 
Having examined the justifications for national territorial boundaries, it is not difficult 
to see how such arguments may run into problems. First is the assumption of a single 
national identity, for national identities may be multiple 
(see O'Neill 1996 for an 
excellent discussion of this issue). For example, 
I may see myself as Welsh and 
British which may be unproblematic to me and most others - to 
be Irish and British 
however is more complicated. In Northern Ireland 
I may be viewed as Irish or British 
depending on political affiliation and/or religious 
belief. Similarly, the 'safety' of being 
German and Jewish depends on the time 
in which you live. my point is that national 
identities may be multiple and historically malleable. 
Multiple identities that seem 
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coherent and compatible in one historical period may be brought into tension and 
conflict at others. Thus, given that a sense of national identity is to possess a profound 
set of beliefs and sentiments, like other beliefs and sentiments, no matter how deeply- 
held, they are not permanently fixed and are, therefore, open to change. Moreover, to 
take issue with the argument from labour - that to cultivate and develop the resources 
within one's territory is to strengthen the legitimacy of national identity and territory - 
this too is questionable. At most, labour may claim a surplus, but it is a claim that may 
be overridden by the needs of others. The fact that someone happens to located 
advantageously with respect to scarce resources for example, is not a justification why 
others should be excluded form the benefits that may be derived from them, and we 
can extend this to include national territories. No one has a 'prima facie' claim to the 
resources under ones feet, thus we can view the natural distribution of resources as 
arbitrary. Furthermore, we have seen that resource-poor societies need to be assisted in 
realising socioeconomic conditions sufficient to promote a just peace. 
Once we begin to perceive 'national identity' as something constituted, not 'instinctive' 
nor given, appeals to national identity to justify state territorial boundaries are 
unconvincing. Indeed, we can turn the argument on its head and suggest that rather 
than state boundaries being adjusted to take account of national identity, national 
identity can or should be adjusted to take account of such boundaries. In either case, in 
our good society with its principles of distributive justice, national identity has no 
place - individuals are bound together by reciprocal obligations on a global scale - the 
citizen has an international identity. 
In sum, by idealising national territory and identity, we obscure our 
interdependence 
with others and the fact that we share a world with them. 
It is a strategy that excludes 
I outsiders' from all moral concern and prohibits activities such as mobility, residence, 
receipt of welfare, political participation and so on. 
Moreover, those deemed as having 
the 'wrong' identity have often been 
forced to relocate through policies such as 
deportation and 'ethnic cleansing' - practices all 
the more unjust given that a slngle 
sense of identity is rarely 
found in all who share a given territory. Attempts to 
legitimise territorial boundaries through national 
identity are an affront to our 
206 
conception of justice that asserts that there are universal human rights and universal 
standards of justice. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING RE- s 
Against the backcloth of socioeconomic and political inequalities described throughout 
this thesis, I have argued that there is a fundamental problem with the political 
obligation assumed to exist in liberal democratic society. I suggested that only the 
most privileged members - that is, the socially and economically advantaged with the 
greatest political influence could be said to owe such an obligation. This conclusion 
was drawn through an application of the benefactor argument - the idea that a political 
obligation exists through the formal rights of citizenship bestowed on individuals by 
the state. A critical examination of these 'benefits" indicated that this justification for 
political obligation is seriously flawed. This is particularly the case when we discuss 
that obligation under severe pressure of circumstance - the unlimited and unconditional 
obligation to kill or to die for the state in war. I examined the parent, consent and 
benefactor arguments for obedience and concluded that the liberal democratic state 
cannot legitimately demand that citizens die or kill on its behalf. Any obligation to 
serve in the military should be viewed, at best, as a legal obligation not a moral one. 
I also suggested that the phenomenon of war should be explored in contexts of both the 
individual (patriotism, pacifism and conscientious objection) and the social, hence my 
focus on the laws of war encapsulated in just war theory. Having analysed the criteria 
set out for J us ad bellum' 0 ustice of war) and 'j us in bello' 0 ustice in war), I accepted 
that just war theory is a useful framework for analysing the initiation and conduct of 
war, but rejected the principle of 'military necessity' (which permitted jus ad bellum 
criteria to override that of jus in bello by using 
indefensible means). I did not, 
therefore, rule out the permissibility of waging war (given the particular set of 
circumstances of each case) nor the political obligation of citizens 
to participate in such 
a war (if the aim is the protection of a good society and 
the promotion of a just peace). 
I then proceeded to identify the 
key components for the construction of a good society 
through which the foundations of a 
just peace would be laid. In this democratic ideal, 
political obligation would 
be conceived as a horizontal relationship - an obligation 
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citizens owe to each other. To construct such an ideal was to provide a context within 
which citizen participation is maximised -a conception of democracy which does not 
abstract the political from the common life. Indeed, the political represents a collective 
dimension of the social. Thus, political life in my good society is a collective 
experience because the citizen is first and foremost a social being. From this starting- 
point of democracy as self-rule, I then developed a theory of distributive justice which 
identified liberty and equality as the two most fundamental principles for the 
satisfaction of the basic human needs of physical health and autonomy, and identified a 
number of social policies required for the satisfaction of intermediate needs. 
Moreover,, for these needs to be human needs, and for their satisfaction to be human 
rights, I argued that principles of social justice in the good society must be applied on a 
global scale. In a society where citizens enjoy the good life, in fact, are the common 
life, the political obligation to risk one's life on its behalf may therefore exist, in order 
to fulfil the moral obligation to protect and promote the values and principles of such 
an existence, which in turn connect with the protection and promotion of a just peace. 
Nevertheless, my critique of the benefactor argument, particularly within the context of 
war, would have remained incomplete without some reference to the empirical 
evidence suggesting that the extension of citizenship through participation in total war 
had reinforced the political obligation to die and to kill for the liberal democratic state. 
To this end, I moved away from a philosophical discussion and adopted an 
historical 
approach in order to explore these claims. Through tracing the 
development of social 
citizenship, I concluded that wartime participation may 
have fuelled social reform, thus 
strengthening the reciprocal relationship 
between citizen and state, but such reforms 
were modest in nature. I argued that citizenship, as conceptualised 
from the 
perspective of my good society, cannot 
be reconciled with capitalist relations and 
institutions, nor sit comfortably alongside 
the inequalities generated by a free market 
economy. 
However, despite the shortcomings of the postwar view of citizenship 
(as compared 
with that of the good society), 
we found that in comparison with the conception now 
being formulated in the 1990s, it was much wider 
in scope, clearly setting out the 
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reciprocal duties and obligations of citizen and state in terms of participation and 
rights. Today, this relationship has fundamentally changed. Again, by turning the 
benefactor argument (used to justify political obligation through the dialectic of total 
war and social reform) on its head, we can argue that in the nuclear age, the link 
between citizen and state has been considerably weakened. In terms of mass 
participation, the nuclear state (as opposed to the 'military-democratic' state) no longer 
requires such duties from its citizens which, from the point of view of reciprocity, begs 
the question of what duties and obligations the nuclear state now owes in return? 
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POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND CIT IZENSHIP IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 
I have tried to demonstrate, through an examination of recent welfare reforms, that 
state protection through the extension of social rights is being withdrawn - and to 
accommodate this new relationship between state and citizen, a new conception of 
citizenship is being formulated. 
In the past, social reforms such as free education, health care and aid to meet the cost 
of sickness, unemployment and old age, together with a sense of national identity 
reinforced by two world wars, were needed to maintain a state which recognised, to 
some degree, a range of duties towards its citizens, including the obligation to reward 
for the sacrifices of war. Moreover, the state was buttressed by a hierarchical society 
in which deference and obedience to authority were the norm. But the nuclear state is 
now shedding its responsibilities towards its citizens. Job insecurity is increasing, 
welfare services are decreasing, and traditional avenues of participation, such as local 
government and trade unions, are becoming less accessible. Moreover, as local 
goverm-nent is being stripped of many of its political and financial powers, much 
political decision-making has passed to non-elected quangos - raising issues of 
democratic accountability as elected politicians increasingly disclaim responsibility for 
policy decisions. 
The loss of resources provided by the state has had its greatest impact on the poor. 
Social inequality has increased, raising fears about the consequences of the growth of 
an 'underclass' with minimum attachment to society. 
For theorists such as Geoff 
Mulgan, architect of the new Labour government's unit on 
'social exclusion', the 
answer appears to lie in the world of paid employment which requires 
the retention of a 
flexible labour market with relatively low wages. 
Hence, the new concept of the 
'active society' which holds that the 
best way for governments to address social 
problems is through the promotion of 
activity (narrowly conceived) - that is, paid 
employment through the market. 
It is an argument which implies that the market is the 
only true source for the satisfaction 
of human desires and needs, just as participation in 
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paid employment is the key to self-esteem. Thus, training is viewed as the panacea for 
many of our social and economic ills, and the way forward is not through social policy 
as generally understood, but through'active labour-market policy'. 
The problem with such concepts as 'the active society', which place emphasis on the 
insider/outsider division within the sphere of paid employment, is that they tend to 
ignore first, the growing problem of structural unemployment and of working poverty, 
both of which must be located within the nature and operation of the capitalist system 
itself, and second, the broader factors which affect the terms on which people, 
especially women, are able to work - the sexual division of labour for example. 
In my view, therefore, we need to address not only economic participation but also 
political participation. I have argued that the concepts of citizenship and political 
participation are intertwined, and recent reforms illustrate the ways in which a 
narrower citizenship makes for a narrower participation. Loss of regular employment 
has reduced the scope for links with trade unions, and political parties have shown 
little interest in seeking the support of those at the bottom of the social scale. It is a 
reciprocal indifference as the poor in turn reject many of the institutions and values of 
liberal democratic society, including the voting mechanism. Neither is this 
disillusionment confined to disadvantaged groups. Empirical evidence suggests that 
citizens are increasingly questioning their obligation to the nuclear state. Respect for 
the law has fallen, with only 41% believing in 1994 that 'the law should always be 
obeyed' compared with 57% in 1984. (British 
Social Attitudes 1995, reported in The 
Guardian 22/11/95 p. 2-5) Moreover, the figures of Miller et al (1996) showed 49% 
believing it right to obey an unjust law. (p. 
47) Of course, Optimists could argue that 
Such figures reflect the existence of a 
better-informed, more articulate citizenry, yet it 
may also suggest a growing public alienation. 
Given the nature of welfare change as outlined above, 
it is plausible to argue that the 
nuclear state is becoming more 
remote from its citizens, and has thus become less 
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sensitive to their needs. It no longer requires nor desires mass participation for its 
protection, only economic participation, through encouraging citizens to prevent their 
own human capital from becoming obsolescent by updating their skills. The citizen 
must thus become an individual capitalist. The nuclear state's obligation is shifting 
away from the provision of social rights to a focus on 'political' rights, particularly 
those associated with consumerism, as set out in the 'Citizens Charter, for example. 
But such rights have little to do with citizenship in any meaningful sense - the focus is 
on individuals with little regard for the wider needs of society. And the obligation of 
the citizen is also individualised - the obligation to support oneself. The debate now is 
'citizenship as entitlement versus citizenship as self-reliance' with the nuclear state 
favouring the latter end of the continuum. 
This reformulated conception of citizenship has serious implications for political 
obligation and the legitimacy of the liberal democratic nuclear state. Fundamental is 
the question of what form political obligation should take in a nuclear society -a 
question inextricably linked to the notion of citizenship. 
The shift in the relationship between citizen and the nuclear state serves to reinforce 
the need for a reassessment of political obligation as a horizontal relationship owed by 
citizens to each other. The nuclear state's separation of its military and social 
apparatuses and its increasing abdication of duties and obligations, has distanced itself 
from its citizenry. With this withdrawal of protection, citizens must turn to each other 
for their security, all the more urgent in an age where minimal political input coexists 
with the potential threat of mass destruction. The route to achieving a real sense of 
security lies in building a sense of citizenship in which a good society and a 
just peace 
can flourish. It is a conception that implies participation, reciprocity, cooperation and 
interaction between parties sharing common interests and values. The good citizen 
respects the needs of others and acknowledges 
that the satisfaction of those needs is an 
essential Prerequisite for the maintenance and extension 
of the good life. In the nuclear 
world then, the security of each citizen 
is dependent upon the security of every other - 
we must view ourselves as global citizens. 
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I have explained why principles of social justice in the good society need to be applied 
on a global scale. But moral concerns apart, I need only to emphasise interdependence 
for it to logically follow that confinement of such principles to the good society has the 
effect of 'taxing' poor or unjust regimes so that we may benefit from living in a just 
society. Moreover, if evidence of global economic and political interdependence 
shows the existence of global social cooperation, we should not view national 
boundaries as having fundamental moral significance. Since interdependence and 
cooperation transcend national territories, then such boundaries do not set the limits of 
moral obligations. Moreover, my reply to the argument that the extension of economic 
and cultural relationships beyond national borders undermines the moral legitimacy of 
the nation-state is, this is my intention, for only through such a perspective can we 
challenge the principle of non-intervention and speak of a just peace. 
My critics may still pose the following question: What purpose can any discussion of 
global redistribution serve in the absence of coercive international institutions, capable 
of coordinating and enforcing redistributive policies? Such a question does emphasise 
the importance of devising such mechanisms, or adjust those which presently promote 
inegalitarian policies. A starting-point could be the development of supra-national 
policies to protect citizens from the undemocratic power of global capital which 
generates employment, income and environmental insecurity. What the above 
question does not do, however, is undermine the force of redistributive obligations. 
Political and economic institutions are not something 'out there', fixed and immutable, 
they exist and function because they are rooted in society and society 
is capable of 
transforming itself. Hence my emphasis on political participation as a crucial aspect of 
citizenship. It does not follow, therefore, that the 
lack of effective global institutions at 
present makes impossible global principles of 
justice. 
The purpose of ideal theory 
is, after all, to prescribe standards that serve as goals of 
political change in the non-ideal world - 
assuming that my good society can, in due 
course, be achieved. 
The ideal cannot be undermined simply by pointing out that it 
cannot be achieved at present. 
Only impediments that are unalterable and unavoidable 
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can lay claim to the impossibility of an ideal, and I have hopefully demonstrated that in 
the construction of my good society, no such impediments exist. To reiterate the point 
which underpins my ideal theory, there is no evidence to suggest that it is somehow 
given in the nature of things that people can neither develop sufficient motivation for 
compliance, nor evolve institutions capable of enforcing global principles of justice. I 
have not claimed that such tasks are easy but that is not what my ideal theory requires. 
It requires only that the necessary changes are possible. Thus, through my advocation 
of the good society, I may well be navigating a map which still leaves many areas 
unexplored, but I believe that those who reject out of hand the possibility of bringing 
about a just society and a just peace have no map at all. 
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